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HARRy W. HAiNES
Now the sons of-bitches are killing us back home.
—Army combat medic at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 
reacting to ihe Newsweek report of the killings of war 
protesters at Kent State University, his alma mater,
1970.
I put in Jor three tours o f duly. /,was in a position to keep 
people alive. I had influence over an entire province. I put my 
men to work helping with the harvest. They put up buildings.
Once the NVA understood what I was doing,they eased up. I'm 
talking to you about a de facto bxice, you understand. The war 
stopped in most o f the province. It’s the kind o f history that 
doesn’t get recorded. Few people even know that it happened, 
and no one will ever admit that it happened.
—U.S. Army Colonel, in a university library, 1974.
We learned how to cheat on the numbers. We worked with the 
computers that were used to call in artillery shells and we 
cheated. And we were good! We put those shells where they 
couldn’t hurt anybody. Some people probably got killed, but 
not as many, and not in the villes.
—Vietnam veteran, on a train between San Francisco 
and Salt Inke City, 1974.
Anecdotal data. A combat medic weeps for the Kent Slate war 
dead, a career officer speaks proudly of soldiers who avoided battle, a son 
of a pioneer Mormon family takes patriotic pride in misguided missiles. 
The Vietnam war’s ideological contradictions produced experiences 
which were so fractured and seemingly disconnected from the on-going 
story of America that Peter Ehrenhaus suggests it was “the first 
postmodern war.”1 And so perhaps Rick Berg expects too much when he 
complains that cultural forms have failed to adequately represent the 
war’s meaning:2 perhaps our culture is simply unable to process the 
debris of ideological crisis. Still, some of us who survived the Vietnam 
war both at home and abroad have some reason to hope that a broader 
range of interpretations might one day unfold in American films, 
television series, and novels and—most importantly—in the public 
rituals central to our national political life. And that hope guides the 
writers whose essays are presented in this special issue of Vietnam 
Generation.
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I have astonished my students and angered some of my fellow 
veterans by pointing out that many American soldiers opposed the 
Vietnam war and took action to limit U.S. military effectiveness. This 
action included the refusal of orders, the assassination of officers, the 
distribution of antiwar propaganda, union-like organizing, desertion, 
sabotage and a general noncompliance with military objectives. By 
1970, American political and military leaders could not longer depend on 
U.S. troops to perform their mission in Vietnam. There developed an 
amorphous, often uncoordinated “GI Resistance,” reflecting a broad 
ideological spectrum and including soldiers who took action individually 
or in groups. This important component of our national experience in 
Vietnam is part of the war’s submerged history. It is not well documented. 
And it is subject to revisionist interpretations which identify television 
news coverage of the war, civilian antiwar activists, or some other factor 
as the “cause” of “morale problems” among the troops. To identify the 
GI Resistance as a significant component of the Vietnam war experience 
is to risk the incredulity of the young, the charge of host ility from certain 
veterans' groups, and the accusation of partisanship from revisionist 
academics. The hegemonic process whereby a discredited political elite 
re-establishes its ideological dominance has resulted in the positioning 
of the Vietnam veteran as a sign of consensus; discussions of antiwar 
soldiers go against the grain, because such discussions threaten the 
positioning of the Vietnam veteran as a sign— a witness— of ideological 
crisis.3
This special issue of Vietnam Generation is intended to provoke 
debate and to encourage continued scholarly examination of the GI 
Resistance. Many of the contributors conceptualize this special issue as 
an attempt to bring the GI Resistance from the margins, to position it as 
a major topic within the ongoing struggle over the war’s meaning.'1 
Additionally, some of us conceptualize this effort in explicitly ideological 
terms. We are laying claim to aspects of the lived social experience of the 
Vietnam war, and we mean to help set the circumstances in which the 
Vietnam veteran can expand his or her range of postwar interpretations 
and subjectivity. The importance of this objective requires some 
explanation of the Vietnam veteran’s developing role as a sign within the 
ideological struggle over the war’s meaning.
David Rabe’s 1972 play. Sticks and Bones, predicted the immediate 
postwar fate of the Vietnam veteran.5 Adapting the conventions of the 
television situation comedy, Rabe located the war’s ideological crisis 
within the family relationships of Ozzie, Harriet, David and Rick, 
characters borrowed from the radio and TV series, The Adventures of 
Ozzie and Harriet. Older brother David returns from Vietnam, and his 
war stories shatter the family’s complacency. David challenges the 
family’s unthinking commitment to anticommunism and racism. Harriet 
vomits when she learns about his Vietnamese lover, whom Ozzie calls 
"some yellow fucking whore.” David is the quintessential pain-in-fhe- 
ass, and he identifies the contradictions of American policy in Vietnam.
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Body bags pile up on the living room floor. Unable to withstand his 
stories and unwilling to accept the ghost of his Vietnamese lover, his 
family conspires to kill David or, rather, they convince him to commit 
suicide. Ever the good natured younger brother, Rick asks, “Do you want 
to use my razor, Dave?”
But, as Ozzie says, David “only nearly dies,” and the play’s final 
scene reduces his presence to an extreme close-up of his face, projected 
on a color slide. Identified as “somebody sick,” the projected image 
signifies both David’s removal from discourse and the veteran’s 
decontextualized maladjustment. The Vietnam veteran “dies” in the 
sense t hat he no longer speaks. His lived experience of ideological crisis 
is muted. David’s troublesome memories become products of his own 
psychosis, disconnected from any sociological or political realities.
Rabe’s play was considered “controversial” in the early 1970s, 
and CBS postponed the broadcast of a television adaptation when the 
original air-date coincided with the return of American POWs from 
Hanoi. At the same time, CBS and other television networks felt free 
enough to represent Vietnam veterans as psychopathic murderers and 
witless victims in prime-time adventure dramas of the period.6 The war’s 
ideological crisis made the veteran a volatile sign, just as Rabe’s play 
predicted, and cultural forms operated to constrain this sign as best they 
could. The veteran emerged as the product of an elaborate therapeutic 
discipline, composed of strategies which played out in a variety of 
communication channels, ranging from the political speech to prime­
time television. These strategies produced the veteran’s immediate 
socio-political niche: inexplicably troubled, haunted by a war we will 
never understand and—above all—in need of periodic therapy or sedation 
to keep him from doing violence. Under these conditions of ideological 
containment, antiwar soldiers were easily positioned as merely one 
component in a population of crazies. They, like David Rabe’s protagonist, 
were removed from discourse in a period labeled by New York Times 
reporter Fox Butterfield as our “trance of collective amnesia.”
The rituals associated with the introduction of the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial provided the veteran an opportunity to again speak. 
The Memorial returned Rabe’s protagonist to discourse, and other 
cultural forms soon positioned him as the object of political rehabilitation. 
Belated homecoming parades (reenactments of V-J Day), films, t elevision 
crime-adventure series, and political speeches signaled a new 
respectability for the Vietnam veteran. No longer the psychotic or victim, 
he emerged as a World War Two poser, a sign of heroic commitment to 
fundamental principles. The veteran’s new respectability demonstrates 
the process of hegemony, the process whereby an ideological bloc 
establishes a dominant position within an array of social institutions.7 
Here is the Vietnam veteran’s newly attained niche: while others 
(namely, reporters, civilian antiwar activists and weak-kneed politicians) 
lost faith in American principles (specifically, anticommunism), the 
Vietnam veteran remained doggedly committed to the war effort; he is
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now the warrior hero betrayed by the nation which sent him to light. This 
posit ion is closely aligned with what historian Jeffrey Kimball identifies 
as the “stab-in-the-back” explanation of the U.S. policy failure in 
Vietnam.8
The Vietnam veteran’s repositioning suggests the therapeutic 
nature of hegemony. The veteran’s rehabilitation is dependent upon his 
or her compliance with the role of ideological cert ainty. Vietnam vet erans 
who resist this role risk an even more marginal position: embittered 
nonconformist, ungrateful for the nation’s belated respect, wallowing in 
self-pity, looking for a handout, probably still crazy. Given the appeal of 
the veteran’s rehabilitated position, a sensible question emerges: Why 
should Vietnam veterans not accept the role which society now offers?
1 believe that this role helps facilitate an American foreign policy 
which assures the continued suffering of the people of Indochina. 
Fifteen years after the fall of the Saigon government, American policy in 
the region remains “shaped... not by objective reality but by policymakers’ 
dislike for Vietnam, the only country ever to defeat the United States.”9 
As a sign of ideological certainty, the veteran helps maintain the 
politically potent delusions which brought so much pain to the Vietnamese 
and American people. Surely, a deeper historical analysis of the GI 
Resistance would not in itself encourage a more rational American policy 
in Indochina, but such an expanded analysis would contribute to a 
broader understanding of the war’s ideological crisis and make it easier 
to set aside the legacy of animosity which exacerbates the grave 
problems of Viet nam. Laos and Cambodia. Anothergeneration iscorning 
of age in Indochina, and Vietnam veterans can take no pride in the 
knowledge that our generation is handing-off the wages of our war to the 
young.
This special issue on the GI Resistance begins with James R. 
Hayes’ overview, written from a sociological perspective which many 
antiwar veterans may dispute. Hayes identifies several failings of the 
movement. Barbara L. Tischler provides a wide ranging historical 
overview which draws upon GI underground newspapers as primary 
documents. David Cortright, author of Soldiers in Revolt, discusses the 
activities of black soldiers in the GI antiwar movement. Gerry Nicosia’s 
essay on the Presidio mutiny (perhaps one of the most significant events 
in the history of the GI movement) is taken from a work-in-progress. The 
oral histories and photographs of antiwar veterans are excerpted from 
a forthcoming collection compiled by Bill Short and Willa Seidenberg. 
Poet and essayist W.D. Ehrhart provides some reflections which may 
encourage future debate in this journal. A  valuable bibliography, 
compiled by Skip Delano, cites several sources of additional information 
on the GI resistance. Larry Rottmann’s poem, “Lieutenant Hatfield,” 
suggests the ideological crisis which many Americans experienced 
during the Vietnam war.
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The generation which defines itself largely by the experience of 
the Vietnam war seems to be always counting its losses. Here, we 
identify with a recent one, with the hope that he will signify the others. 
Michael Patrick Madden was an assault helicopter pilot who took part in 
the invasion of Cambodia. He also Hew defensive missions for aircraft 
which spread Agent Orange on Vietnam. ‘The stuff came in through our 
vents,” he told me. He died from cancer last December. Madden was 
highly decorated, and the Central Intelligence Agency courted him for 
postwar work in Central America. Instead, he adapted the warrior spirit 
to graduate work and earned a doctoral degree from the University of 
Iowa. He became fascinated by the communication strategies which 
praised the Vietnam veteran as a warrior hero, a role he regarded with 
alarm. He spent his last months working on an oral history, a 
comparative analysis of American veterans of the Vietnam war and 
Soviet veterans of the Afghanistan war. He brought veterans of both wars 
to his classes at the University of Puget Sound in Tacoma, Washington. 
Madden feared that the Vietnam war might eventually be used to justify 
some future American aggression, a fear shared by many Vietnam 
veterans, and this is the reason we dedicate this special issue of Vietnam 
Generation to his memory.
' Peter Ehrenhaus, “Shooting the War: Vietnam Images by Army 
Photographer Ken Pollard,” a paper presented at the meeting of the 
Western States Communication Association, Sacramento, CA (Feb 
1990).
2 Rick Berg, “Losing Vietnam: Covering the War in an Age ofTechnology,” 
Cultural Critique 3(1986): 46-78.
3 Harry W. Haines, “They Were Called and They Went: The Political 
Rehabilitation of the Vietnam Veteran,” in L. Dittmar and G. Michaud, 
eds., From Hanoi to Hollywood: H ie Vietnam War in American Film (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press) 1990.
4 The lessons o f the Vietnam War, a modular textbook produced by t he 
Center for Social Studies Education (Pittsburgh, PA) makes reference to 
GI opposition to the war. Veiy few of the standard histories of the 
Vietnam war mention the GI Resistance.
f> David Rabe, Sticks and Bones (New York: Samuel French) 1972.
6 Berg: 101.
7 A. Gramsci; Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith, eds. and trans.. Selections from 
the Pi'ison Notebooks (New York: International) 1971.
8 Jeffrey Kimball, T h e  Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam 
War,” Aimed Forces and Society 14 (1988).
9 John McAuliff and Maiy Byrne McDonnell, “Ending the Cambodian 
Stalemate," World Policy Journal 7(1989): 99.
ThE W ar WbhiN a W a r : DissENT in tMe 
Vie t n a m  E ra MiliTARy
Jaimes R. Hayes
The signing of the Indochina peace agreements in early 1973 
officially ended American participation in the Vietnam conflict. Military 
officials would probably be the first to admit that they, more than any 
other group in society, experienced the first sigh of relief. Throughout 
most of the war, the military was subjected to invectives emanating from 
a war-weary civilian sector, as well as disgruntled, ant iwar, anti-military 
GIs. While civil-military relations have a well-documented tradition of 
animosity, organized protest within the ranks is without parallel in 
American military history.1 For military traditionalists, the presence of 
a small but vocal minority of soldiers raising the old ideal of a “democratic 
military” produced some acute anxiety. Contrary to its functionalist 
image of human nature and dissent , the military was forced to come to 
grips with the reality that internal discontent ran deeper than the mere 
disaffections of a few disruptive, “bad” individuals.2
This essay describes and analyzes the effort by a minority of GIs 
to create an antiwar, anti-military movement within the Vietnam-era 
military. An attenuated chronology of the movement is presented along 
with an analysis of what appeared to be the major causal variables in its 
genesis and development.
ThE MiliTARy FiqhTS It seU
Beginning in the latter part of the 1960s, an unprecedented 
movement of soldier dissent gathered momentum. Originating primarily 
as an antiwar movement, it escalated to a point where it was a force 
waging a battle against military authority and legitimacy. While 
desertion. AWOLs, drug use, and even fraggings have long plagued the 
United Stales military, organized resistance appears to be a uniquely 
Vietnam-era phenomenon. The social movement characteristics exhibited 
by the movement (e.g., a sense of group identity and solidarity, consciously 
articulated ideologies, movement organizations) distinguished it from 
other more spontaneous and transitory uprisings such as the “Back 
Home Movement” in the aftermath of World War II. Adjustment
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responses such as drug use and various types of withdrawal reactions 
such as desertion and AWOL will not be discussed in the context ol this 
art icle; the degree to which these various forms of dissent are politically 
motivated is open to debate.3
Although there was one well publicized instance of an officers’ 
organization—The Concerned Officers Movement (COM), and antiwar 
group that disassociated itself from the more radical GI groups— and a 
lesser-known and smaller group—The Concerned Graduates of the 
Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies, headquartered in San Francisco 
and largely limited to ex-officers in that area—the GI movement was for 
the most part comprised of lower-ranking enlisted personnel (“enlisted" 
referring to st at us and not to mode of entiy into the service), predominant ly 
Army but cutting across all branches of the armed services. Short of 
revolutionary in outlook and ideology, the movement aimed primarily at 
institutional structural reform. There was no accurate measure of the 
numerical strength of the movement, and the estimates vary according 
to source— the military appears to underestimate while movement 
sympathizers tend to exaggerated It is safe to say, however, that the 
movement represented only a small fraction of GIs.
THe E a r Iy Y ears
Like other movements of the period, the GI movement emerged 
in a rather piecemeal and disorderly fashion. Movements tend to emerge 
as rather amorphous, poorly organized, and fonnless entities, develop in 
periods of cultural drift, and the early action tends to be individualistic 
in nature and lackinggroup consciousness. The GI movement witnessed 
its beginning in a series of individual acts of resistance against the war. 
These initial exemplary acts occurred during a period (1965-1967) in 
which the Vietnam conflict and American military involvement in it were 
becoming increasingly important concerns for both the civilian and 
military sectors.
One of the first publicized incidents of resistance occurred in 
November of 1965 when Lt. Henry H. Howe, Jr. participated in an 
antiwar demonstration in El Paso, Texas. How was court-martialed and 
charged with disrespectful utterances toward public officials for carrying 
a sign which read: “End Johnson’s Fascist Aggression in Vietnam,” and 
“Let's Have More Than a Choice Between Petty Ignorant Fascists in 
1968." In December, 1965, Howe was convicted and sentenced to two 
years hard labor (later reduced to one) and dishonorably discharged. 
Howe’s conviction raised the ire of some because the military presented 
no clear evidence that Howe’s conduct threatened military discipline and 
order, particularly in light of the fact that he was off-duty as well as out 
of uniform.
The most celebrated case of GI antiwar resistance during 1966 
took place on June 30, when three enlisted men at Fort Hood refused 
shipment to Vietnam on the grounds that it was an immoral war. The
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refusal by Pvt. Dennis Mora, Pfc. James Johnson, and Pvt. David Samas 
was the first case of overt resistance against shipment to the war zone. 
All were given dishonorable discharges and forfeiture of all pay; Samas 
and Johnson were sentenced to five years at hard labor, Mora to three. 
The case of the “Fort Hood Three” gained broader significance when a 
number of civilian activists became involved in it in an effort to make it 
a cause celebre. Although most civilian activists still viewed the GI with 
some disdain, a few were beginning to realize that the GI could be a 
potential ally in the antiwar struggle.
Perhaps the most significant and important individual act of 
antiwar resistance in the entire 1965-1967 period was the case of Capt. 
Howard Levy. Levy, a dennatologist, refused to train Green Beret medics 
for duty in Vietnam, citing the commission of war crimes by the special 
forces as one reason. Levy was accused not only of disobeying an order, 
but also of attempting to “crush the spirit” of enlisted men with his 
continued criticism of the war. On June 3, 1967, Levy was sentenced to 
three years hard labor and dismissed from the service. The Levy case 
received nationwide attention and the military had created a martyr. 
Less than two months after Levy’s conviction, two black marines, Pfc. 
George Daniels and Cpl. William Harvey, were arrested for taking part 
in a barracks discussion where they argued that blacks should not take 
part in the Vietnam war. They were convicted; Daniels was sentenced 
to ten years hard labor and Harvey to six. Their conviction and 
subsequent sentencing not only raised more questions about extreme 
military oppression but was also attacked as racist. Another case of 
officer resistance to the war also took place in 1967 when Air Force Capt. 
Dale Noyd was convicted and imprisoned for refusing to train pilots for 
Vietnam.
The above examples constitute only a select number of antiwar 
acts that occurred in 1965-1967. The formative years of the movement 
were typified by a number of different individuals engaging in similar 
behaviors, but acting independently of each other with no real 
communication existing among them. The early resisters played a key 
role by drawing attention to the possibility of political dissent in the 
military, and, perhaps more importantly, by using the war issue as a 
vehicle, they brought to the surface the larger issue constitutional rights 
for military personnel, particularly enlisted persons. They did, however, 
suffer a heavy toll for their actions as prison sentences and dishonorable 
discharges constituted the backbone of the military defense.
H ie Biq Y ear : 1968
'fhe individual acts of confrontation which characterized the 
1965-1967 years continued throughout the duration of the war. Beginning 
in 1968. the frequency of individual acts of resistance declined, and 
dissent of a collective nature look precedence. It was also in 1968 that 
some of the defining traits of a social movement were first discernible.
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What had been uncoordinated and disconnected acts of resistance 
began to coalesce around an organizational framework. The organizational 
network was decentralized (in that no central decision-making 
headquarters existed) and segmented (in the sense that a number of 
groups arose and operated essentially independent of each other, linked 
only by a common mission and communications network. Consciousness 
of membership and joint interact ion were created by the establishment 
of the G1 underground press—The Bond, FFA, Vietnam GI, The Ally— and 
coffeehouses— Mad Anthony’s and the UFO. Movement cells, such as 
the American Servicemen’s Union (ASU) and theFTA, developed programs 
and ideologies. The ASU and FTAwere followed in 1969 by the GIs United 
Against the War in Vietnam (GIs—United), and the Movement for a 
Democratic Military (MDM). In May of 1969, the GI Alliance was 
constituted in Washington to serve as an umbrella organization with the 
intention of coordinating the actions of the various movement cells. 
While the specific ideological positions of the GI groups varied, their 
goals overlapped considerably and called for such things as an end to 
racism in the military, collective bargaining, federal minimum wage 
standards, and, most importantly, full constitutional rights for all 
enlisted people.5
1968 proved to be a banner year for the GI movement in a variety 
of ways. Collective resistance against the war came to the forefront and 
manifested itself in a variety of styles. In addition to the war-related 
protest, stockade rebellions added a new dimension to GI resistance.
A new strain of antiwar resistance originated in 1968 as a 
number of military personnel across the country took sanctuary in 
various churches and universities. In July, nine GIs representing all 
four sendees chained themselves together inside a San Francisco church 
and held a 48-hour vigil in protest of the war. Army Pfc. Michael Locianto 
was arrested in August after he had taken sanctuary in a Greenwich 
Village church following his refusal logo to Vietnam. Also protesting the 
war. Marine Cpl. Paul Olimpieri took sanctuaiy in the Harvard Divinity 
School in the fall of 1968. In November, Army Pvt. John Michael 
O’Connor was arrested by milit ary police after he had taken refuge in the 
Student Union at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 
approximately 1,000 MIT students fried to shield O’Connor from the 
police in that instance. On November 8th, Army Pvt. William Brakefield 
and Airman David Copp were arrested after they had sought sanctuaiy 
on the campus of New York City College. The use of sanctuaries— 
particularly churches—by antiwar GIs was increasingly facilitated as 
more and more clergy adopted an antiwar stance.
There was a dramatic growth in the number of GIs part icipat ing 
in antiwar demonstrations and teach-ins in 1968. The most significant 
participation occurred on October 12 when GI and civilian antiwar 
marches were held in Los Angeles, Atlanta, Washington DC, New York, 
and Chicago. The Veterans Stars and Stripes fo r  Peace reported that an 
estimated 200 GIs led the march in Chicago. Approximately 700 GIs took
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part in the October 12 march in San Francisco. At Fort Campbell, 
Kentucky, 35 GIs held an October 12th antiwar rally in sympathy with 
the nationwide protests. The stockade was turned back over to the 
authorities only after the military police were ordered to shoot to kill. An 
estimated 40-50 prisoners from the Navy, Marines, and Army held the 
stockade in Da Nang, Vietnam for three days in August, protesting poor 
condit ions and military authoritarianism; once cell-block was burned to 
the ground in this eruption. Also in Vietnam during August, GIs revolted 
at the Long Binh stockade, and a GI was killed by the military police and 
another 59 were wounded. The most publicized case of collective 
resistance wit hin stockades occurred in October when 27 inmates of the 
Presidio stockade (San Francisco) mutinied in protest over the slaying of 
a fellow prisoner.0 The trial of the “Presidio 27” brought massive criticism 
upon the military due to the severe nat ure of the punishment meted out 
to resisters. As a result of extreme pressure, the military reduced many 
of the sentences.
Stockade rebellions increased after 1968 and brought with them 
increased publicity over the less than adequate conditions under which 
inmates were forced to live. More importantly, stockade rebellions 
served to emphasize what a growing number of GIs were beginning to 
realize: the military’s basic denial of any kind of rights and freedoms for 
enlisted individuals.
Although the above account of resistance in 1968 deals only with 
a small number of cases, it does illustrate that resistance was not only 
taking on a collective nature but it also was no longer solely confined to 
the war issue. More and more enlisted people were defining the military 
per se as oppressive, and deciding to confront it rather than withdraw. 
As l he self-generated protest increased, dissident GIs saw larger numbers 
of civilian radicals and antiwar groups taking an interest in them and 
willing to aid them in their struggle.
THe FiNAl PERiod
In 1969 and the following years, the issue of constitutional rights 
came to the forefront of the GI movement. The war, however, remained 
the most appropriate vehicle for confronting the issue. This larger 
concern had been precipitated by the military’s reaction to and handling 
of antiwar dissenters. The military inadvertently pricked the 
consciousness of some hitherto uninvolved GIs and civilians by its 
heavy-handed repression of initial dissent. The dilemma confronting the 
movement at that time was one of transforming what appeared to be a 
growing body of partisan support into active support. In general, 
enlisted personnel were aware that any gains made by the movement 
would be in the form of “public goods,” benefits which would accrue to 
all GIs regardless of whether or not they took an active role in the 
movement. Although initially direct confrontation of military authority, 
such as refusals of orders and distribution of “subversive” literature on
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base, functioned as the main tactic, less risky behavior, such as rap 
sessions and political meetings in the barracks, were also employed with 
the hope that these relatively safe actions would increasingly involve 
larger numbers of GIs. Despite these efforts, the majority of the GIs 
preferred to remain sympathetic bystanders.
In 1970, GI participation in antiwar demonstrations was 
considerable. Although the possibility of punitive sanctions loomed 
large, the 1969 directive on dissent issued by the Department of Defense 
made such participation legal if the demonstration was off the base in the 
United States, and if GIs participating were off-duty and out of uniform. 
Various GI papers stressed the legality of participation and many 
advertised names and addresses of lawyers willing to defend any GI 
punished for participating. The largest nation-wide participation of GIs 
was in May, 1970 in what the GIs termed “Armed Farces Day.” This 
demonstration was held in conjunction with the tradition Armed Forces 
Day celebrations. GIs at Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, Fort Bragg, Fort Lewis, 
Fort Devens, and other bases turned out to protest the war and the 
military. Estimates of the numbers involved ranged from 1,500 at Fort 
Bragg and 500 at Fort Hood down to 20-30 at Fort Devens.7 Black 
soldiers continued to step up their fight against racism. In July, 250 
black GIs revolted at Fort Hood, burning two “Re-Up” offices and a BEQ 
building. At Fort Carson, also during July, 200 black soldiers seized a 
section of the base while fighting off the military police. In Heidelberg, 
West Gennany, 1000 black and white GIs held a July rally against racism 
in the army. While these demonstrations by black military personnel 
were not the first signs of growing antiracist sentiment, the expanding 
scope and intensity of this resistance in conjunction with the antiwar, 
anti-military position of many white enlisted people did present a 
formidable threat to the brass... at least the military defined it as such.
By 1971, there were approximately 26 anti-military and antiwar 
coffeehouses, along with an estimated 144 underground GI papers and 
a nationwide network of GI counseling sendees.8 The estimate of 144 
newspapers may seem unreasonable, but a significant number of these 
papers were very short-lived due to financial problems, military 
harassment, and staff turnovers. The papers themselves fell into two 
general categories: 1) “base papers” which dealt primarily with the 
act ivities on a part icular base and were generally confined to that specific 
military installation; and, 2) “national papers” representing more of a 
news sendee publication, which detailed resistance and court-martial 
cases at bases all across the country and overseas. The national papers 
were distributed all of the U.S. and abroad to GIs and interested civilians, 
largely through subscriptions and clandestine distribution networks, 
including to units in Vietnam. Through the GI press, activist GIs were 
aware that their colleagues at other bases were engaged in similar acts 
of resist ance, and they were constant ly informed of the responses ol the 
military authorities. The papers continually published self-help items 
for GIs, informing them of various groups and lawyers willing to defend
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them, as well as informing them about such things as conscientious 
objection and rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The 
establishment and proliferation of the GI press served to bridge some of 
the structural limitations GIs faced in regard to communication and 
mobility, and helped to foster a feeling a membership and interaction 
between activist GIs and movement cell organizations.
In 1971 and 1972 resistance directed against the military and 
the war continued. GIs joined civilians in demonstrations around the 
country, as well as conducting their own protests on posts. In addition 
to resistance and U.S. military installations, there were numerous 
reports out of Vietnam detailing refusals to engage the enemy on the part 
of some combat troops. While GI and antiwar civilian groups were quick 
to exploit the different protests as indicative of the strength of the GI 
movement, there remains some question as to whether these incidents 
were indeed related to the GI movement ormore a result of the immediate 
situational contingencies of combat. While the GI movement may have 
been, in part, a motivating factor behind the sporadic instances of 
combat refusal in Vietnam, it is equally true that the movement was 
basically ineffectual in creating any type of massive resistance among 
combat troops. Similar examples of troop demoralization occurred in 
Korea as that war was winding down.
HiE DiAlECTics of R esistance
As was pointed out above, the initial phase of the GI movement 
(1965-1967) was characterized by a number of individuals protesting the 
war, with no real communication among themselves and probably not 
even any knowledge of each other’s acts. These individual acts of 
resistance arose in a period of “cultural drift” symbolized by the 
beginnings of a serious questioning of the legitimacy and purpose of the 
Vietnam war by many segments of the American public. This growing 
sentiment combined with a Cold War ambivalence among many, 
particularly liberals, to the increasing size and dominance of the military 
establishment in American society. It was also significant that many of 
the initial acts of resistance by military personnel, especially the most 
publicized ones, were earned out by officers. Their dissent was given 
more credence by the public, and the severe sanctions by the military— 
in an atmosphere which was becoming increasingly hostile to the war 
effort and the military—created a number of heroes. In a climate of 
opinion where civil liberties and the right to dissent were increasingly 
brought to public attention through the civil rights movement and the 
beginnings of student dissent, the military’s response of rather harsh 
sentencing did not go unnoticed. The military’s decision to severely 
sanction some of its own kind (officers) for protesting a war which more 
and more civilians were coming to question was seen by many as a 
repressive rather than a justified disciplinary measure.
In 1968 antiwar sentiment increased as did antiwar 
confrontations. It was also the year in which the total number of active 
duty enlisted personnel reached its peak for the Vietnam conflict and the 
year in which draft inductions for the army hit the top level of 334,222.9 
The military, particularly the Army, was confronted with a mass of young 
people, many of whom were in the military against their will, required to 
fight a war in which many of them did not believe. The fact that all of them 
had been exposed to and some had participated in antiwar demonstrations 
and they know were all grouped together on various military bases gave 
rise to certain self-generated action among enlisted people. Resistance 
look place as some GIs acted against the war explicitly, and, in so doing, 
implicitly tested the degree to which enlisted personnel enjoy constitutional 
rights. Confronted with a situation which they perceived to be a real 
threat to discipline and morale, the military continued to respond in a 
manner best described as panic. Their immediate response, typical of 
a regime feeling itself threatened, consisted of swift and harsh punitive 
action. As resistance reared its head beyond the individual acts of 1965- 
1967, the Pentagon ordered a hard-nosed position against dissenters.10 
The expressed rationale for a policy of harsh suppression hinged on the 
military’s need for discipline and control, while the latent intention 
continued to be a scare tactic designed to intimidate other GIs.
For activist GIs, the military’s policy of handling dissent not only 
increased the sense of struggle but also provided the movement with 
more publicity than they could generate themselves. The military, 
already under attack for Vietnam, was now roundly criticized for its 
handling of dissident GIs and its blatant denial of the constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of press, assembly, and speech. The handling of 
political activists helped to raise some fundamental issues that perhaps 
would not have surfaced had the military initially pursued a different 
policy.
It was at this time (1968) that civilian activists started to view the 
GI as a potential ally in the antiwar, anticapitalism struggle. Prior to 
1968 those who accepted induction into the armed forces were written 
off as potential radical partisans. Antiwar organizations and other 
radical groups began to add GI names to their mailing lists, and 
coffeehouses were set up near military bases by civilians with the 
purpose of providing a place where GIs could congregate and vent their 
hostilities. The coffeehouses were also an attempt on the part of the 
largely middle-class antiwar movement to break down the barriers 
between themselves and their working-class counterparts in the military. 
Civilian groups provided GIs with legal defense as well. Quite cognizant 
that court-martials would be readily forthcoming for radical GIs, 
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union, National 
Emergency Civil Liberties Union, and the GI Civil Defense Committee 
offered their support. These organizations generated considerable 
publicity for the cases in which they were involved. Undoubtedly, more 
GIs were willing to run the risk of dissent with the realization that a
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defense network was established to challenge any punitive action on the 
part of the military. In addition to some important legal victories, the 
adverse publicity directed against the military and its system of justice 
has led military authorities into a more rigorous scrutiny of both the case 
they wish to prosecute and the types of punishment they wish to dole out.
In response to growing dissent and mounting adverse publicity 
for the military, Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor issued a 
memorandum in May of 1969 titled “Guidance on Dissent.” The 
statement instructed commanders to adopt a more relaxed attitude with 
regard to GI coffeehouses, the GI press, and political resistance in 
general. Too liberal for some, especially the House Armed Services 
Committee, the guidelines were reissued in September, 1969. The 
revised statement in effect wiped out the recommendations for tolerance 
in the initial directive. The new directive de-emphasized constitutional 
restraints on commanders and at the same time added to their repressive 
options. Notably absent from the revised document was the phrase “to 
impose only such minimum restraints as are necessary to enable the 
Army to perform its mission.”11 The military found itself, or perhaps 
placed itself, in an unenviable position. In attempting to short-circuit 
what they considered to be a serious breakdown in discipline and 
morale, the inadvertently spawned a growing body of criticism of the 
military justice system and specifically of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.
While the military’s inexperience with political resistance did 
lead them to err and overreact on many occasions, they did learn from 
their mistakes. In the years following 1969, they made greater use of 
administrative discharges and in general pursued a somewhat more 
tolerant position vis-a-vis dissent.
ThE GI M o v e m e n t : A n A sse ssm e n t
In terms of its stated goals and objectives, which, aside from 
ending the war, involved mainly institutional structural reform, the GI 
movement was, not surprisingly, far from successful. It is difficult to 
believe that even the most die-hard GI organizers ever felt the movement 
could produce major changes in an organization as firmly entrenched as 
the military. The movement made a discernible, yet largely ineffective, 
attempt at fostering subversion within the ranks. There are a number 
of possible explanations for the movement’s failure to create an effective 
challenge on a mass scale against the Vietnam-era military. Some of the 
more glaring ones can be singled out here.
The GI movement was inextricably intertwined with the New Left. 
In the course of its development, the organized element of the movement 
found itself relying more and more on this sector of the civilian 
population. While the outside support was necessary if the movement 
was to transcend some of the limitations in political resourcesconfronting 
it. the GI movement became to “civilianized,” particularly in its ideological
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orientation. As the movement began to gather momentum and, 
correspondingly, the civilian input loomed larger and larger, the middle 
class ideological rhetoric of the New Left began to overshadow some of 
the more pragmatic day-to-day concerns of the GIs themselves. The 
feeling of helplessness and powerlessness that many GIs felt could not 
be adequately dealt with by sweeping references to “imperialism” and the 
“military industrial complex.”
If one grants that an extremely inequitable Vietnam-era draft 
resulted in a predominantly lower-middle and working-class military, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the middle-class emphasis that the 
organized element of the movement adopted under New Left influence 
lacked meaning for a significant number of GIs. As the movement 
strayed from issues directly related to the immediate self-interest of GIs, 
it increasingly reduced the possibility of mobilizing the discontent of 
large numbers of enlisted personnel. In a veiy real sense, the movement 
failed to integrate itself with the “ordinary” nonideological GI.
Another reason for the movement’s failure to mobilize massive 
discontent stemmed from its own internal contradictions. Factionalism 
developed over tactics. There were also disputes over the proper role that 
civilian radicals should play in the GI movement. A  major point of 
contention concerned those groups who, on the one hand, maintained 
that civilians should provide support to GIs but leave the actual control 
and operation of project to the GIs themselves (such as the Student 
Mobilization Committee, and United States Servicemen's Fund), and 
those groups who, on the other hand, wanted to function as a type of 
vanguard party leading the struggle against the military (such as the 
Socialist Workers Party/Young Socialist Alliance and the Youth Against 
War and Fascism). The orientation of the former groups appeared to be 
directed more toward democratizing the military, while that of the latter 
seemed more concerned with creating a broader revolutionary youth 
cohort. It was the latter who turned out to be more vociferous, and the 
GI movement came to be identified with them.
Although the GI movement claims to have been a significant 
factor in instigating troop dissent in Vietnam, there is little evidence to 
support this contention. The sporadic cases of troops refusing to go into 
combat, and acts such as fraggings appear to have been inspired by 
factors more or less separate from the stateside GI movement. Rather 
than viewing combat refusals as consequences of the GI movement, it 
seems more reasonable to interpret both phenomena as products of the 
anti-Vietnam war malaise affecting the larger society. As the war 
continued, reports from Vietnam indicated that more and more GIs were 
sharing the same disillusionment with the war as Americans at home 
were experiencing.
The GI movement was also ineffective in dealing with racial 
issues.12 Some of the organizations did have a multi-racial membership 
base, but the black participants seemed to be token members. Black 
soldiers began forming their own organizations in an effort to meet the
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needs of black service personnel. For the most part, black GIs were 
waging a separate battle with military authorities. From the perspective 
of black GIs, their battle was qualitatively different from the one being 
conducted by the whites. Black soldiers discovered that the military was 
a microcosm of American society and that the problems confronting 
blacks in the military were not significantly different from those which 
faced them in the civilian world. Just as the New Left organizations failed 
to bring about a desired coalition with blacks and other minorities in 
civilian society, so the GI movement proved deficient in this realm as 
well.
Summary ANd ConcIusIon
The GI movement made a discernible, but largely ineffective 
attempt to foster subversion within the ranks. It failed to mobilize the 
discontent of the large bulk of GIs into a unified antiwar, anti-military 
force. To be sure, part of the failure stemmed from the fact that those 
who were most radical in the 1960s were also those who enjoyed 
deferments from military service. While a few entered the military with 
the avowed purpose of organizing, most remained on the outside and 
attempted to organize GIs from that vantage point. This not only 
engendered a certain degree of resentment on the part of GIs, but the 
“outsiders” were unable, or perhaps unwilling, to grasp the concerns of 
GIs. Though the movement had to rely on civilian support to get off the 
ground, civilian groups appear to have co-opted the movement in an 
attempt to exploit GI resistance for ideological purposes. The New Left 
was never able to overcome its elitism. The same mistake had been made 
in the abortive effort to radicalize workers. Even for GIs who were 
sympat hetic to the GI movement’s aims, the lack of a clear-cut strategy 
and program of action resulted in the overshadowing of the hoped for 
gains by the very real risks involved in striving for them. In simple terms, 
it was not worth it.
Although the movement faltered partially because of its own 
internal contradictions, its inability to radicalize a large constituency of 
GIs was, in the final analysis, testimony to the military’s system of social 
control. The military went a long way in defusing dissent after it had 
learned from its initial mistakes. 12
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BREAkiNq RANks: Gl A ntIw a r  Ne w s p a p e r s  
ANd t He C u Iture  of P ro test
BARbARA L. TischlER
GIs: Caution, Reading this paper may be 
hazardous to your Discipline, Morale, and 
Loyalty.
— The Pawn (Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD)1
This publication is your property and cannot 
legally be taken from you.
—Aboveground (Fort Carson, Colorado Springs, 
CO)2
Popular works about the United States in the 1960s often 
analyze the Vietnam war in terms of the actions of Lyndon Johnson, 
Melvin Laird, and William Westmoreland juxtaposed to the protests of 
Abbie Hoffman, Mark Rudd, and Bemadine Dohm. But such a “top 
down” approach is unsatisfactory in analyzing the decentralized and 
loosely structured opposition to United States military involvement in 
Southeast Asia. The antiwar movement was not a single entity, but a 
coalition of organizations on college campuses, in local communities, 
and, increasingly after 1968, on military bases in the United States and 
abroad. GI “alternative” or “underground” newspapers gave voice to 
antiwar sentiment within the military along with calls for First Amendment 
rights for soldiers and an end to racism and sex discrimination in the 
United Stales.
'fhe idea of opposing the Vietnam war within the military took 
shape as the civilian antiwar movement began to expound a broad 
prot est agenda and as soldiers began to see themselves as occupying the 
front ranks of a multi-faceted struggle against American imperialism 
abroad and injustice at home.3 Just as the civilian/student antiwar 
movement considered the war as part of a wider pattern of serious social 
ills, there were voices in the military that articulated personal and 
collective discontent, of which the war was one major cause. Modeled 
in many cases after civilian underground papers that were easily 
obtainable off base, GI antiwar newspapers were a sounding board for 
expressions of resistance in an environment not known for its tolerance 
of dissent.
Challenges to military authority that ranged, even in wartime, 
from grumbling comments on latrine walls to draft riots and refusals to 
fight, were not new in the 1960s and early 1970s. American soldiers had
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long complained about the oppressive nature of the military bureaucracy 
and the meaningless quality of its regulations, the degree to which 
advancement was based less on merit than on favoritism, and the fact 
that the institution saw no need to recognize or grant its citizens in 
unifonn basic constitutional rights. But expressions of dissatisfaction 
did not necessarily connote a spirit of resistance or rebellion. Prior to the 
Vietnam war, GIs generally accepted the legitimacy of military authority 
and the capacity of superiors to make a dissenter’s life unbearable.
Resistance and rebellion against policy in Vietnam and against 
the military itself diverged sharply from dissent in America’s wars earlier 
in the twentieth century. The new military protest, which was small at 
first, grew dramatically in its power and impact as the war dragged on. 
Antiwar activists demanded that the various branches of the military 
recognize its subordinate members as citizens with a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to dissent from established policy. They demanded the 
right to defy and modify regulations, and they insisted that soldiers as 
workers had the right to bargain collectively with base commanders on 
such issues as work assignments, recreational activities, and the right 
to express opposition to the war.
Why did these soldiers presume that they had rights protected by 
the First Amendment when their predecessors had resented but essentially 
accepted the Uniform Code of Military Justice? Clues can be found in 
the nature of the war itself, the profile of the antiwar GI, and the 
emergence of protest as a significant aspect of American culture by the 
late 1960s.
The fighting in Vietnam was part of an undeclared “non-war” 
against unseen enemies. It exacted a high cost in American and 
Vietnamese lives with few if any signs of victory. Even soldiers who 
enlisted with the idea of saving the world from the “Communist menace” 
often became disillusioned because they were fighting a war they could 
not win. The ranks of antiwar soldiers and veterans swelled after theTet 
Offensive of January'' 1968, and many of the men and women who were 
most vocal in opposing the war and demanding GI rights had recently 
returned from service in Vietnam.
Many of the men drafted into military sendee came to the fighting 
with overwhelmingly negative feelings about the war. As draftees, they 
accept ed the mission in Vietnam with little enthusiasm and often sought 
to evade rather than obey military rules. African-American and Latino 
soldiers and those from poor families saw themselves as cannon fodder 
with little to gain from the abstraction of a fight to preserve American 
interests in Southeast Asia. With the end of student deferments in 1966, 
some of the military’s lower ranks were populated by young men drawn 
from the counter-culture itself. Those who could not avoid militaiy 
sendee and for whom obtaining conscientious objector status or evading 
the draft were not realistic options now found themselves subjected to 
a system of total military regulation. For young people who had recently 
begun to question and challenge authority and to see this challenge as
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a legitimate exercise of popular political will, the reality of military life ran 
counter to their notions of the fundamental principles of American 
politics embodied in the Bill of Rights.
The GI protest movement comprised many groups of soldiers 
who had come to mistrust both the military and government policy­
makers. Some, who at first had no specific identification with the 
antiwar movement or the counterculture, saw the war as unwinnable, 
many African-American and Latino GIs felt that they had no stake in the 
struggle, and many middle- and working-class young conscripts began 
their military careers with strong opposition to the war. To some extent, 
the GI antiwar movement mirrored the culture of protest and resistance 
to government policy that developed on college campuses with the first 
teach-ins and antiwar protests as early as 1965 and which permeated 
the larger culture by the end of the decade.
Oppositional culture in the U.S. in the late 1960s can be 
discussed in terms of both the challenges it posed to traditional authority 
and the search that it demanded for a better community that would be 
achieved through struggle with established ideas and social structures. 
America’s war in Southeast Asia became for many Americans and, most 
particu larly for the men and women who rejected its basic premises even 
as they were asked to fight it, a symbol of misguided policy and outright 
betrayal. Protest against the politics of passivity that had made the war, 
along with racism and sexism, possible, became central to the lives of 
many GIs and recently discharged veterans. The slogan “No More 
Vietnams” connoted resistance to what many in the antiwar movement, 
both in and outside of the military, saw as an imperialist venture by a 
hierarchical and undemocratic government. In antiwar papers all over 
the United States and in Germany, Japan, and the Philippines, citizen 
soldiers criticized the war, not in isolation, but as part of a larger matrix 
of social ills that was very much in need of radical change.
The presence of a military antiwar press underscores the extent 
to which official pronouncements of victory, high military morale, or 
“peace at hand” in Vietnam were less than candid assessments. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to quantify the extent of GI resistance from the 
papers. Many GIs took part in antiwar demonstrations but did so out 
of uniform and on their own time in order to stay within the regulations. 
Circulation figures for unofficial GI newspapers are an unreliable 
indicator of the extent of antiwar activism, as papers were often passed 
from hand to hand when funds to print a large run could not be raised. 
The GI antiwar press provides qualitative indicators of dissent within the 
armed services, as many papers covered protests over conditions in 
military jails, individual and large-scale refusals to fight, racism and 
sexism in the military, the civilian antiwar movement, massacres and 
other battlefield atrocities, the use of chemical weapons and defective 
weapons in Vietnam, and attempts to censor or eliminate anti-military 
papers. The antiwar press and the attempt to suppress it shows that 
resist ance was a serious problem for the military brass, which infiltrated
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newspapers and off-base antiwar groups and harassed movement 
leaders and participants.4
GI newspapers emerged in part to fill a gap in the mainstream 
press coverage of news that GIs though was important. Until 1968, the 
majority of American newspapers accepted government assertions of the 
validity of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia and military assessments of the 
extent to which we were “winning” the war. It was not until after the Tet 
Offensive that reporters challenged the information that was fed to them 
in the daily Saigon military military briefings that came to be known as 
the Five O’clock Follies. Even as the mainstream press began to take 
notice of the student/civilian antiwar movement, major city and small 
town newspapers offered very little coverage of strong resistance to the 
war within the anmed forces. Further, military papers such as Stars and 
Stripes offered no outlet for expressions of protest. For example, when 
The Airnored Sentinel the official post newspaper at Fort Hood, Texas, 
carried an advertisement during the summer of 1968 soliciting 
contributions to a writing contest sponsored by the radical magazine 
Ramparts and the Summer of Support—a project launched by Rennie 
Davis to raise funds for antiwar coffeehouses—all 12,000 copies of the 
issue were burned before any soldiers could see the ad. In some 
localities, publishers whose papers were distributed on military bases 
demurred from printing news that was potentially critical or damaging 
to the brass/’ For many, the need for an alternative press was obvious.
The journalistic activity of antiwar GIs was consistent with the 
long-standing historical use of the First Amendment to foster dissent. 
American radicals, from J.A. Wayland, publisher of the early 20th 
century midwestem socialist newspaper The Appeal to Reason, to 
contributors to the independent socialist journal Monthly Review 
(published from the late 1940s to the present), have used the press to 
articulate a Left political perspective. During the Vietnam war, hundreds 
of underground or alternative publications produced by individuals, 
college groups, and organizations that identified with the Left, gave voice 
to disparate antiwar and counterculture viewpoints and aided in the 
organization of a broad-based and decentralized antiwar coalition. The 
antiwar press became an especially important part of the terrain of 
military rights over which antiwar soldiers and the brass battled 
frequently. In the early days of the movement, the antiwar GI or officer 
was an anomaly isolated by the harassment he or she faced simply for 
challenging prevailing military wisdom. Alternative newspapers provided 
assurance that there were kindred antiwar spirits as they encouraged 
the growing tide of protest against the military ethos as well as the war 
itself.6
The editorial and reporting staffs of these off-base publications 
were often transient, as writers and editors were shipped off to Vietnam 
or discharged from the service, although, in a number of cases, staff 
members were former military men and women who remained in the area 
of their bases to organize the antiwar movement. Many papers received
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support from or were affiliated with other military and civilian antiwar 
groups. These included the American Servicemen’s Union, Concerned 
Officers Movement (founded by junior grade officers from all services in 
Washington, D.C. in early 1970), the GI Alliance (founded at Fort Lewis, 
Washington in 1970), GIs United Against the War in Indochina (an 
integrated antiwar group, founded in 1969 at Fort Jackson), Movement 
for a Democratic Military (founded as a revolutionary organization by 
Marines at Camp Pendleton, California in 1969 and later established at 
other west coast bases), the United States Servicemen’s Fund (an 
umbrella agency that funded newspapers and coffeehouses and provided 
support ranging from antiwar films and speakers to legal counsel), and 
Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Some papers developed ties to 
revolutionary antiwar groups that provided theoretical guidance and 
production help. Such an alliance, however, could present problems, 
especially where tension existed between civilian radicals and antiwar 
GIs who adopted an eclectic and practical approach to ending the war 
rather t han one based on a specific theory.7 In cases of a conflict between 
preserving the authenticity of an original contribution and presenting a 
politically clear analysis, many of the GI papers opted for the direct, often 
unedited but authentic, voice of the soldier.
GI papers often challenged the notion that a good paper had to 
be polished in style and appearance. Funds, generally raised by 
subscriptions and occasional donations, were always in short supply, 
making high-quality production difficult. In an effort to represent the 
grassroots'GI perspective, editors frequently solicited articles, letters, 
poetry, and cartoons, with no mention of any standard of journalistic 
“quality." The “You write it, we’ll print it” slogan appears often in these 
publications that preserved the integrity of original contributions by 
editing them as little as possible8. The practice of not “correcting” 
contributions, even for grammar or spelling, was common. The idea that 
GI antiwar papers presented the views of their readers as they were, 
without censorship, modification, or the veneer of professional editing or 
typesetting was an article of faith with many editorial staffs that regarded 
form as subordinate to content.
The non-professional, even anti-professional, image of many of 
the GI papers could be interpreted as a weakness rather than a strength 
of grassroots publications operating with serious resource limitations. 
Writing in the Columbia Journalism Review in 1970, critic Murray 
Polner, who was one of the first mainstream journalists to recognize the 
GI press, argued that the papers and the soldiers who produced them 
were “amateurs, for now at least. Their content is uneven, their style 
sometimes turgid, their humor simply not funny.” Polner evaluated the 
appearance and tone of the GI papers in comparison to the mainstream 
press, but even as he did so he recognized that the value of these papers 
lay not in their journalistic “quality,” but in the power of their message. 
The writers, he noted, were “angrier than any other generation of 
conscriptees” and they would continue to search for an outlet for their
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views “as long as the mass media pretend that military life is like a 
television serial” and as long as the war and military injustice continued.9 
When viewed not as professionally-produced newspapers designed to 
capture advertising dollars and a large readership, but as expressions 
of discontent and, in many cases, as organizing tools for the military 
antiwar movement, the papers appear in a very different light. Some 
include ponderous political statements, but many provide personal 
glimpses into the transformation of a generation of soldiers into protesters. 
Cartoons and articles on the brass, “Armed Farces Day” activities, and 
the “Lifer of the Month” are sharply critical and often devastatingly 
funny. Indeed, many of the papers that were the least sophisticated in 
terms of appearance often contained analyses of the war and military life 
that gave voice to the deepest anger and frustration of participants 
themselves.
Contributors to GI antiwar papers often communicated with one 
another through poetry. The work of Vietnam veteran poets has become 
familiar in recent years as a result of the efforts of Jan Bariy, W.D. 
Ehrhart, and others to find and publish their work, but the appearance 
of poems amid stories of military harassment and massacres in Vietnam 
in the late 1960s and early 70s was both anomalous and fitting. Soldier- 
poets looked for a voice and often found it outside of the slogans and 
cliches of war and military life. Most of these works were unsigned and 
as a group they fit the description that Ehrhart applied to the poems in 
Winning Hearts and Minds (1972), the first anthology of Vietnam era 
poems, which he characterized as “artless poems, lacking skill and 
polish, but collectively they had the force of a wrecking ball.”10 In their 
directness and simplicity, these works communicated the GI response 
to the hopelessness of fighting in Vietnam without the artifice or 
conventions of high art :
"Dig it,” they said, 
and I dug.
“Shoot it," they said, 
and I shot.
“Eat it," they said, 
and I ate.
But then, 
god dammit,
"Defend it," they said, 
and I died.11
This poem appeared in one of the best-known GI papers, Fun, Travel and 
Adventure, produced by soldiers at Fort Knox, Kentucky, from June of 
1968 to 1972. The paper’s initials were quickly identified with the 
popular coffehouse shows and the slogan, “Fuck the Army."
Occasionally, an editorial staff would articulate a position that 
seemed to eschew specific political or antiwar content. Perhaps the 
editors of A Four Year Bummer (fonnerly Harass the Brass ) at Chanute
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Comments on the stultifying effect of the military mindset appeared 
often in the GI antiwar press. Chuck Mathias' cartoon commentary 
on military conformity appeared in many papers.
Air Force Base, Illinois, were being disingenuous or cautious when they 
declared that the paper “does not necessarily have an anti-war slant— 
it’s for GI’s, by GI’s, and therefore its stand is that of each writer. Most 
of its writers, however, are anti-war in their philosophy, but we will print 
all GI articles.”12 Antiwar GIs occasionally claimed that their papers were 
“objective” voices in the manner of the mainstream press rather than 
ideologically clear statements against the military whose goal was to 
organize widespread opposition. As the political analysis of some 
contributors grew more sophisticated and as it became clear that the 
mainstream press continued to report government and military 
disinformation about the war, the GI antiwar press played an increasingly
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important role in refuting the official military line from a clearly antiwar 
perspective.
The GI antiwar press helped to undermine traditional military 
authority and discipline. Many papers were focal points for specific 
antiwar organizing through their ties to coffeehouses and civilian 
antiwar groups, most offered a forum for the expression of broader 
critiques of American society, and almost all provided an outlet for 
expressions of frustration with military life and the denial of basic rights 
of free speech and assembly to service personnel. The papers spoke 
directly to draftees and short-time soldiers caught in the contradiction 
of having to fight a professional soldier’s war without the commitment 
of the long-term fighter. In scathing attacks on lifers and the brass, GI 
antiwar newspapers highlighted deep division within the military.
From the first publication in Berkeley in June, 1967, of The Bond, 
a civilian antiwar paper that later came to be identified as the “voice of 
the American Servicemen’s Union,”13 to the withdrawal of American 
troops from Vietnam in 1973, GI underground or alternative newspapers 
were effective mechanisms for communication within military 
installations. In many instances, the papers also facilitated the sharing 
of information and ideas among GIs from different bases and branches 
of the service, as they reprinted articles, cartoons, letters, and poetry 
from other antiwar papers. Many papers also printed lists of GI antiwar 
publications, coffeehouses, and drop-in rap and counseling centers as 
a direct response to military attempts to censor the papers and close 
down “unofficial” gathering places for military personnel.
The disclosure in these papers of official harassment of antiwar 
soldiers aided the organizing effort of the GI movement. An individual 
soldier who was punished for unpopular, though not necessarily illegal, 
protest could be ignored, but as the numbers of publicly antiwar soldiers 
grew, their actions, as reported in the GI press, encouraged others to 
express their resistance to American policy more openly. WhenLt. Henry 
H. Howe became the first serviceman to be prosecuted under Article 88 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1965 for carrying a sign that 
read, “End Johnson’s Fascist Aggression against Vietnam,” at a local 
antiwar march in El Paso, few groups existed that could support him. 
With no one to testify in his behalf or publicize his trial and the fact that 
the Supreme Court had previously upheld a citizen’s right to criticize the 
president, Howe received a sentence of a year’s hard labor followed by a 
dishonorable discharge. When black Marines George Daniels and 
William Harvey spoke out publicly against the war and racism in their 
branch of the service in the wake of ghetto disturbances in many cities 
in the summer of 1967, they were arrested, tried, and sentenced to long 
jail terms.
By 1969, growing opposition to the war improved the situation 
somewhat for antiwar soldiers. The extensive coverage and public 
protests over the Navy’s arrest of seaman apprentice Roger L. Priest for 
publishing OM, The Liberation Newsletter (Washington, D.C.) helped to
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Antiwar commentators attaced the hypocrisy of veterans' groups 
and others who insisted on continuing the war at whatever cost. 
(The Ally No. 19, September 1969.)
keep the climate of resistance alive. Faced with fourteen charges, 
including the encouragement of sedition and desertion, Priest declared 
that “the admirals and generals are trying to silence dissension in the 
ranks by any means. This is the only way to view the heavy-handed 
at t empts to put out of commission the antiwar, anti-military newsletter 
which I edit.” 14 Priest received a bad conduct discharge but did not serve 
time in a military jail, in part because his case had received considerable 
public attention in the GI alternative press. Similarly, the response to 
the repeated firebombing of a coffeehouse near Fort Knox and the 
attacks on the Movement for a Democratic Military center in San Diego
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prompted more rather than less resistance to military authority. According 
to A Four Year Bummer,
The organized GI Movement has grown in the last tew years 
largely as the response of servicemen and women to the brass’s 
attempt to repress any and all dissent in the military. From 
individual or isolated acts of resistance more and more GI's are 
moving toward more organized forms and long-range goals.15
The protection of the first amendment rights to free speech and 
a free press was a major issue in many GI antiwar papers. Clearly, 
editors were vitally concerned with their right to publish unpopular 
views in the military, but the issue transcended the desire for a free 
military antiwar press to encompass a broad range of rights that enlisted 
personnel began to demand as citizens. The first issue of Fun, Travel, 
and Adventure identified the paper as “Published Underground—for and 
by the GI’s at Fort Knox, Dedicated to Free Speech and the Struggle for 
Our Rights.”16 Such rights were not always spelled out clearly in the 
papers, but military personnel had a clear understanding that they 
wanted, for example:
• freedom from harassment for attending antiwar 
demonstrations off base;
• the right to produce, distribute, and possess antiwar 
newspapers and other antiwar and anti-military documents;
• the right to wear peace signs, long hair, African unity arm 
bands;
• an end to institutionalized military racism;
• an end to sexism in the military;
• the right to refuse an order to fight that a soldier considered 
unlawful or immoral.
That this generation of soldiers spoke in terms of rights that had 
long been denied in the military as a matter of course and as a way of 
maintaining discipline in both war and peacetime reflects the extent to 
which broader challenges to authority fueled opposition to American 
policy in Southeast Asia. Soldiers could not have presumed to struggle 
for their rights as citizens without indications that they would find 
support in the culture of protest that influenced American political life 
after the mid-1960s.
The vast majority of lhe GI antiwar papers included in their 
masthead this assertion: “This is your personal property. It cannot 
legally be taken away from you.” The right to possess a single copy of an 
unofficial military paper was protected by Department of Defense 
Directive 1325.6. TheDepartment’scommunique, “Guidance on Dissent,” 
issued on May 27, 1969, allowed the publication of such papers under 
certain conditions:
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Unless such a newspaper contains language, the utterance of 
which is punishable under Federal law (e.g. 20 USC sec. 2387 or 
the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice]), authors of an 
“underground newspaper” may not be disciplined for mere 
publication.
But the editors of Up Against the Bulkhead, and unofficial Navy paper 
affiliated with the Movement for a Democratic Military and published, 
first in Berkeley and later in San Francisco, recognized that Defense 
Department regulations offered little protection against harassment on 
individual bases. Readers were advised that “you can still be put on 
report or cited with an Article 134 if the Brass feels like citing you. So 
don’t kid yourselves. Although you may have many rights on paper, you 
have none in practice.”17
While possession of an antiwar paper could be a problem for an 
individual soldier, the distribution of the paper on base touched off 
battles between base commanders and antiwar newspaper staffs. 
Shipments often had to be smuggled on base, and officers could and did 
confiscate bundles of papers before they reached their destinations. 
Individual commanding officers had wide discretionary power to allow or 
prohibit antiwar papers. Col. Harold G. Lund, the outgoing commander 
of Selfridge Air Force Base in Michigan, wrote to The Broken Arrow  that 
Air Force regulations allowed commanders to exclude from their 
installations “material they consider to be detrimental to the loyalty or 
morale of their personnel.”18 The paper continued to publish articles and 
letters critical of the military, including the reminder to readers that “if 
you believe the brass and the straight press tell you the whole story, 
you’re in for quite a shock.”19 In the fall of 1970, harassment of the paper 
and GIs who distributed it prompted The Broken Arrow to print the text 
of a petition to the new base commander in support of the paper’s right 
to publish. The lone reflects an overriding emphasis on civil liberties:
WHEREAS the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
recognizes that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are 
guaranteed to all citizens and
WHEREAS Air Force regulations recognize that members of the 
United States Air Force are entitled to possess any written 
materials for their personal use that they desire, and 
WHEREAS AFR 35-15 states that “The service members [sic] 
right of expression should be preserved to the maximum extent 
possible," and that distribution of literature “may not be prohibited 
solely on the grounds that the material is critical of Government 
policies or officials,”
WE, THE UNDERSIGNED personnel of Selfridge AFB, Michigan, 
petition Col. Kenneth I. Gunnarson, Base Commander, to grant 
the request of The Broken Arrow for distribution rights pursuant 
to Selfridge AFB Reg 5-1, which indicates that distribution may 
be accomplished with “prior written approval.” Although we do
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not necessarily agree with all the views expressed in The Broken 
Arrow, we feel that the right of free expression of all points of view 
should be protected.20
Military protest also sometimes reflected revolutionary goals of 
transforming the military and American society that were part of a 
broader New Left agenda. The Movement for a Democratic Military, 
founded in 1969 by Marines from Camp Pendleton and sailors from the 
San Diego Naval Complex, was especially active in spreading the antiwar 
message in California. The interracial MDM, that referred to itself as a 
“rainbow coalition,” published several papers21. A  statement in Duck 
Power, the paper of the San Diego MDM group, connected the servicemen’s 
demand for rights and a larger worldwide “struggle for basic human 
rights.” The MDM demands included:
1. The right to collective bargaining.
2. Constitutional rights for militaiy men and women.
3. Stop all militaiy censorship and intimidation.
4. Abolish mental and physical cruelty in militaiy brigs.
5. Abolition of the present court-martial system and 
replacement with trial by jury of one’s peers.
6. Wage rate the same as the federal minimum wage.
7. Abolition of the military class structure, an end to saluting 
and officer privileges.
8. End all racism everywhere.
9. Free all political prisoners.
10. Stop the glorification of war.
11. Abolish the draft.
12. Pull out of Vietnam now.22
The positioning of the idea of withdrawing from Vietnam at the end of the 
statement hardly detracts from its importance. Rather, it places the war 
in a much broader context of military and social oppression that MDM 
hoped to eradicate. For many groups on the Left, ending the Vietnam 
conflict was a liberal issue in comparison to the more revolutionary goal 
of transforming American society. For members of the anned forces 
facing the prospect of combat in Southeast Asia, ending the war was a 
critical issue. The MDM demands, framed as they were in broad social 
and political terms, reflect a strong Left political influence on at least 
some of the GI antiwar groups.
In 1969, and MDM spokesman, writing in Up Against the 
Bulkhead, produced in the San Francisco Bay area, declared the 
Movement to be:
dedicated to using every means at our disposal to bring about a 
prompt end to the war in Vietnam, the exploitation of our 
brothers and sisters abroad, and the repression—both physical 
and economic—of those in our own land.
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We feel that by remaining silent, the serviceman has contributed
to the denial of this deep-founded right of himself and of people
everywhere to live free from intimidation and oppression. We
have been silent for a long time. We will be silent no longer.23
In a style reminiscent of Abbie Hoffman and the Yippies, a few 
antiwar military groups combined serious political ideas with anti­
military proposals that were humorous or fantastic. The Movement to 
Off the Military presented its demands in April of 1971, in AH Ready on 
(he Left published at Camp Pendleton:
1. The right to free and open purchase of marijuana in the 
mess halls and P.X.
2. The right of Black, Brown, Yellow, and Red GIs to form their 
own armies.
3. The abolition of uniforms.
4. The right to wear hair any length but not less than three 
inches. (Persons with shorter hair should be busted for 
indecent exposure.)
5. Community control of officers and staff N.C.O. clubs so they 
could be used as ethnic studies centers, free schools, etc.
6. A descending pay scale where E -ls would receive $3,000 a 
month and 0-1 Os would get $143 a month.
7. Compulsory retirement at 25 years old.
8. Government credit cards instead of military IDs.
9. Stockades turned into rehabilitation centers for lifers and 
officers.
10. We demand that 50% of all military personnel at all ranks 
be women.
11. We demand peace.
12. We demand the President of the U.S. be replaced with a 
statue.24
Whether the various antiwar organizations in the military inspired 
serious political discussion, informal rap sessions, or a humorous 
evocation of what military life might look like with the troops in 
command, they were powerful vehicles for communicating a 
counterculture voice. There was energy in the military to demand 
change, and some papers reiterated Joe Hill’s “Don’t mourn, organize!” 
dictum to their readers, even those who might be considering desertion 
as an act of protest: “If you’re that pissed off at the military and you’re 
thinking of deserting, write to us instead. You couldn’t be in a better 
mood and position than you are right now to do something about the 
Military-Industrial complex.”25
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Articles on military discrimination and the denial of basic rights 
often went hand in hand with exposes and analyses of military racism, 
and black soldiers were an important component of the GI antiwar 
movement. Blackcasualties numbered about 13% of the total and, while 
this figure was only slightly larger than the percentages of African- 
Americans in the population at large, these young men numbered close 
to half the infantry population, the “grunts” whose only training was in 
combat and whose job was disproportionately risky. The significance of 
using less-educated minority men on the front lines was not lost on black 
soldiers who defied military authority in many ways, from the “dap” 
handshake and Afro hairstyle to refusing to fight. For minor infractions 
of milit ary discipline, black soldiers were called up on Art icle 15 charges 
more frequently than their white counterparts, and blacks received a 
majority of the less-than-honorable discharges during the Vietnam 
war.26 Articles and letters on racism in the military and in American 
society appeared often in the GI press, and black soldiers often connected 
their oppression in the military to the struggle for Black Power.
To regard African-American soldiers who opposed the war simply 
as a part of the larger antiwar movement in which white students, 
civilians, and military personnel played major roles would be to 
oversimplify that movement and present an incomplete picture of black 
resistance and rebellion. Black soldiers responded not only to the 
Vietnam war, but also to rising demands in the late 1960s for Black 
Power. Their motivation to protest was often driven more by racism than 
by the war itself. Like many civilian activists, black soldiers launched 
their own protests and formed their own organizations. In many cases, 
they also published newspapers that articulated their own demands in 
their own style.27
Revelations of the hostility of black soldiers to the military and 
the war were not confined to the unofficial GI press. Indeed, as the war 
dragged on, mainstream newspapers began to cover dissent in the 
military in general, with a particular focus on the problems of black 
soldiers, whose emerging nationalist consciousness prompted a critique 
of the “white man’s war.” In April of 1969, the New York Times quoted 
the Defense Department’s director for civil rights, who characterized the 
problem of racial unrest in Vietnam as “serious and comparable to the 
potential for racial discord within the United States.”28 Similar articles 
in other major newspapers focused on black discontent and offered 
various opinions on the clenched fist salute, the dap handshake and the 
display of the Black Power Hag, sometimes in the context of an escape 
from the war through drugs or an assertion of cultural independence.
But in articles like “Army is No Army at All... Discipline’s Gone 
to Hell,” from the 23 May 1971 Philadelphia Bulletin, the writer concluded 
that, in spite of peace signs, heavy heroin and opium consumption. 
Black Power salutes and loud rock music, “the job still gets done. The 
ammo gets humped, the hill gets taken.” 29 From this type of coverage.
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The hierarchical structure of the military and the ultimate power of 
money were portrayed in this Liberation News Service cartoon that 
appeared in both the civilian and GI antiwar press. (Aboveground 
1:7, March 1970).
the American public was given the impression, as late as 1971 when 
public opinion polls were revealing full-blown dissatisfaction with the 
war, that all was well in Vietnam. Most mainstream press coverage of 
black protest in Vietnam and in the military at home failed to relate the 
struggle for equality and power to opposition to the war itself. The 
antiwar press raised this issue frequently and powerfully with the 
argument that military racism was part of the larger fabric of oppression 
and that black opposition to the war was a step toward self-determination 
and power.
In January of 1966, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee issued a formal statemenl in opposition to the war in 
Vietnam. Coming on the heels of the murder of SNCC member Sammy 
Younge, a college student and Navy veteran who had tried to use a “White 
Only” bathroom in Alabama, the statement connected Younge’s murder 
to the killing of Vietnamese peasants, arguing that both attacks were 
against people “seeking to secure the rights guaranteed them by law.” 
SNCC articulated its opposition to the draft as well as to the war. Stokely 
Carmichael even declared that blacks who fight for the rights of others 
while possessing no rights themselves at home were little more than 
mercenaries.30 Although black respondents to public opinion polls 
indicated an early support for Lyndon Johnson’s conduct of the war, the 
extensive use of ground troops and the escalation of the fighting 
diminished that support considerably by 1967. On April 4 of that year, 
Martin Luther King, Jr. publicly broke with the Johnson administration 
and announced his opposition to the war in a speech in New York City’s 
Riverside Church, in whicch he urged African-Americans to protest the
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war, calling the United States government "the greatest purveyor of 
violence in the world today.’
Until the Vietnam war, the military had been an accepted and 
sometimes desirable route out of rural poverty or the urban ghetto for 
young black men. Frederick Douglass had even declared in the m id-19th 
century that, with his uniform and musket, “there is no power on earth 
which can deny that he [the black soldier) has earned the right to 
citizenship in the United States.”31 But reality was not so happy as 
Douglass’ pronouncement. The career black soldier was often able to 
make accommodations to a military establishment that used his skills, 
paid him almost a minimum wage, and gave him a pension after twenty 
years, and the black draftee, like his white counterpart, simply hoped to 
survive his hitch with a minimum of difficulty. But Vietnam was a 
different war, and the black men who were drafted and black women who 
enlisted were sensitive to military injustice and often began to think 
about the relationship of the war they were being asked to fight to their 
own struggles for personal and collective liberation.
The first soldiers who gained national publicity for their refusal 
to fight in Vietnam took their stand, not only against the war, but against 
racism, whether it was directed at blacks in the United States or 
Vietnamese in their own country. The Fort Hood Three— Dennis Mora, 
David Samas, and James Johnson, declared in June of 1966 that they 
would refuse orders to fight in Vietnam. Johnson, a black soldier, linked 
his struggle to that of the Vietnamese people:
Now there is a direct relationship between the peace movement 
and the civil rights movement. The South Vietnamese are 
fighting for representation, like we ourselves.... Therefore the 
Negro in Vietnam is just helping to defeat what his black brother 
is fighting for in the United States. When the Negro soldier 
returns, he still will not be able to ride in Mississippi or walk 
down a certain street in Alabama. There will still be proportionately 
twice as many Negroes as whites in Vietnam. Those Negroes that 
die for their country still cannot be assured of a burial place that 
their family feels is suitable for them. His children will still 
receive and inferior education and he will still live in a ghetto. 
Although he bears the brunt of the war, he will receive no 
benefits.... We can gain absolutely nothing in Vietnam.32
It was in this context of opposition to the war by advocates of black 
power, a weakening of popular support for the war, and the public 
refusal to fight in Vietnam by a black soldier for explicitly political 
reasons that black resistance grew within the military. Reports ol black 
soldiers being disciplined for minor infractions of dress codes and 
standards of military “attitude” were accompanied by coverage of serious 
trouble in military stockades over the conditions in which prisoners were 
held. Riots involving black GIs in the summer of 1968 at military prisons 
in Da Nang and Long Binh were part of a growing pattern of resistance 
to the war and the military that had specifically racial overtones.
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Harassment of black military personnel for political and antiwar 
activities was reported in the GI antiwar press because such cases were 
useful in rallying GIs to the defense of a particular comrade and of 
organizing the larger antiwar movement. In August of 1970, Cliff 
Manskar, a black Marine who was known to be a member of the 
Movement for a Democratic Military at Camp Pendleton, was arrested for 
assault. The specific charge was that Manskar had threatened three 
military police officers who attempted to remove the black unity band 
that he was wearing on his wrist.
Writers for All Ready on the Left, an antiwar paper that leveled 
particularly sharp critiques at the military brass, argued that Manskar’s 
“crime” had been to distribute copies of Black Unity in the local 
community of Oceanbottom and that the city police had turned him over 
to military authorities who then charged him with disobeying a “legal 
order” to remove his unity band and with assault when the MPs forced 
t he issue. Describing the fact that many enlisted men came to Manskar’s 
defense in the early days of his trial, All Ready on the Left connected the 
case to military racism and the larger question of resistance:
Why do the piggies fear Cliff? Is it because GIs rallied to his 
defense, eagerly testifying on his behalf in the opening days of his 
trial? These people realize that the lifer may come down hard on 
them because of their insolence. Still, they testify. Is it because 
Cliff relates to all people and is well-liked by everyone who has 
come in touch with him (except a certain few who sport bars and 
rockers)? Is it because Cliff refuses to accept a deal from the pigs, 
shunningaUD in order to expose lifer oppression?... Pigs realize 
their days have become numbered. With people like Cliff around, 
those days of power are dwindling even more rapidly. It is hard 
to relate just how much Cliff means to the GI movement in our 
country. Maybe it is sufficient to simply say that we love this 
beautiful brother who has dedicated his life to his people in order 
to help them to determine their own destiny. And that’s good for 
all of us.
Manskar’s trial ended with a ruling by the militaiyjudge that the original 
order to remove the unity band had been illegal. In addition to 
concluding one Marine’s chapter in the military justice system, this 
ruling also clarified that, in the future, other GIs could not be harassed 
for some of the sartorial trappings of Black Power.33
Billy Dean Smith, an Army private, was the first soldier to be 
brought before a courts martial for fragging two white officers in 
Vietnam. Smith, who had enlisted from the Watts neighborhood in Los 
Angeles in 1967, was open about his hatred of the military. Marked with 
the reputation of having a “bad attitude,” he was often charged with 
minor rules infractions and was in the process of being dishonorably 
discharged when the braggings occurred. Because of Smith’s notorious 
views and the fact that he was arrested with a live grenade in his pocket,
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he was charged with murder. His case aroused indignation in the GI 
antiwar press, which generally viewed it as a frame-up of a troublesome 
black soldier. All Ready on the Left compared Smith’s case to that of Lt. 
William Calley:
Calley is the convicted murderer of at least 22 Vietnamese but 
is only on restriction, and may well be pardoned by old Dicky.
Billy on the other hand is only suspected of murder, but you can 
bet he is in solitary confinement in some stockade. And 
considering that he is a black enlisted man accused of killing two 
white officers, you can guess how fair a trial he’ll get. Let's hear 
it for American justice, right on right on right off!34
Smith’s trial did not take place until 1972, when he was acquitted on the 
murder charge but found guilty of assault. In a statement reprinted in 
the Lewis McChord Free Press, Smith described himself as, “a candid 
black, outspoken individual. I had stated time and time again that I 
realized that the war in Indo-China was unjust and racially motivated, 
and most of all that I strictly hated all who had high regard for the 
habitual butchery of the Vietnamese people. ” The paper went on to argue 
that Smith’s guilt or innocence was less important, especially given the 
particularly flimsy nature of the evidence against him, than “the Army’s 
blatant attempt to smash the resistance of GI’s, and to intimidate those 
who are unafraid to stand up.” The article ended with a poem, “Mr. Yes- 
Sir,” that Smith had composed from his prison cell:
Hey! Brothers, listen to what I have to say.
You say you want equal opportunity each and every day.
Well, how’re you going to get this if you’re not willing to fight 
And stand up for what you believe in because you know it’s 
right....
He drafts you into the army, where you are strong and brave,
But if you happen to be Black, you wind up being a slave.
He sends you cross the waters to fight the Viet Cong,
But if you think on who caused the trouble, you’ll find out that 
he’s the the one.
He’ll put you in the stockade, because you’ll learn the truth.
Now ifyou’re not willing to do his dirt, for you he’ll have no use.35
Occasionally, statements from outside the military in support of 
resisting soldiers appeared in the GI antiwar papers. From her prison 
cell, Angela Davis wrote in “Love, Strength, and Solidarity” to members 
of the armed forces, in a letter printed in July of 1972 in OffulTimes, from 
Offut Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska, the headquarters of the 
Strategic Air Command:
In recent years, the people in this country have learned a great 
deal from prisoners and from men and women in the military.
The long concealed brutalities woven into the normal routine of 
prison life have been laid bare. Prisons have been exposed as
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central tools of maintaining racism.... From those who have 
experienced it first-hand, people have learned how the military 
is used to maim and kill people in Indochina who are desperately 
trying to be free.... Through their functions, both the prisons and 
the military touch almost eveiy section of the people in this 
country who have no power—Black people, Chicanos, Puerto 
Ricans, Native Americans, working people, and the poor. It is 
only natural that in both of these structures, many of the ills 
which afflict American society as a whole will be reflected.... The 
stockades and prisons are full of beautiful, committed, strong, 
struggling people. Their beauty, their commitment, theirstrength 
are a threat to the interests of the rich, to racism, to wars which 
sacrifice human lives for profit and power.36
One issue that helped to place military racism in a familiar 
context was the increasingly frequent deployment of troops in ghetto 
neighborhoods to control civil disturbances. Many of the major military 
antiwar groups included planks in their platform positions that decried 
the use of troops in American cities. For black soldiers, this use of troops 
was an example of how, as workers in the military, they would be ordered 
to attack their own people. Recalling earlier uses of troops against 
strikers, Shakedown, a paper published at FortDix, New Jersey, argued 
that it was important for soldiers
to understand what riot training is really aimed at, since we all 
will be subjected to mandatory training and in some cases will 
be called to “pacify” areas here at home. Vietnam, Berkeley,
Newark, and Columbia University are all recent examples of the 
armed power of the state in action against the people.... The most 
vicious use of armed power by the state has been against people 
of color—at first to annihilate the Indians and to take their land, 
later to preserve and protect the slave system, and today to 
control the ghettoes [sic ] of our country.37
The particular problems of harassment and military racism 
received attention in GI antiwar papers, most of whose staff members 
were white. Expressions of solidarity with black service people included 
exposes of the abuses of local and military police authorities. In addition, 
articles on the struggle for racial equality appeared often. On the second 
anniversary of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s murder, Aerospaced reprinted 
its version of “ 10 Commandments on Vietnam,” that it attributed to the 
slain civil rights leader:
1. Thou shalt not believe in military victory.
2. Thou shalt not believe in a political victory.
3. Thou shalt not believe that the Vietnamese love us.
4. Thou shalt not believe that the Saigon Government has
the support of the people.
5. Thou shalt not believe that the majority of the South 
Vietnamese look upon the Viet Cong as terrorists.
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6. Thou shall not believe the figures of killed enemy or of 
killed Amerikkans.
7. Thou shalt not believe that the generals know best.
8. Thou shalt not believe that the enemy victory means 
Communism.
9. Thou shalt not believe that the world supports the United 
States.
10. Thou shalt not kill.38
Aerospaced and other papers helped to keep military racism in the 
forefront of the GI antiwar movement.
Occasionally, the antiwar press brought a light touch to the fight 
against racism. When the Beatle Bailey cartoons, a regular feature of 
daily newspapers throughout the country and in the military, began to 
include Lt. Flap, a bearded black officer who asked questions like, “How 
come there’s no blacks in this honkie outfit?” the Pacific Stars and 
Stripes, an official Army paper, pulled the strip, arguing that “Negro 
soldiers aren’t like that. Besides, the Army regulations wouldn’t allow 
a soldier to grow a goatee.” The Ally, published in Berkeley, suggested 
that Flap’s facial hair had nothing at all to do with his disappearance 
from the Army’s voice of record: “Flap might have been a ‘bad’ example: 
he takes no shit. And then there’s the fact that all those white lifer 
sergeants have to call him ‘Sir!”'39
When they appeared in the mainstream press, reports of 
disaffection and racial violence in the military were often accompanied 
by assurances that the problems were being investigated, that hot lines 
and counseling services were being put in place for black soldiers, and 
that the situation was under control. A ’Bout Face, a “Black GI Publication 
of USB, Unsatisfied Black Soldiers,” based in Mannheim and Heidelberg, 
Germany, offered a differing perspective:
It is the policy of this paper to expose the racist-military clique 
for what they are. Down through the years black GIs have never 
had a voice to speak their true opinions. To that we say ‘no 
more.’... As the struggle intensifies there will be stronger 
repressive measures, again we say ‘no matter how hard you try 
you can’t stop us now.’... We see ourselves as the vanguard of 
the revolutionary struggle....
— Editor-in-chief 
A down brother40
Black soldiers were not alone in seeing their struggle against 
military authority and against the war as part of a broader pattern of 
resistance to oppression. Women in the armed forces began to speak out 
in the GI antiwar press, just as they were beginning to articulate an 
understanding of their oppression in the broader culture. In the press, 
articles on women’s issues discussed gender stereotyping, harassment, 
sexuality, abortion, and the right of women to express independent 
views.
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Women 's Voices iN tHe G l A ntIwar P apers
It was in the context of a culture of protest that women's voices 
began to be heard within the GI antiwar movement through the 
alternative press. Their letters and articles reveal a growing awareness 
of women’s oppression in the larger culture, dissatisfaction with the 
treatment of women in the enlisted ranks, and a sense of futility with 
regard to their ability to bring about an end to the war.41 Antiwar activists 
who organized women on or near military bases realized that enlisted 
women and military wives who may have opposed the war did not “see 
themselves in a direct relationship to the war effort as guys do.... no one 
seems to see herself as able to do anything to stop it.”41a
Women who were dissatisfied with military life could not help 
being ambivalent about their newly found urge to speak out. They were, 
after all, volunteers, who entered the servie with the expectation that the 
military would do something for them and would, at the same time, value 
(heir contributions. They did not call themselves “feminists.” GI 
women’s narratives collected in recent years reflect this ambivalence as 
they reveal a strong nurturing, care giving impulse. According to Renny 
Christopher, who has analyzed oral histories of both male and female 
veterans:
Women often felt that they were supporters of the men, and not 
participants in their own right. Women in the military often felt 
that what they were doing was not as important as what the men 
were doing, and that in addition to their own jobs they also had 
the responsibility of acting as mother, sister, and girlfriend to 
male soldiers. Having absorbed the gender role stereotypes of 
the larger American society, these women expeted to submerge 
their own needs, and to take care of the men, whose role as 
combat soldiers was valued more highly than that of nurses of 
‘support’ personnel.4111
Despite a sense of powerlessness and an absence of ontrol over their 
lives, many women began to speak out in the GI alternative papers that 
were available to them about the conditions of military life, institutionalized 
sexism, and what they, like their counterparts in an emerging feminist 
movement in the larger culture, saw as the obj etifiation of women. They 
did so in a language and style that lacked theoretical clarity and 
intellectual posish, but their views mirrored those of women in the civil 
rights and antiwar movement and, increasingly, in American society as 
a whole.4lc
One important subtext of the GI papers is the close personal 
bonding of men who come to depend on eacch other for support, either 
in combat or in opposition to the military. In military training, an 
important aspet of this bonding proess is ahieved through thehigh value 
plaed on “male” aggression and the fear of being labeled a woman. Mark 
Gerzon has argued that the fear of man's:
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“ W A R ! 'Peace...
As opposition to the war intesified, cartoonists drew sharp 
distinctions between antiwar GIs and civilian supporters of the 
fighting. {The Ally, No. 27, June 1970.)
feminine side, the 'anirna’ in Jungian terms, seems inextriably 
involved in triggering our apaity for destrutiveness. It is as if war 
provides men with a periodi exorism of the aniina—a ritual 
leansing and purification of masculinity. The anima is banished 
from the Soldier's consiousness because it disturbs, in Emma 
Jung's words, “a man's established ideal image of himself.”4 ld
The male soldiers who rejeted the war and who, in many ases, struggled 
to distane themselves from the most destructive aspects of the “male” 
ethos of the military, nonetheless often developed other bonds that 
excluded women. The cultivation of ritual handshakes that emulated 
those of black GIs, calling each other “brother,” and speech peppered 
with expletives and militaiy jargon were all part of a style that can still 
be observed in antiwar veterans nearly twenty years after the end of the 
fighting. Military women often used the vernacular of the men simply to 
“get along” in a male environment and to communicate their political and 
cultural concerns. While they struggled on the job to survive among “the 
guys,” they wrote in the GI newspapers of their frustrations and anxieties 
as women.
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To read the mainstream press during the war is to get a mixed 
picture of women serving in Vietnam. The female GIs, so often referred 
to as “girls,” are portrayed as serious and dedicated soldiers, some of 
whom had volunteered for wartime service because their husbands were 
also serving in Vietnam. But however heavily committed the women 
themselves may have been as they began their tours of duty in Vietnam, 
the press often spoke of them as ornaments whose presence made life 
more “bearable” for male soldiers. Under the headline “41 WACs Are 
First to Serve in Vietnam: 3,000 GIs in Area Suddenly Spruce Up,” UPI 
ran a story in January of 1967 that described life in Vietnam for a group 
of clerk-typists in terms of the male soldiers who surrounded them:
Alter their arrival this month, the WACs appeared on the parade 
ground for a command formation. When the GIs marched onto 
the field, there was chaos as more than a few got out of step while 
watching the girls.... After the girls’ arrival, one company of GIs 
which had been exercising each evening in dirty fatigue uniforms 
and T-shirts suddenly appeared in sharp-looking track 
uniforms.... [One soldier commented] “Take that first sergeant 
for instance.".... “First sergeants are supposed to be mean and 
nasty. But she’s the cutest one in the bunch.”42
A few months later, the Philadelphia Bulletin printed an article about the 
20,000 service women under the title, “Our ‘Soldiers in Skirts’ are Going 
Off to War,” that focused on the patriotism of the women and their 
eagerness to serve in Vietnam. The women, one of whom was described 
as “a petite, pretty brunette with short cropped hair,” and another as 
“head of the nation’s lady Leathernecks,” were all volunteers. Most of 
those interviewed were officers.43
The GI antiwar press gave voice to another group of women, 
mainly enlisted personnel who, while they also began as volunteers and 
may have been self-described “flag wavers,” now felt a sense of 
disillusionment at the reality of their military lives. Angered at being 
treated simply as adjuncts to the male military ethos and increasingly 
aware of the harassment they faced both as soldiers and as women, the 
female GIs who expressed their discontent in the antiwar newspapers 
demanded to be taken seriously. Many women expressed particular 
disillusionment because they had been promised educational, travel, 
and other benefits for enlisting. They asserted that the recruiting pitch 
aimed at women was a lie and that military women were far from “Gung 
Ho” about the war.
Often, male writers supported the women’s cause, as in the 
following excerpt from AFB, the American Servicemen’s Union paper at 
Chanute Air Force base in Illinois:
The WAFs stationed at Chanute are continually oppressed and 
discriminated against by the brass. They are referred to, and 
treated in, materialistic ways, as decorations for the “dreary”
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offices of the brass, and a release for the airmen on Friday night.
The brass refer to WAFs as prostitutes and sex objects, and 
cannot seem to think of women as normal human beings capable 
of experiencing emotion and frustration just as you and I feel it 
as men.
The author also pointed to the absence of recreational facilities for 
women, a hostile atmosphere for women at the pool halls and recreational 
clubs provided for servicemen, movies shown on base that showed 
women as “the main character’s playthings, or sex toys,” and unrealistic 
curfews and regulations that prohibited women from being out of the 
barracks after dark without a male escort. With a sharper and more 
radical analytical perspective than most papers, AFB argued that 
military sexism had its roots in “the capitalist economy of this country” 
and that unequal treatment “dehumanizes both men and women.” AFB 
too the position in its pages that “anything that divides people serves only 
the pigs, whether it’s racism or male chauvinism or intersquadron 
rivalry.”'14
Many of the letters and articles written by women and supportive 
men stressed that women were treated as inferior soldiers because of 
pervasive sexism in all branches of the service from the top down. 
Women complained particularly of sexual harassment and an inability 
to gain promotions. One medical technician, Spec. 4, wrote to Fragging 
Action about the special problems of being a military woman, citing 
frequent weight checks, the absence of weapons training in basic 
training because, “as the story goes, one very hip sister threatened to do 
in her C.O.,” and the difficulty of attaining higher rank: “Well, where do 
the promotions come in? The hard part about being a woman in the 
green machine is if you don’t kiss the right ass or fuck the right people, 
forget about any more rank.”45
Some papers described more than usual harassment of military 
women. At SAC headquarters at Offut Air Force Base, Offul Times 
reported that a WAF unit that failed a general inspection was assigned 
a variety of unusual duties:
Working with little, if any, supplies, our sisters at war have been 
cleaning in places never touched by civilian janitors. Stripping 
wax off the floors on their hands and knees until early hours of 
the morning; scraping paint off windows with razor blades; 
cleaning vents that haven’t been cleaned in a number of years; 
dusting the inside of BX candy machines; painting over furniture 
marks on walls; and cleaning stairways with toothbrushes, are 
only a few examples of the outrageous “duties” that our sisters 
in (he WAF squadron have been doing.
The article ended with the assertion that no Air Force enlisted person 
should have to put up with the excesses of “military discipline” that the 
women were enduring. The writer suggested that individual GIs could
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file a grievance under Article 138 of the UCMJ, advice that appeared in 
many antiwar papers as a way to deal with harassing officers or 
sergeants.
The maj ority of expressions of women’s discontent in the antiwar 
papers transcended simple complaints about specific grievances, although 
these were often reported in the alternative papers and nowhere else. 
“WAF Harassment [sic ] 3” and other similar articles linked the demeaning 
treatment of women to the more gen^*ic oppression of soldiers in all 
branches of the service. Military women complained, not only of unequal 
treatment in the military, but of an equality of oppression to which they 
and their male counterparts were subjected. Writers urged their 
colleagues, men and women, to file charges against their immediate 
superiors under Article 138 or, failing this, to contact their member of 
Congress for a redress of their grievances. Local antiwar projects and 
coffeehouses increasingly began to offer an opportunity for women to 
discuss their problems.46
Women in the enlisted ranks were more involved than officers in 
the emerging critique of the war and resistance to military policy and 
regualtions. Enlisted women, wives of service personnel, and civilian 
antiwar oganizers often marched in demonstrations, held consciousness- 
raising grou ps off base, and took part in other symbolic acts of resistance. 
Women at Fort Bragg, North Carolina organized a small group to study 
American history, which they defined as “worker's history, third world 
history, and women's history.” The Fort Bragg women also instituted 
courses in such “essential” skills as emergency first aid, basic auto 
mechanics, self-defense, and carpentry.46a
Women's groups in the military were especially fragile and often 
did not survive for more than a few months. Enlisted women who spoke 
publicly on women's issues, like male GIs who opposed the war, were 
subject to harrassment and frequent transfers, a technique used 
effectively by military brass to rid a unit of outspoken soldiers. Like 
participants in the new women's groups in the civilian population, 
military women who met to dscuss their problems often had no common 
political perspective. These groups often disintegrated not over common 
complaints but over strategic and tactical debates over how to organize 
women and for what purpose.
In addition, military women were haunted by the issue of 
lesbianism. Homosexuality was cause for less-than-honorable discharges, 
and many gay women feared being too outspoken on political issues. 
According to USSF women organizers, gay women
don't relate to Fl'A politics because the army is basically 
pretty good for them and our relationship to them was much 
more essentially political: we talked about class, the war, 
women. The problem... is that they are not in a position to 
move politically—they don't want to get kicked out of the 
army.46b
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Women who were not gay feared charges and innuendo that they could 
neither accept nor refute. It was not surprising that women in the 
military were often wary of organizing ingroups. Instead, many used the 
existing GI antiwar press to express their grievances and correct the 
record on the issue of what life was really like for them in the service.
Like black soldiers and those who openly expressed antiwar and 
anti-military views, women who gave voice to their grievances often 
experienced surveillance, restrictions, undesirable job assignments, 
excessive charges filed against them for minor infractions, and other 
fonns of harassment. Women who distributed Broken Arrow at Selfridge 
AFB in Michigan were questioned by the FBI as well as by military 
authorities. WACs at Fort Bragg were questioned and intimidated by 
base authorities in an effort to encourage them to “name names” in order 
to substantiate “charges” of drug use, homosexuality, or subversive 
activity. One WAC wrote that the tactics of dragging people who were to 
be questioned off their jobs in public and threatening them with 
dishonorable discharge was working:
WAC company has got us WACs so uptight and paranoid about 
being reported to the CID as gay, that we avoid sitting together 
in the dining room or on buses. It gets pretty lonely here when 
you can’t even be close friends with other WACs for fear of being 
labeled gay. Don’t let them scare you from relating to your WAC 
sisters.47
Women began to find a voice in the military, just as they were beginning 
to express themselves as individuals and as an oppressed group in the 
larger culture. But they faced major cultural obstacles in the male 
military culture in which women served men. Helping Hand, the antiwar 
paper at Mountain Home AFB in Idaho, described lectures on sex that 
were presented to new recru its. The easy availability of oral contraceptives, 
without a medical examination or warnings as to possible side effects 
and dangers, and the fact that a pregnancy could be “handled with 
discretion by the Air Force” received attention in this article. The author 
wondered why the Air Force was not more candid about its “true” 
purpose for recruiting women:
If WAFs are on this or any other base entirely for the purpose of 
servicing GIs, then there should be some kind of warning that 
recruiters gwe to potential WAFs. Each girl who is thinking of 
joining the service with intent of serving her country should 
know that the recruiter she is talking to is really a pimp for the 
United States Air Force. The eighteen year old girl, fresh out of 
high school and patriotically motivated should be made awar e of 
how the military is planning to use her.48
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From time to time, the GI antiwar papers printed articles on 
individual acts of resistance by women, such as the refusal of a WAF at 
Travis AFB to accept a transfer to the Philippines because of her 
opposition to this country’s presence and investment in Third World 
countries.49 They also printed attacks on sexism in advertising and on 
the newly-emerging issue of legalized abortion.50 These contributions
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helped to raise the consciousness of military women and their male 
counterparts to issues of sexism in American and the relationship of that 
fonn of oppression to others.
CONClusiON
Resistance to the m ilitary ethos and demands for a more 
democratic organization, along with protests against military racism 
and sexism, helped to broaden the base of the GI antiwar movement. 
Military personnel who began to read the papers because of a specific 
gripe or grievance were exposed to a broad range of issues that 
demanded engagement. The use of the papers as a forum for antiwar 
views made it possible for military personnel to connect—as their 
counterparts in the civilian and student antiwar movement were doing— 
their own oppression with that of many others in the United States and 
throughout the world.
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One of the least known but most important chapters in the 
history of America’s encounter with Vietnam was the internal rebellion 
that wracked the U.S. military. From the Long Binh jail in Vietnam, to 
Travis Air Force Base in California, to aircraft carriers in the South China 
Sea, the armed forces faced widespread resistance and unrest. 
Throughout the military morale and discipline sank to record lows. 
Antiwar committee and underground newspapers appeared everywhere.1 
Unauthorized absence rates reached unprecedented levels: in the Army 
in 1971 there were seventeen AWOLs and seven desertions for every one 
hundred soldiers.2 Harsher forms of rebellion also occurred—drug 
abuse, violent uprisings, refusal of orders, even attacks against superiors. 
The cumulative result of this resistance within the ranks was a severe 
breakdown in military effectiveness and combat capability. By 1969 the 
Army had ceased to function as an effective fighting force and was rapidly 
disintegrating. The armed forces had to be withdrawn from Indochina 
for their very survival.
The strongest and most militant resisters were black GIs. Of all 
the soldiers of the Vietnam era, black and other minority GIs were 
consistently the most active in their opposition to the war and military 
injustice. Blacks faced greater oppression that whites, and they fought 
back with greater detennination and anger. The rebellions that shook 
American cities like Watts, Newark, and Detroit erupted at major 
military installationsjust a few years later. The result was a military tom 
by racial rebellion.
The militancy of black GIs was a reaction to the pervasiveness of 
racial discrimination within the military. Racism has always existed in 
the American military as it has in the larger civilian society. In some 
respects the milit ary is better than civilian life: in 1948, the anned forces 
were desegregated before many civilian agencies, and military sendee is 
one of the few avenues of potential advancement available for blacks. In 
other respects, though, the military is worse: the arbitrary nature of 
command authority can mean a miserable existence for those who seme 
under prejudiced commanders. Studies conducted during the Vietnam 
era confinn that institutionalized discrimination was widespread, 
especially in the military justice system. One of the most thorough 
studies was the Department of defense’s own four-volume Report o f the 
Task Force on the Administration o f Military Justice, issued in December
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1972. According to the Pentagon report, “No command or installation... 
is entirely free from the effects of systematic discrimination against 
minority servicemen.”3 The Congressional Black Caucus also conducted 
a study of discrimination within the military in 1972 and came up with 
similar findings. The Caucus’ report concluded that “racism has 
become institutionalized at all levels of the military.”4
Job assignment is a primary concern for black GIs, and the 
Pentagon and Black Caucus reports confirmed what the soldiers already 
knew: they were disproportionately assigned to low-skill and dead-end 
positions, especially in combat and service jobs. In 1971, according to 
the Black Caucus study, black servicemen represented 12.1 percent of 
all enlisted people, but they constituted 16.3 percent of those in combat, 
and 19.6 percent of those in service and supply positions.5 By contrast 
they held only 4.9 percent of jobs in electronics specialties. In an Army 
study of dissenters in 1971, 31% of blacks interviewed were assigned to 
combat, compared to only 18% of the whites.6 Blacks were also 
discriminated against in military promotions. Blacks were 
disproportionately assigned to the lowest ranks and were 
underrepresented at the highest grades. This pattern was most 
pronounced in the Officer Corps. In 1974, blacks constituted 16 percent 
of all military personnel, but only 2.8 percent of officers.7
The system of military justice is notoriously discriminatory. The 
Department of Defense Task Force found that “a greater number of black 
enlisted men received non-judicial punishment [25 percent] than their 
proportionate number [12 percent].”8 Likewise in General and Special 
courts-martial studied by the Task Force, 23.4 percent of blacks and 
only 16.9 percent of whites received a punitive discharge as part of their 
sentence.9 The incidence of less-than-honorable discharges shows the 
same pattern. In 1971 less-than-honorable discharges were issued to 
one of every seven black GIs, compared to only one of every fourteen 
whites.10 Blacks were twice as likely as whites to receive a bad discharge.
While the struggle against racism and injustice was a major 
concern for black GIs, they, like most other soldiers, were also motivated 
by opposition to the war. The Army study of dissenters noted above 
confirms that ending the war was the number one priority for the 
majority of GI resisters. When asked to give the reason for their 
participation in dissent activities, the soldiers interviewed cited the 
"Vietnam War" 58 percent of the time. The other major reason, “The Way 
the Army Treats the Individual,” was cited 38 percent of the time.11 For 
black and other minority GIs, opposition to the war had a special 
meaning. Many blacks asked why they should risk death to defend 
freedom in Vietnam when they were denied basic rights back home. Why 
should they fight Asians in a distant land when they could be struggling 
against discrimination and racism in their own society? Such critical 
thinking received encouragement from the example of Cassius Clay 
[Muhammed Ali] and other draft resisters, and the antiwar speeches of 
Martin Luther King. Jr. A  popular documentary movie of the time was
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titled No Vietnamese Ever Called Me Nigger. The teachings of Malcolm 
X and his radical critique of the war also had influence at several major 
bases. Andrew Pulley, a leader of GIs United Against the War at Fort 
Jackson, South Carolina, reports that he and other soldiers were 
initiated into the GI movement by listening to tapes of Malcolm X in the 
barracks.12
For black GIs, opposition to military authority was often expressed 
in cultural symbols. Throughout the military blacks gathered in 
informal study groups and cultural clubs to listen to music, to study and 
rap together, and to promote black pride and consciousness. Many of 
these groups became centers of resistance activity as the connections 
between the war and racism spurred growing numbers of GIs into action. 
Often they would join together in collective defiance of the military. I 
remember from my own experience at Fort Bliss, Texas, for example, that 
“the brothers” roomed together in the same part of the barracks and 
engaged in behavior that blatantly challenged regulations. Many of the 
troops had huge Afro haircuts that far exceeded allowable standards. A 
group of ten or more of the brothers adorned with beads or African 
jewelry would strut conspicuously across the quad between the barracks 
carrying “power sticks” (African walking sticks with a carved fist at the 
top). Their Army caps perched atop oversized Afros, many wearing 
sneakers rather than combat boots, most with their shirts unbloused 
and unbuttoned, they were an affront to the military dress code. But the 
brothers were left alone. The company sergeants and commanders 
already had more than enough trouble dealing with the current level of 
dissent , and they did not want to cause more trouble by challenging the 
blacks.
One controversial cultural expression of the time was the “dap” 
or “power greeting”—an elaborate series of hand slapping and finger 
popping that could sometimes take a minute or more to perform.13 An 
innocuous enough greeting by itself, it sometimes became the center of 
conflict when prejudiced commanders or NCOs took offense and issued 
instructions banning it. In response, some blacks would develop an even 
more elaborate and time-consuming form of the dap, which they 
invariably chose to perform in mess hall lines, where it would cause the 
greatest disruption. Such manifestations of solidarity occurred frequently 
throughout the military and were an important assertion of social 
identity for black GIs.
To bet ter appreciate the extent of the GI resistance movement, let 
us consult again the Army study of dissent. Conducted in 1970 and 
1971 by the Research Analysis Corporation, a Virginia-based think tank 
that frequently served Army needs, the two volume report depicts a GI 
movement even more widespread than those of us involved at the time 
thought possible. The Army’s researchers interviewed hundreds of 
soldiers at major Army bases in the continental United States to 
determine the extent of participation in resistance activities and GI 
attitudes toward the military. The survey found that one out of every four
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enlisted soldiers had participated in “dissident” activities, defined as 
attendance at a coffee house, publication of a GI newspaper, participation 
in a demonstration, etc. The study found that an equal percentage of 
soldiers engaged in acts of “disobedience,” which was defined as 
insubordination, refusing orders, sabotaging equipment, etc. This 
dist inction between dissent and disobedience is helpful for understanding 
the full range of GI resistance activities. By combining these two 
categories of opposition, the Research Analysis Corporation found that 
a startling 47 percent of the soldiers interviewed engaged in some form 
of dissent or disobedience, with 32 percent involved in such activities 
more than once. If frequent drug use is added as another form of 
resistance, the combined percentage of soldiers involved in rebellious 
behavior comes to an incredible 55 percent. The Army’s own study thus 
shows that half of its soldiers during the 1970-1971 period were engaged 
in resistance activity—a truly astounding level of disaffection within the 
ranks.14
The development of the GI movement followed the evolution of 
the war itself. Soldier resistance appeared first in the Army and Marine 
Corps, which bore the brunt of the fighting in the early years of the war. 
As the Army and Marine Corps were withdrawn and the burden of 
continuing the war fell to the Navy and Air Force, the GI movement took 
hold in these services, and by 1970 the locus of revolt had shifted more 
to the Navy and Air Force.
During the first phase of the GI movement, black Marines and 
soldiers staged numerous rebellions at stateside bases. These were 
usually prison uprisings sparked by mistreatment and oppressive 
conditions. At Fort Bragg, on July 23, 1968, black and white GIs seized 
control of the stockade to protest the beating of a black inmate. The 
rebels held the stockade for forty-eight hours before surrendering to 
armed troops from the 82nd Airborne.15 Similar rebellions occurred at 
several Army bases in 1969—on May 13 at Fort Carson, on June 5 at Fort 
Dix, and on three separate occasions at Fort Riley. Nonviolent protests 
and boycotts were also led by blacks that year at Fort Ord and Fort 
Jackson.
Major rebellions also occurred in the Marine Corps. The oppressive 
brig at Camp Pendleton, California— described in an influential article as 
“Andersonville by the Sea”—was the site of several violent incidents.16 
After a series of protests during 1969, the prison exploded in bitterness 
and frustration. On the night of September 14, hundreds of prisoners 
broke out of their barracks, setting fires and smashing nearly everything 
in sight. When the rebellion was finally suppressed by tear gas-firing 
Military Police (MPs), the entire prison was a shambles.17 An even more 
severe and tragic uprising occurred on July 20, 1969, at Camp Lejeune. 
A dispute over a racial incident at an enlisted men’s club turned into a 
huge brawl that spread over the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines barracks 
area. The fighting left fourteen injured and one Marine dead.18
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GI resistance was even more widespread among the more than 
200,000 American soldiers stationed in West Germany. Black GIs 
organized study groups and rap clubs at nearly every major U.S. base in 
Germany. Among the more active groups were Unsatisfied Black 
Soldiers from the Mannheim-Heidelberg area, the Black Action Group in 
the Stuttgart region, and the Black Dissent Group from Smiley barracks 
at Karlsruhe. In 1970 these groups joined together at a remarkable “Call 
for Justice” assembly at the University of Heidelberg. Nearly 1,000 active 
duty soldiers, most of them black, gathered on July 4 to issue their own 
declaration of independence, demanding an end to the war, a withdrawal 
of U.S. interests from southern Africa, the elimination of discriminatory 
practices in military justice and a guarantee to equal opportunity for 
black and other minority GIs.19
While black and white GI groups often worked in isolation from 
one another, black-white unity sometimes emerged with potent effect. 
An example occurred at Nellingen, West Germany, in the summer and 
fall of 1970. The arrival of a zealous new commander and an increase 
in complaints about harassment and racial discrimination created a 
virtual war within the base. A  Molotov cocktail was exploded outside the 
company orderly room, several fire bombings occurred on the base, and 
there were increasing incidents of sabotage. As the harassment of the 
troops and the number of racial incidents increased, the soldiers 
threatened to blow up the base. On the evening of September 21, 
approximately one hundred black and white GIs broke a curfew and 
marched through the base shouting “Revolution!” and “Join us!” to fellow 
GIs. The men returned to their barracks, but only after the Provost 
Marshal pledged that no reprisals would be carried out. Similar acts of 
defiance occurred at numerous bases, notjust in Germany but throughout 
the military.20
The cumulative result of this mounting wave of resistance was a 
severe crisis for U.S. ground forces. Already reeling from the heavy 
combat losses and huge manpower commitments of the Vietnam war, 
the Army faced a “terrible nightmare,” in the words of author Shelby 
Stanton.21 Practically every unit in the Army had been stripped of 
manpower for Vietnam and faced severe internal turmoil. Stanton 
writes:
By that year [1968] in Europe only 39 percent of the 465 
reporting units had a personnel readiness equal to their 
deliberately diminished assigned capability.... Even more chilling 
was the secret December 31,1968 pronouncement by the United 
State Army in Europe that none of its major units had met their 
operational training readiness conditions for the second straight 
year.22
Within the United States the situation was even worse:
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In June of 1968 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced to flunk every 
division and brigade on the continent with the lowest grading 
possible in all categories—including personnel training and 
logistics, with the exception of the 82nd Airborne Division which 
had a brigade in Vietnam.23
Within Vietnam the morale and disciplinary crisis was the most 
severe of all and sapped the Army’s ability to fight. The most extreme and 
tragic manifestation of the collapse of the Army was fragging, an attack 
against a sergeant or commander with a fragmentation grenade. According 
to the Army’s own statistics there were 551 fragging incidents in the 
years 1969-1972, resulting in 86 deaths and over 700 injuries. Eighty 
percent of the victims in these incidents were officers and NCOs.24 These 
statistics do not tell the full story of the internal rebellion within the 
Army, since they do not include shootings with fireamis, which were also 
common. By 1969 the Anny was at war with itself. Gung-ho officers 
eager to push their men into battle were an endangered species and often 
became the victims of assault by their own men. Shelby Stanton 
confirms what had been a widely circulated rumor at the time: following 
the bloody ten day battle for Hamburger Hill in May 1969, soldiers put 
a notice in an underground newspaper offering a $10,000 reward for 
fragging the officers in charge.25
The ultimate impact of the spreading internal breakdown was 
that soldiers increasingly refused to fight. By 1969 combat refusals and 
mutinies occurred with shocking frequency. One example during 1969 
involved A Company of the First Battalion/506th Regiment at Camp 
Evans near the A  Shau Valley. After a night of racial tensions that almost 
resulted in a shoot-out between black and white soldiers, fifteen black 
soldiers refused to report for combat patrol the next day.26 Numerous 
such incidents occurred throughout Vietnam. During research for 
Soldier’s Revolt, we were able to identify ten major incidents of combat 
refusal. Stanton’s study, drawing upon official Army unit archives, 
shows that the “ugly stain of combat disobedience” had reached epidemic 
proportions. In the elite First Cavalry Division alone, according to 
Stanton, there were thirty-five incidents of refusal to fight during 1970, 
some involving entire units.27
One of the most severe rebellions of the Vietnam era occurred in 
1968 among black inmates at the Long Binh jail, known to the troops as 
LBJ. As was common throughout the military at the time, LEkJ was 
oppressive and overcrowded, and many of the prisoners were black. 
Tensions and violence within the jail steadily rose until it exploded at the 
end ofAugust in a rebellion that left much of the stockade destroyed and 
resulted in injuries to 63 soldiers, including 23 who required 
hospitalization. One GI, Pvt. Edward Haskett of St. Petersburg, Florida, 
was killed in the uprising. Afterwards, nearly 200 blacks banded 
together and staged a work strike. A small group barricaded themselves 
within the stockade and continued to hold out for more than a month.28
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A similar rebellion occurred two weeks earlier at the Marine brig 
in Da Nang. The prisoners seized control of the central compound area 
and held out against armed guards for twenty hours. When commanders 
tried to remove some of the inmates a few days later, violence erupted 
again and a force of 120 riot-equipped MPs was required to restore order. 
Eight soldiers were injured in the incident, and the cell block was heavily 
damaged by fire.29
As elsewhere in the military, blacks in Vietnam formed solidarity 
grou ps and rap clubs that often became the centers of political resistance. 
One such group, the so-called “Black Liberation Front of the Armed 
Forces,” was lead by Eddie Burney, a Black Panther Party supporter 
stationed at the 4th Transportation Command in Long Binh. In the 
spring of 1971, Burney and other blacks staged a demonstration at Long 
Minh to commemorate the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. Chanting 
“Free Angela Davis!” and “Free the Brothers in LBJ!” forty GIs participated 
in the action.30 Similar groups appeared at other camps in Vietnam, as 
black GIs banded together to oppose the war and defend themselves 
against harassment and discrimination. Their resistance activities had 
an enormous impact on the American military and played a crucial role 
in speeding the end of the war.
As noted earlier, the GI movement spread from the Army and 
Marine Corps to the Air Force and Navy as the latter services assumed 
the principal burden of continuing the American war effort. The 
rebellion that nearly crippled the Army and Marine Corps began to 
disrupt operations in the Air Force and Navy as well. By 1972, resistance 
had reached the point where B-52 crews were refusing to fly and the 
Navy’s aircraft carriers were crippled by sabotage and internal rebellion.
As in the Army and Marine Corps, black servicemen played a 
leading role in the GI movement within the Air Force. Faced wilh the 
usual injustices—unequal job assignment, a disproportionate number 
of disciplinary punishments, slow promotions—black airmen joined 
together to defend their interests. As elsewhere in the military, they 
formed discussion groups or cultural organizations. At the end of 1970, 
Air Force Times admitted the existence of twenty-five such groups, many 
of them actively engaged in local struggles against injustice.31 One such 
group, affiliated with the American Servicemen’s Union, was the Black 
Discussion Group, active during 1971 at Plattsburgh Air Force Base in 
New York. Another was Concerned Black Airmen, centered at Chanute 
Air Force Base in Illinois. In 1971, the Chanute group held an on-base 
service on Armed Forces Day, May 17, dedicated to the memory ol 
Malcolm X. In August, after months of worsening racial tensions on the 
base and growing black frustration, Chanute erupted into violence. 
During a three-day period, the base exchange, theater, and gas station 
were damaged and several airmen were injured. A  few weeks later eighty 
men participated in a demonstration and picket line outside a high level 
meeting of the Air Training Command, to press home their demands for 
equal treatment.32
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There were other uprisings and militant actions at air bases 
during the war, but the largest and most dramatic occurred at Travis Air 
Force Base in May, 1971. Travis was a crucial center for the American 
war effort, and the primary embarkation point for flights to Indochina. 
From May 22 through May 25, this important California base was 
crippled by perhaps the largest mass rebellion in the history of the Air 
Force. The roots of the conflict lay in command repression, rampant 
discrimination against black airmen, and a general crisis in morale 
resulting from the increasing unpopularity of the war. The rebellion 
began with a fracas at the local enlisted men’s club, and quickly 
broadened into a generalized uprising throughout the base. Fighting 
apparently began on Saturday afternoon between black enlistees and 
the base security police. Following the incident, the minority barracks 
area was cordoned off and a number of black airmen were arrested. 
Anger and resentment continued to mount and on Monday evening the 
base erupted in violence as more than two hundred enlisted people, 
some whites included, attempted to free the imprisoned blacks and were 
met by a force of three hundred MPs and nearly eighty civilian officers 
called in from surrounding communities. A  major brawl ensued that 
involved some six hundred airmen. The officers’ club was burned, 
several dozen people were injured, and 135 GIs (most of them black) were 
arrested. Fighting continued into the next day; armed guards patrolled 
the base and all incoming traffic was searched at the gate.33 For a few 
days, Travis was in a virtual state of siege, with base activities disrupted 
and nearly all attention devoted to restoring order.
In the wake of the 1971 Travis revolt, the Pentagon hurriedly 
dispatched special race relations advisors to the base in an attempt to 
prevent further violence. Throughout the Air Force (and in other services 
as well), racial harmony programs were established, including “human 
relations” councils and so-called equal opportunity officers, as a means 
of stemming the growing black rebellion. The new policies had little 
impact on the actual conditions of service and were designed mainly to 
channel grievances into controllable outlets. These programs did 
nothing to alter the systemic discrimination and injustice within the 
military, and they did not even address the problem of the continuing 
war in Indochina.
The GI movement in the Air Force continued to grow right up 
until the end of direct U.S. involvement in the war in 1973. By 1972, 
there were more than thirty active GI organizing projects and underground 
newspapers within the Air Force, not counting the substantial number 
of black discussion groups. With each new wave of bombing by the Nixon 
administration, protests and demonstrations erupted at bases throughout 
the world. During the massive escalation of bombing in response to the 
1972 Easter offensive, demonstrations and rallies occurred at dozens of 
air bases throughout the world— including Westover, Mountain Home, 
Kirtland, McGuire, Offutt, Travis and March Air Force Bases in the 
United States, andYokota, Misawa, and ClarkAirForce Bases in Asia.34
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The rising tide of antiwar resistance ultimately began to disrupt 
bombing operations and reached even the predominantly white officer 
pilots. Morale among airmen and crew members at the combat bases in 
Thailand and Guam steadily plummeted in 1972, as evidenced by rising 
heroin use and increasing incidents of “fodding” or “foreign object 
damage”—a phrase used to describe the unknown source of damage to 
aircraft. In December, two pilots stationed in Thailand (Captains Dwight 
D. Evans and Michael Heck) refused to fly further combat missions.35 In 
the spring of 1973, four B-52 crewmen stationed at Guam joined in a 
federal court suit filed in New York by Congresswoman Elizabeth 
Holtzman, challenging the constitutionality of the continued bombing.36 
Shortly thereafter the Pentagon cut back on bombing missions, and a 
few months later Congress finally cut off funding and brought to an end 
the most intensive bombing campaign in the history of warfare.
Black resistance in the Navy also increased dramatically as its 
giant aircraft carrier task groups assumed increased responsibility for 
carrying on the air war. The Navy had traditionally been the most racist 
of the military services. It was the last to desegregate, and it has had a 
long tradition of exploiting Filipinos as servants and cooks. In 1971, 
fewer than five percent of the Navy’s sailors were black, and the 
percentage of blacks among officers was less than one percent. The 
expanding manpower needs of the Vietnam war, though, forced the Navy 
to open its doors to an increasing number of black recruits. While the 
number of blacks grew, the discriminatory traditions of the past remained. 
The result was widespread resistance and political dissent, with black 
sailors playing a leading role in the GI movement within the Navy.
By 1970 underground newspapers and protest actions began to 
appear at major naval bases and even aboard ships. One of the earliest 
manifestations of this development was the Movement for a Democratic 
Military (MDM), a network of loosely connected radical groups that 
appeared at San Diego, Long Beach, and Alameda in California, and at 
the Navy’s Great Lakes Naval Training Center near Chicago. The Great 
Lakes MDM chapter included a considerable number of black sailors, 
and in July, 1970, blacks and whites staged a series of protest marches 
and demonstrations in an attempt to free four WAVES they felt were 
unjustly imprisoned in the base brig.37
As the pace of Naval air operations off the Indochina coast 
intensified in 1971 and 1972, the level of antiwar opposition also grew. 
As aircraft carriers left their California ports for combat missions in the 
South China Sea, they were greeted not by the traditional cheering 
crowds, but with protest demonstrations and political opposition. In 
October, 1971, sailors and antiwar civilians in San Diego organized an 
informal election to decide whether the U.S.S. Constitution should sail for 
Vietnam. Fifty-four thousand San Diegans voted in an unofficial 
referendum, including 6,900 active duty servicemen and women. Eighty- 
two percent of the civilians and 73 percent of the servicepeople voted to 
keep the Connie home.38 The ship eventually departed for Indochina, but
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it sailed under a cloud of dissent. A  similar movement, initiated entirely 
by active duty sailors, emerged at the same time aboard the carrier U.S.S. 
Coral Sea at Alameda. Twelve hundred sailors— one fourth of the entire 
crew—signed a petition opposing the war in Indochina and urging that 
the ship stay home.39 A  similar below decks movement emerged in 
opposition to the sailing of the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk a few months later. 
When each of these ships sailed, a small group of black and white sailors 
on board declared that they could not in conscience participate in the 
war and publicly refused to go.
The Nixon administration’s response to the Easter offensive in 
1972 placed even greater pressures on an already heavily committed 
Navy. During the rest of that year as many as four carrier task groups 
(out of a total of fourteen) were on combat station in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
Normal fleet operations were completely disrupted, as practically the 
entire Pacific fleet was thrown into the fray. For the already overworked 
crew members involved, the escalation created great hardships. With 
opposition to the war spreading rapidly, morale plummeted. While many 
sailors expressed their opposition through acts of political dissent, many 
others resorted to more extreme measures of disobedience and 
obstruction.
Perhaps the most shocking manifestation of the disintegration of 
morale within the Navy in 1972 was the growing prevalence of internal 
sabotage. In its 1973 report on Navy disciplinary problems, the House 
Armed Sendees Committee disclosed what it termed “an alarming 
frequency of successful acts of sabotage and apparent sabotage on a 
wide variety of ships and stations.” 40 The Committee reported “literally 
hundreds of instances of damage to Naval property wherein sabotage is 
suspected.”41 The most dramatic and important of these internal acts of 
disruption occurred in July, 1972, when within the space of just three 
weeks, two of the Navy’s aircraft carriers were put out of commission by 
attacks from within. On July 10, 1972, a massive fire broke out aboard 
the U.S.S. Forrestalin Norfolk. The blaze caused seven million dollars in 
damage and was described as the largest single act of sabotage in Naval 
history. The carrier’s deployment was delayed by more than two 
months.42 Three weeks later another act of sabotage crippled the carrier 
U.S.S. Ranger as it was about to depart from Alameda for Indochina. A  
paint scraper and two twelve-inch bolts were inserted into the ship’s 
reduction gears, causing nearly one million dollars in damage and 
forcing a three-and-a-half month delay in operations for extensive 
repairs.43
The sabotaging of the Ranger and Forrestal set the stage for one 
of the most violent internal uprisings in the history of the Navy—the 
rebellion aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk. In October, 1972, after a 
grueling eight months at sea and constant bombing missions in the Gulf 
of Tonkin, the huge ship pulled into Subic Bay in the Philippines for a 
rest stop before a scheduled return home. Unexpectedly, the crew was 
informed that rather than sailing home, they had to return to combat
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operations in the South China Sea. According to the report on the 
incident by the House Armed Services Committee, “this rescheduling 
apparently was due to the incidents of sabotage aboard her sister ships 
U.S.S. Ranger and U.S.S. Forrestal.”44 With two of the Navy’s principal 
carriers out of commission due to sabotage, the Kilty Hawk was forced 
to cancel its return home. With tensions already high among crew 
members due to declining morale and rising racial tensions, the order to 
return to Vietnam was the spark that touched off violence. On the night 
before the ship’s departure, serious fighting erupted at the Subic Bay 
enlisted men’s club. On the evening of October 12, as the ship arrived 
at Yankee Station off the coast of Indochina, the ship’s intelligence 
investigator exacerbated tensions by calling in only black sailors for 
questioning about the brawl at Subic. Outraged at what they considered 
unfair treatment, over one hundred blacks gathered for a meeting on the 
ship’s aft mess deck at approximately 8pm. The armed Marine detachment 
aboard the earner was summoned to suppress the meeting, and an 
explosive situation quickly developed. The Executive Officer (XO), 
Commander Benjamin Cloud (a black man), entered the area and 
attempted to restore calm by ordering the blacks and Marines to 
separate ends of the ship. Moments later, however, Captain Marland 
Townsends, the Commanding Officer (CO), arrived and issued conflicting 
orders. As confusion spread, the blacks and armed Marines encountered 
each other unexpectedly on the hanger deck and a bitter clash erupted. 
The fighting spread rapidly throughout the ship, with bands of blacks 
and whites marauding through the decks and attacking each other with 
fists, chains, wrenches, and pipes. For hours the ship seethed with 
violent conflict and confusion. At one point the XO believed that the CO 
had been injured or killed, and made an announcement over the public 
address system ordering the rebels and armed Marines to separate 
locations. The Commander, still on the hanger deck and distressed at 
the XO’s announcement, gave different orders over the address system. 
Finally, at about 2:30am at a meeting in the forecastle, the black sailors 
agreed to lay down their chains and other weapons and disperse. A total 
of forty-seven men, most of them black, were treated for injuries that 
night. Three had to be evacuated to shore hospitals. All twenty-five 
sailors arrested for the incident were black.45
A few weeks later, another major rebellion— this time nonviolent— 
occurred aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Constellation in San Diego. 
Described by the New York Times as “the first mass mutiny in the history 
of the U.S. Navy,”45 the rebellion aboard the Constellation grew out of the 
effort s of an onboard organization known as The Black Fraction to resist 
repression and discrimination against black crew members. Throughout 
Oct ober, 1972, the black sailors organized committ ees among themselves, 
elected representatives and demanded investigations into the ship’s 
records of non-judicial punishment. As the organization grew in 
strength, the ship’s commanders singled out fifteen members as agitators 
and ordered that six of them be given immediate less-than-honorable
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discharges. Rumors began to circulate that as many as two hundred 
blacks would receive bad discharges. In response, more than one 
hundred sailors—mostly black, but including a few whites— staged a sit- 
in in the aft mess deck on November 3, 1972. The sailors continued their 
protest action throughout the day and into the next morning, refusing 
a direct order to report for muster. To avert violence and another Kitty 
Hawk incident, the ship’s captain decided to return to North Island in 
San Diego and put the dissident group ashore as a “beach detachment.” 
More than 130 men, most of them black, went ashore. A  few days later, 
on November 8th, the commander ordered the men to return to the 
Constellation. The sailors refused and instead mustered in their own 
formation on the pier, in effect staging a dockside strike. A  total of 122 
crewmen were involved in the action. Despite their direct refusal of an 
order, the rebels received light treatment. Commanders were apparently 
eager to prevent, at all costs, further violence or uprisings. A number of 
the rebels were quietly discharged, but most were simply reassigned to 
shore duty.47
In the wake of the Kitiy Hawk and the Constellation incidents, 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, called together eighty 
leading admirals and Marine Corps generals for an emergency meeting 
at the Pentagon in order to address the problem of race relations. The 
assembled commanders were urged to be more sensitive to the growing 
number of blacks within the military and to give greater attention to the 
human relations councils and other reforms recently introduced by the 
Pentagon.4” In some places commanders sponsored educational programs 
on black history and culture, and sensitivity sessions and discussion 
groups were allowed. As noted earlier, these attempts at reform did 
nothing to redress the structural injustices and systematic discrimination 
encountered by blacks within the military. Moreover, as long as the war 
in Vietnam continued and American troops remained in Indochina, the 
GI movement and the black rebellion within the military continued. Only 
in 1973, as the direct U.S. combat role finally came to an end, did 
tensions within the ranks begin to ease and military life slowly return to 
normal.
As Anerican forces completed their withdrawal from Indochina 
and the military shifted to the all-volunteer force, hundreds of thousands 
of Vietnam-era GIs were discharged en masse. Manpower levels in the 
military dropped sharply from a high of 3.5 million in 1968 to 2.3 million 
in 1972. In some cases, an “early out” release program allowed enlisted 
people to return home months ahead of schedule. Many of the black 
resisters in the Navy were released under this program in 1972; the same 
strategy was used to rid the Army of soldier activists the year before. The 
longest and most divisive war in American history was at last over, and 
the GIs who resisted it were sent home. Military commanders breathed 
a collective sigh of relief and began the arduous task of rebuilding their 
shattered services and creating a new all-volunteer force.
Although little known or understood, the GI resistance movement
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in which blacks played a leading role was an important part of the 
Vietnam war experience. Never before in modern history had the 
American armed forced faced such widespread internal revolt. Hundreds 
of thousands of soldiers, marines, airmen and sailors dissented and 
disobeyed military commanders, often at grave personal risk, to speak 
out for peace and justice. Their struggle had a major impact in forcing 
the American military to finally end the war in Vietnam.
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I wasn’t getting out, I knew I was there—this guy just got killed, 
and I’m just going, “Shoo! Man, this is wrong! I can’t live with 
this.” And so my life, and what happened to us, seemed kind of 
insignificant, considering what had just happened. We were 
mindless of our own mortality, or anything else—our safety. I 
mean we were scared to death, ‘cause we knew something was 
gonna happen, but we didn’t know exactly what.
1968 was a year of death in America. Anyone who lived through 
it as an adult will remember the back-to-back assassinations of the 
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. in April, and Senator Robert F. 
Kennedy in June—two men whose respective crusades, for racial 
equality and civic justice, had converged fairly near the end of their lives 
in heartfelt pleas to end the war in Vietnam. King’s decision to speak out 
against the war had occurred a year earlier; Kennedy’s challenge to the 
official Democratic Party support of the war did not occur until after the 
Party’s leader. President Lyndon Baines Johnson, had withdrawn from 
the 1968 Presidential race, making way for Kennedy to mount his own 
campaign. The decision of Johnson to withdraw, as well as that of 
Kennedy to run on a peace platform, were both motivated in large part 
by the sudden swift increase in American combat deaths in Vietnam 
during theTet Offensive. Almost 15,000 GIs died in 1968, the majority 
filed in the period from February through April.
1968 was also the year America’s cities, from Washington, D.C. 
to Chicago to Los Angeles, went up in the flames of race riots; and many 
overzealous mayors instituted “shoot on sight” orders against the 
(mostly black) rioters. It was the year when a Democratic National 
Convent ion in Chicago brought thousands of antiwar protesters, led by 
a few old-time pacifists, a few SDS radicals, and Abbie Hoffman’s brand 
new Yippies (Youth International Party), into bloody confrontation with 
the Chicago police. But, as Mayor Daley later boasted, though plenty of 
heads, ribs, and reporters’ cameras were bashed, “No one was killed.”
1968 was the year that Richard “Rusty” Bunch was shot to death 
in the Presidio stockade in San Francisco— though it is doubtful whether 
more than a handful of people still remember his name. But the news 
of his death, and the subsequent protest, gave a critical boost to the 
burgeoning GI movement.
* An excerpt from Home to War: A Histonj o f the Vietnam Veterans 
Movement.
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Rusty Bunch was nineteen years old when he was killed on 
October 11, 1968. And though he died on the Presidio, one of the oldest 
military bases on the North American continent, he was a casualty of the 
Vietnam war as surely as the more than 58,000 men named on the 
Memorial Wall in Washington, D.C.
Bunch was a short, skinny, sandy-haired kid from Moraine, 
Ohio, who looked scarcely old enough to be out on his first date. His 
parents were both poorTennessee Baptists who had migrated to Ohio for 
the steady work, and they did their best to give their son a happy 
childhood. He was outgoing, played Little League baseball, bowled, and 
learned to ride a motorcycle as soon as he was old enough. In 1967, at 
seventeen, he asked his father to sign him into the U.S. Army, and his 
father complied—though the old man, a World War II vet, felt as if he were 
signing his son’s “death warrant.”
Later, in the Presidio stockade, Rusty claimed to have done a tour 
in Vietnam, but by that time he was so prone to delusory fantasies that 
his word could no longer be trusted. The next sure glimpse we have of 
him is in the spring of 1968, when he showed up among the flock of 
AWOL GIs who were living on the streets of San Francisco’s Haight 
district and camping out in Golden Gate Park. He had taken a headlong 
plunge into the hippie drug culture, and, in the lingo of the day, had had 
his “circuits fried” on LSD. He went around in a purple satin shirt and 
filthy blue jeans, holding two-way conversations with himself and 
boasting that he could walk through walls and communicate with 
Martians.
Like most AWOLs, Bunch eventually went home, but his parents 
couldn’t get him to make sense and finally shipped him down to relatives 
in LaFollette, Tennessee, hoping “the drugs would wear off.” When he 
got no better, they started calling VA hospitals, all of which declined to 
help. Instead, officials at the VA phoned the police, who arrested Bunch 
and delivered him to the stockade at Fort Meade, Maryland. Authorities 
at Fort Meade determined that Bunch needed psychiatric care, but 
before he could receive it he was transferred to Sixth Army jurisdiction 
in California, and landed in the Presidio SPD (the Special Processing 
Detachment barracks for military personnel who have committed minor 
offenses). Once again he went AWOL, but this time voluntarily turned 
himself in on September 15. The Army’s response was to place him in 
the stockade, the repository for serious criminals and repeat offenders.
Anybody with an ounce of sense would have had Bunch admitted 
to the nearest Army hospital— in this case, Letterman General right on 
the Presidio. He bumped into walls, screamed throughout the night, 
made incomprehensible notes in a tattered math book, talked gibberish 
about warlocks and Hying saucers, and continually implored his fellow 
inmates to recommend “easy” ways for him to commit suicide.
The stockade guards thought Bunch’s condition was a joke, and 
they routinely withheld his medicine just for the kick of watching him 
twitch and beg for it.1 For the other prisoners it was painful to watch
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Bunch’s constant nervous agitation, and one of them, Ricky Dodd, kept 
trying to get word to the authorities that Bunch should be removed and 
given medical treatment.2
That September, the Presidio stockade reached its peak of 
overcrowding. Close to 140 prisoners were forced to inhabit a reconverted 
bank building and annex that were intended to hold no more than sixty- 
seven.3 Many of them had to sleep on the messhall tables, and that was 
the least ol the inconveniences. The toilets backed up, excrement floated 
in the shower stalls, and there was hardly ever enough food to go 
around.'1
A lot ol factors contributed to this egregious situation. The fierce 
combat in Nam pushed more and more GIs to run before the almost 
inevitable assignment to a combat zone; at the same time, the 
counterculture, with itsvisions offree love, endless highs, and “strawberry 
fields forever,” was nourishing as never before. Furthermore, the big riot 
at LBJ (Long Binli Jail) in Vietnam had taken place in August, and after 
the devastation oft he prison there, many of the detainees were transferred 
to other stockades, including the one at the Presidio/’ Antiwar protests 
were polarizing the country, at the same time as a large number of 
embittered Vietnam veterans were returning to the States, setting tlie 
stage for a very tense confrontation. The relationship between the 
guards, many of whom were Vietnam veterans, and the prisoners, many 
of whom openly opposed the war, was exceedingly hostile. No wonder 
that between June and October, 1968, there were over two dozen suicide 
attempts among the Presidio stockade prisoners, who used such methods 
as hanging themselves, cutting their wrists and arms, and drinking lye/ 
The brass discounted these attempts as “suicide gestures,” intended to 
gain attention and not actually to take one’s life—despite the fact that the 
man who had hung himself, Ricky Dodd, was pronounced dead on 
arrival at Letterman Hospital and only revived with much effort.7
On Wednesday, October 9, Bunch talked with another prisoner, 
Billy Hayes, about the fact that if this country did not love him, he would 
just as soon do what it wanted him to, that is, die.8 Hayes was one of 
McNamara’s 100,000— a group of GIs with low int elligence and aptitude 
scores whom the Secretary of Defense had decided to draft, ostensibly 
to help them gain job skills, but chiefly so that the President would not 
have to further antagonize opponents of his war policy by calling up the 
reserves (before the end of the war, the 100,000 swelled to over 300,000). 
Bunch must have figured Hayes would be sympathetic because Hayes 
had already tried and failed to commit suicide by drinking Head and 
Shoulders™ shampoo. Hayes told Bunch that the surest way for him to 
die would be to tell a guard he was running away and then take off, giving 
the guard a good chance to take aim and shoot him. They both laughed.9
On Friday morning, October 1 1, four prisoners, including Bunch, 
were marched out on a work detail by a Mexican-American guard, a Nam 
vet. The guard had only a few months to go before discharge, and he 
knew that several guards had already faced court-martial lor letting
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prisoners escape. During a break. Bunch began taunting the guard, 
asking if he would promise to shoot him if Bunch ran. As they left a 
barracks where they had gone for water, Bunch veered away from the 
other prisoners. The guard later claimed he had broken into a “dead 
run,”10 though by other accounts Bunch was merely “jogging” or even 
doing just a fast walk.11 The guard claimed that he yelled “Hall!” twice. 
The other prisoners did not recall hearing him yell anything before he 
sighted the shotgun on Bunch’s back and pulled the trigger.12 The 
shotgun was loaded with double-ought buckshot, large pellets that are 
capable of killing a man even at a fair distance. The recommended 
procedure was for guards to shoot at the ground j ust behind the escaping 
prisoner—the pellets will then glance up and catch the fugitive in the legs 
and buttocks, effectively stopping him. The guard’s gun, which he had 
neglected to check, fired several inches higher than the sights indicated, 
and the blast came within inches of blowing Bunch’s head off. It made 
a grapefruit-sized hole in his back and chest, and he died in a matter of 
moments.13
Word of the shooting hit the otherprisoners like an electricaljolt, 
and their reactions ran the gamut from anger and outrage to terror that 
they would be the next victim of the guards’ sadism. Among those who 
reacted most strongly was a twenty one year-old AWOL GI named Keith 
Mather, whose story would become entangled with Bunch’s for the next 
twenty years.
Mather was raised in a rather traditional Baptist family in San 
Bruno, California, just south of San Francisco. The most powerful 
influence in his life, however, was not the Bible, but his loving and 
sensitive mother, who often told him of her horror while riding troop 
trains during World War II and seeing the endless carnage of the war— 
soldiers in wheelchairs, on crutches and stretchers, and so forth.
A handsome and high-spirited youngster, Mather got in trouble 
almost without trying. He’d been suspended from eighth grade for 
calling the school bus driver a “motherfucker,” and subsequently telling 
the science teacher to fuck himself when he gave Keith a hard time over 
the bus incident. As a result of such troubles, including a car theft bust, 
Mather didn’t graduate high school until he was almost twenty years old, 
in 1966. He tried San Mateo Junior College for fourmonths, but couldn’t 
keep his grades up. On September 17, 1967, he was inducted into the 
United States Army in Oakland.14
In many ways Mather was a typical Fifties punk with greased 
blondish hair and pegged pants, but with one major difference: he knew 
for certain that he could never take another human life. When he arrived 
at Fort Lewis, Washington, for basic training, he was given a form asking 
his attitudes toward war: on it, he wrote that he would never consent to 
fight in Vietnam. His language was so strong that the CID (Criminal 
Defense Division of the Army) sent an agent to question him as to 
whether he would disobey a direct order to embark for Vietnam. Mather 
told the agent he would deal with such an order when it came. In the
meantime, he set about finding ways to keep the military from completing 
his occupational training.
It did not take much effort, for he unintentionally caught 
pneumonia and then, while recovering, was forced to stand in line in the 
rain and caught it a second time. When Mather finally recuperated he 
was slotted for AIT (Advanced Infantry Training), the next step before 
liftoff to Southeast Asia. At first he tried handling the Army just as he 
had the unfriendly world of authority at school; but when he flipped off 
his top sergeant he got a good beating and found "you have to get up the 
next morning and do the same thing everybody else does.” Eventually, 
he says, “I had been harassed and fucked with to a point where I figured 
it was conceivable that I could actually kill people— they had done it, they 
had succeeded, which really pissed me off. I felt like I had been ripped 
off.” 15
At Christmas, Mather went home on leave, and proceeded to get 
stoned out of his mind on acid, pot, and a variety of other drugs with his 
boyhood friends. In one of those quintessential Sixties countercultural 
pads, complete with Indian rugs, crystal chandelier, and hookah on the 
floor, he experienced what—next to Bunch’s death—would be the most 
powerful revelation of his life. He suddenly felt a horrible weight of 
depression, and it occurred to him that the reason for it was that none 
of the others in that room were in the Army, none of them had to face the 
same life-or-death pressures that he would be subject to in a matter of 
weeks. And just as quickly Mather decided that he would stop worrying, 
because he simply would not go to Vietnam, no matter what they did to 
him, and he felt enormous relief.
Mather returned late to Fort Lewis, with an earring in one ear, a 
non-issue knitted tie, no brass insignias (he’d given them away at the 
party), black socks with little red crests on the side, and his pockets 
stuffed with marijuana. Fourteen people in his unit had done roughly 
the same thing, and the Army put them all together in the same 
“troublemakers' barracks,” which enabled them to band together and 
plot against the military. “That was my first camaraderie I really liked 
in the military, being able to identify with other people who were 
experiencing the same thing,” Mather recalls. “It gave us more strength 
to go on, to continue to fight, because we could all discuss it, and we were 
becoming very subversive.”15
Convicted at a special court-martial, Mather received a three 
month suspended sent ence and one-third reduction of wages, then was 
recycled right back into AIT, into a company where the men were already 
wearing jungle boots. The unit was full of guys with trick knees, bad 
backs, heart murmurs, and one guy who had even been drafted by 
mistake, since he had a wife and two kids, was carrying a full academic 
load at college, and had a nervous debility besides—but all of these guys 
(some of whom Mather witnessed crying in their bunks at night) were so 
buried in military paperwork that their grievances would not be redressed 
for months, if ever. Mather thus decided to take things into his own 
hands.
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On a lovely Northwest spring day in March, he put on his civilian 
clothes under his military clothes, went on sick call, and boarded a bus 
for town, where he jettisoned the uniform in a garbage can and hailed a 
cab for Seattle. With money wired from his girlfriend, he got a plane to 
San Francisco the same night. This time he stayed away only a few 
weeks, because his father convinced him to turn himself in, and they Hew 
him back to Fort Lewis in chains. Almost immediately he got in trouble 
again by trying to keep the authorities from getting hold of a letter from 
his girlfriend containing LSD.
Keith had heard rumors that the Army was dealing with reluctant 
warriors like himself by simply sticking them on a plane bound for Nam, 
where they could get “on-the-job training.” Within a few days, he got a 
bus straight down to San Francisco, and commenced living on the 
streets and from house to house for about four months. Concerned that 
the FBI would not stop hassling his parents and friends, he went to the 
office of the War Resisters League, a pacifist organization dating from 
just after World War I, for suggestions as to how he might turn himself 
in. He was now wanted for desertion, a far more serious crime than 
AWOL (AWOL implies that a soldier still intends to return to the military; 
desertion means that he has turned his back on it for good).17
The War Resisters League had been involved in the earliest 
antiwar protests from about 1963 on, and unlike most of the GIs, who 
had all they could do to get just a little information on the workings of 
l he military in their immediate vicinity (while embroiled in a daily battle 
for survival with military discipline), the WRL was cognizant of the larger 
picture of GI resistance that was beginning to emerge at U.S. military 
bases worldwide. As early as June, 1966, three GIs (a black, a Puerto 
Rican, and an Italian) at Fort Hood in Killeen, Texas, had refused orders 
for Vietnam on the grounds that the war itself was undeclared and 
therefore unconstitutional. Despite sentences of up to five years at hard 
labor (of which they served two), and the Supreme Court’s refusal—with 
a notable dissent by Justice William O. Douglas—to hear their case, the 
notoriety of the Fort Hood 3 encouraged the growing wave of refusal that 
followed, including such celebrated cases as those of Howard Levy and 
Louis Font.18 More recently, in Southern California, there had been 
several instances of sailors and Marines taking sanctuary in churches 
in order to keep from being sent to Southeast Asia.19 Even though 
military police could arrest an errant GI in a church just as well as 
anywhere else, the image of war resisters being dragged from churches 
had undeniable power as a symbol to sway people whose views on the 
war were still middle-of-the-road.20
According to Keith Mather, the idea for the “Nine for Peace” 
emerged by chance. The WRL was in touch with seven other men—four 
from the Anny, two from the Navy, and one Marine—who were in similar 
situations and looking for a way to surrender and yet to guarantee that 
they would not be immediately shipped off to war. A minister, the 
Reverend Philip Farnham, offered them the use of his church, Howard
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Presbyterian, in the Haight district. A former union organizer in the 
copper smelters in Seattle, and later a leader in the leftist group No 
Business As Usual, Famham wasn’t your garden-variety do-gooding 
man ol the cloth, but he helped put the eight servicemen in touch with 
a more traditional religious antiwar group called Clergy and Laity 
Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV, later just CALC), which had been 
formed in 1965 by Father Daniel Berrigan, S.J., and the Reverend 
William Sloane Coffin. Together they hatched the plan for the eight men 
to show up, each chained to a clergyman, at Howard Presbyterian 
Church, where they would take Communion publicly and issue a 
statement of their beliefs to the media. Hearing of the demonstration, Air 
Force Sergeant Oliver Hirsch asked to join them at the eleventh hour. 
Because of logistical delays they were not able to make their appearance 
on the Fourth of July, but when they finally took their stand a few days 
later, the impact could hardly have been greater.21
The military viewed the demonstration as a major threat, but it 
is well to remember that the young men taking part in it were scarcely 
more than kids. Mather recalls that he was hard put to decide whether 
he should do the demo or forget it and go see a concert by the rock band 
Cream. In the end, Mather’s sense of responsibility to other GIs tipped 
the balance in favor of going public. Once again, the feeling for others 
that he had learned from his mother came into play, as well as the 
obligation he felt to “try to educate and to help the movement from 
inside.”22
For protection, each of the Nine, with the minister he was chained 
to, rode to the church separately. When they arrived, each made his own 
statement. In front of numerous press people, they spoke out against the 
war in Vietnam, formally resigned from the military, and claimed 
sanctuary there. Mather stated that he was making a personal decision 
of conscience and encouraged others to do the same.
After the news conference hit the papers and TV stations 
throughout the area, a bomb threat forced them to move to St. Andrew’s 
Presbyterian Church in Marin City. This time military police from all four 
armed services were waiting to arrest them; though, perhaps because of 
the presence of two hundred supporters, they allowed them to drink their 
Communion wine. In one of the rare shows of solidarity between the 
black and white protest movements, a large contingent of Black Panthers 
showed up to offer their militant protection for the demonstrators, but 
the demonstrators had sworn a nonviolent pact and declined the aid of 
the Panthers’ muscle.23
On the videos that exist of the event, Mather looks like a 
Springsteen-style young tough, in denim shirt and sideburns, cigarette 
hanging from his lips, with a deeply serious expression as he holds forth 
to the press about how “a majority of the men in the service were opposed 
[to the war], but really didn’t know how to voice their opinion.” 24 Then 
they all held up their chains “to symbolize the bonds between men, which 
you can’t escape no matter what you do.” The symbolism was lost on the
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military, whose enforcers brought out their chain-cutters and shunted 
the Nine, sans ministerial guard, off to the appropriate jails. According 
to Mather, “it was pretty emotional, one of the most emotional things I’ve 
ever been through. We knew we were all gonna go to jail. They were 
gonna do to us what they wanted to do to us. They always had.”25
Mather was bound for the Army stockade at the Presidio, where 
he met Richard Bunch and a number of other increasingly intransigent 
malcontents. From the moment he got there, Mather set himself on a 
course of noncooperation, figuring that if he refused to work, the Army 
would have to get another man to do his duties, and that would keep 
another body from going to Nam. But each time Mather refused a direct 
order to work, he would accrue one more charge against him, so he 
decided simply to take off his uniform and go about in a blanket. A 
soldier cannot be ordered to work while he is out of uniform, and they 
could only order him once to put on his uniform, which they did. And 
they locked him up in solitary confinement, where he didn’t see the light 
of day for nearly a month26.
Nonetheless, things were happening that made Mather take 
heart. The press continued to give them highly sympathetic coverage.27 
A group of ministers from CALCAV began a 24-hour vigil outside the 
gates to protest the fact that many of the prisoners, like Mather, were 
being denied the right to meet with their chosen pastors. Several of the 
best lawyers in San Francisco, such as Terrence Hallinan and Howard 
De Nike, volunteered their services to the Nine. Mather faced a general 
court-martial on a bevy of charges— desertion, refusing a direct order, 
conspiracy, disloyal statements, subversion. There commenced a 
waiting game between Mather and the Army, since they wouldn’t court- 
martial him without his uniform on, and for the time being he was 
satisfied to accept the peace of solitary confinement, which allowed him, 
perhaps for the first time, to really think about his life and what he 
wanted to do with it.28
By his own admission, Mather knew almost nothing of the GI 
movement per se, though occasionally word filtered through to him of 
significant events— for example, in August, 1968, 43 black GIs at Fort 
Hood refused to be sent to Chicago to do riot duty in anticipation of 
trouble at the Democratic National Convention, and, in their eyes, to be 
used most likely against black ghetto rioters. Such incidents, and 
stories of troops in Vietnam refusing to go into battle, made Mather feel 
less alone, but the major transformation inside him had much more to 
do with a strengthening of his own integrity and the larger commitment 
to humanity that grew out of that. In Mather’s words: “You see yourself 
differently when you’re up in your own face in prison.” What Mather saw 
was that when a man confronts injustice, “the only real choices” are to 
take positive action against it or to “feel like you’re compromising your 
own being.” And once Mather had figured out “what really matters and 
what doesn’t,” he put his unifonn back on and decided to get the worst 
over with, so he could start living his life again.29
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And the next thing he knew, Richard Bunch was shot to death.
At the mutiny trials that followed, the Army sought to prove that 
the Presidio 27 were conspirators who deliberately and calculatedly 
sought to “override the lawful authority” of the United States Army.30 In 
truth, the so-called mutiny grew out of a joint exercise of conscience, all 
the more remarkable for the extreme confusion and duress under which 
it occurred.
Within hours of Bunch’s death, all hell broke loose in the 
stockade. Cans full of piss were thrown on guards, wires were pulled out 
of the walls, toilets were stopped up and flushed until water backed up 
out of every pipe. The prisoners all vowed not to go outside the fences 
until given some reassurance that they too would not be shot.31
The next day, October 12, there was a peace march of over 15,000 
people in San Francisco, led by some 500 active-duty GIs and Vietnam 
veterans. Having had advance warning of the GIs and Vets March for 
Peace, the Presidio brass denied weekend passes to any soldiers known 
to be opposed to the war. One such soldier, a Vietnam vet named Richard 
Lee Gentile, participated in the march anyway. Another participant was 
Randy Rowland, the twenty one-year-old son of an Air Force colonel, who 
was willing to serve as a medic outside of combat. When he was ordered 
to Vietnam, he sought help from the Central Committee for Conscient ious 
Objectors (CCCO) in San Francisco, and eventually went AWOL. While 
working on his CO application, he learned that the Army was harassing 
his wife in order to learn his whereabouts, so he went to attorney 
Terrence Hallinan for help, and together they worked out a plan for 
Rowland to turn himself in publicly at the Presidio after the peace 
march.32
Despite his voluntary return, Rowland was charged with desertion. 
The night of October 12, both he and Richard Gentile, who also returned 
voluntarily, were thrown into the Presidio stockade, where they were 
caught up in the fear and frenzy following Bunch’s shooting.
Rowland immediately sought out Mather; and all Saturday night 
both of them, along with some other of the more radicalized young men, 
began going around the stockade “getting people talking” about how they 
shou Id respond to the insufferable cruelty and terror that now enveloped 
them. The key to the whole situation that developed is that these 
prisoners had been pushed beyond anything a human being should 
rightfully be forced to endure, and they saw no way out other than direct 
action. There was only one lawful grievance mechanism available to the 
prisoners, the filing of a DD 510 form, and thus far all such complaints 
had been systemat ically ignored. “We knew the penalty for mutiny was 
death, but in a wildly elated way we didn’t care,” Rowland wrote later. 
“We were going up against the motherfuckers, we were taking our 
stand.”33
Mather’s and Rowland’s efforts were bolstered by the energy and 
courage of a prisoner named Walter Pawlowski, himself a paradigm of t he 
way the Army at this period was pushing soldiers into rebellion. A
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straight-A student, Pawlowski had to drop out of college lor lack ol 
tuition, and when he enlisted in the Army he was promised a non­
infantry assignment. Finding himself in AIT, he became so angry that 
he got violent with another soldier over a pool game. He was so upset over 
his own aggression that he asked to see a psychiatrist, but the Army 
offered him a chaplain instead. Pawlowski decided to become his own 
counselor and headed down to San Francisco with a bag of marijuana. 
After a short stint of living in the Haight, he went on the road to Mexico 
and Canada, then was finally arrested back in Florida.
The local police remanded him to the Army at Fort Stewart, 
Georgia, where Pawlowski got so tired of make-work details (like picking 
up pine cones for twelve hours a day) that he took off once more for San 
Francisco. Arrested in Utah, he was sent on to the Presidio and, despite 
the relative pettiness of his offenses, was put into the stockade. There 
Pawlowski served as a model prisoner for several months, but he was 
biding his time, waiting for a chance to escape. After a bungled attempt, 
he was no longer allowed outside the stockade on work details. From 
that point on, he began an unrelieved campaign of resistance, refusing 
to wear his uniform and going on a twenty-six-day fast in isolation in the 
“box,” a six-by-four-foot cell painted black. Originally the Fort Stewart 
officials had intended to discharge Pawlowski as “undesirable”— a 
discretionary method for the Army to get rid of unsuitable soldiers—but 
now the Presidio authorities decided to court-martial him on two counts 
of desertion plus one count of “disobeying a lawful command” to put on 
his uniform.34
By Sunday morning the 13th, Mather, Rowland, Pawlowski, and 
a few others had succeeded in rousing almost all the prisoners to a 
fevered pitch of opposition. Teriy Hallinan showed up that day to meet 
with Pawlowski, but was effectively prevented from speaking with the 
entire group. That night there was a packed meeting upstairs in Cell 
Block 4. Grievances were discussed and Pawlowski wrote them down, 
and a consensus was achieved to demand a thorough investigation of 
Bunch’s “murder.” The black brothers, united among themselves, 
complained against the blatant racism of the guards, but in the end 
decided to opt out of any demonstration because they “figured they’d get 
punished worst.” Eventually a plan took shape for a sit-down strike, to 
begin the next morning at 7:30am when the first name was called at roll 
call.35 Mather proposed that they all break ranks and sit in a circle in 
the grass nearest the fence, so media cameras could film them—and 
thus keep the guards from any brutal overreaction—and that they sing 
“We Shall Overcome” to signify their nonviolence, as in a civil rights 
protest. Later Mather went over to the other stockade building, where 
a second group was meeting, but much to his chagrin he found that this 
second group had voted down the idea of a mass protest.36
Through the phone call of an informer, the command at the 
Presidio got advance word of the demo, but did nothing to prevent it, 
other than to keep away the media. That morning, Monday the 14th of
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October, when the first name was called, everyone was supposed to 
answer “Here!” in unison. But only a few men yelled “Here!” and none 
started to move out of formation. So Mather pushed aside the guy in 
front of him and headed for the grassy area, and twenty six others, 
including two Vietnam vets, joined him. Sergeant Thomas Woodring, 
almost universally hated among the prisoners for his brutality and 
bigotry, chased after them screaming that they were committing a 
mutiny. No one took him seriously (he was drunk much of the time), but 
they were, one and all, by Mather’s account, terrified of the military’s 
retribution. In fact, their fears seemed to be substantiated when, in a few 
minutes, they were surrounded by both a line of firemen with hoses at 
the ready, and a tactical squad of soldiers with gas masks and rifles.37
What had pushed twenty seven prisoners to such a reckless 
stand? Mather answers for himself: “I wasn’t getting out, I knew I was 
there— this guy just got killed, and I’m going, ‘Shoo! Man, this is wrong! 
1 can’t live with this’ And so my life, and what happened to us, seemed 
kind of insignificant, considering what had just happened. We were 
mindless of our own mortality, or anything else—our safety. I mean we 
were scared to death, ‘cause we knew something was gonna happen, but 
we didn’t know exactly what.”38
Another of the twenty seven, Danny Seals, explained, “Something 
was just drawing me out there. It was like walking down the street and 
seeing someone getting beat up. You just couldn’t look the other way. 
It was something that I had to do.”39
Pawlowski explained, “People were finally getting together and 
accomplishing something. For me it was a moment of liberation. We’d 
been so impotent, so uptight. Now we weren’t just going along with 
everything, we were resisting."40
The 27 chanted “Freedom! We want freedom!” and sang a variety 
of songs— “We Shall Not Be Moved,” ‘This Land Is Your Land,” “America, 
the Beautiful”— not so much to make any political statement, according 
to Mather, as to “keep our souls warm.” They also Hashed the two-finger 
“V” peace symbol at CID photographers who were busy recording their 
action as evidence against them. When Captain Robert Lamont (the 
stockade commander) arrived, Pawlowski read him the men’s list of 
demands. Lamont, stunned, could say nothing. Finally, in response to 
Pawlowski’s taunt, “May we have a reply, sir?” Lamont read them Article 
94, “the mutiny act,” out of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 
The 27 just sang louder to drown him out. Lamont retaliated by reading 
the article again over a loudspeaker atop an MP sedan, and then gave the 
men a direct order to return to their cells. Most of them returned 
voluntarily, though Mather, Rowland, Pawlowski, and a few others had 
to be carried.41
The charge of mutiny refers to the action of two or more soldiers 
who act in concert to overthrow the military’s power structure and its 
ability to exercise control over enlisted men. It was a ridiculous charge 
for Lamont to have brought. Captain Jesse C. Jones, head of the police
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detail that had been called to the demonstration, said he would simply 
have listened to the men’s complaints, asked for a representative to come 
to his office, and dispersed the rest. But the Army, in the person of Sixth 
Army Commander General Stanley R. Larsen, insisted on following 
Lamont’s poor judgement through a series of outrageously unfair trials 
well into 1969. Later Larsen reputedly explained, “We thought the 
revolution was starting, and we were trying to crush it.”42
Tales of the Presidio 27 hit the presses almost immediately, and 
for months they made front-page headlines, both in the United States 
and around the world. (Mather even claims there were prominent news 
stories in China.) The Presidio 27 became a phenomenon on so many 
levels that it warranted a book—and got a fine one— The Unlawful 
Concert, by Fred Gardner, a key activist in the GI movement.
First and foremost, it was a personal tragedy for almost all of the 
men involved. The first man to be tried, and the first to be convicted, 
Nesrey Sood, received a sentence of fifteen years at hard labor in Fort 
Leavenworth Military Prison. He had had only one day left in the military 
when he decided to join the demonstration. With three children to 
support, Sood should never have been drafted. His anger over that led 
to so much drinking and fighting that the Army finally agreed to give him 
an unsuitability discharge, but before it was processed he heard that his 
children were being neglected and rushed from Washington to San 
Francisco to check on them. He was picked up for being AWOL and put 
into the Presidio stockade on October 12. On Monday he was scheduled 
to be taken back to Fort Lewis to receive his discharge, but that morning 
he felt compelled to protest with the others. Then, on top of everything, 
while he was awaiting trial for mutiny, the Army failed to give him a 
summons to a custody hearing in Oakland, and as a result he lost 
custody of his three-year-old daughter Darryl.43
The next two men to be tried, Louis Osczepinski and Larry Reidel, 
received fourteen and sixteen-year sentences respectively.
Further adding to the injustice, the Army refused to try the 27 
individually, but grouped them into various irrational clusters of 
defendants, which made a systematic defense impossible.44
Some men did not wait for the Army to take their life away. Before 
Keith Mather came to trial for mutiny, he was court-martialed and 
convicted on his previous charges, and sentenced to four years at 
Leavenworth. Pawlowski, who by this time had become a friend and 
mentor to Mather, was also tried on his previous charges in the interim, 
and sentenced to two years at Leavenworth. They were both certain that 
as “leaders” the Army was certain to make examples of them— and 
though the death penalty had been ruled out (it is usually applicable to 
mutiny only during a declared war) they both might well receive life in 
prison. Both of them took the opportunity of a minimal guard on 
Christmas Eve to escape and, helped by the “underground railroad” of 
antiwar people, they made it safely together to Vancouver, Canada, a few 
days later.
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The decision to leave was not as easy as it might seem, for Mather 
felt a great responsibility to the men he had convinced to demonstrate 
with him. But he was “freaked out by the possibility of having to spend 
the rest of my life in prison.” Moreover, he had serious doubts about his 
ability to survive in jail. Enormous hatred was directed toward the 27: 
the stockade doctor actually prescribed “paint thinner” for Mather, when 
he developed a high fever, “for that yellow stripe down your back.” Even 
so, through twelve years of hard living in Canada, he was often 
tormented by guilt—to the point where he had to willfully put his entire 
past life out of his mind. And yet, his past still pursued him. In 1980, 
he returned with his wife and family to live in Half Moon Bay in California, 
near where he’d grown up, but a lost wallet led to the Army laying hands 
on him again, in late 1984, and putting him in prison in Fort Riley, 
Kansas, until Congressional pressure on the Secretary of the Army 
effected his early release.45
What may have made all this suffering worthwhile for these men 
was the knowledge that their action was a pivotal event in the fashioning 
of the GI movement, and eventually in the ending of the war itself. By 
late 1968, underground antiwar GI papers were springing up near 
military bases around the country, and almost all of them seized on the 
Presidio 27 as a rallying point. Furthermore, those 27 showed the rest 
of the peace movement, as well as the whole nation, that, in Mather’s 
words, “the soldiers that are fighting the war are not doing it because 
they want to, but because they’re forced to. And they shouldn’t be looked 
on as the enemy [by antiwar people], because here were soldiers fighting 
against the war, and putting their lives on the line in a different way, in 
a different war—the war against the war. It flew in the face of everything 
the military stands for.”46
Hal Muskat, who began his activism in the U.S. Army in Europe 
in the late Sixties and is a leading veteran activist to this day (and whose 
lobbying in Washington helped gain Mather’s release in 1985), states the 
case even more forcefully: “The Presidio 27 was the best thing that ever 
happened to the GI movement—it put us on the front page. It made 
civilians realize that there were antiwar GIs within the military. Which 
is very important. Because the civilian antiwar movement was mostly 
middle-class, and we were working-class. So it was able to provide a 
bridge, and it was very significant, probably one of the most significant 
trials and cases, for that reason.”47
Proof of that bridge came in early 1969 with tens of thousands of 
war protestors marching from the Civic Center in San Francisco to the 
gates of the Presidio, trying to break into the base to free the 27. Though 
they were repulsed, images of the melee—which looked like the ragtag 
mob attempting to storm the Bastille—were cast on picture tubes all 
across America.48
The shakeup within the Army was equally profound. Some 
observers felt that the roots of the whole debacle lay in the Sixth Army 
Commander’s professional failures vis-a-vis the war in Vietnam. In
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1966, General Larsen (right-hand man to General William Westmoreland) 
advocated an extension of the war into Cambodia, in direct opposition 
to the current policy of the State Department. Larsen’s claim that the 
Cambodians were harboring six North Vietnamese regiments nearly 
precipitated a hostile confrontation between Cambodia and the United 
States, and Westmoreland quickly dissociated himself from his erstwhile 
friend. Larsen was transferred back to the States soon thereafter. It may 
well be that by ramrodding the first mutiny charges through the 
American military court in 78 years, he felt he was alleviating the shame 
he had helped bring on the faltering American military.49
In any case, the public furor over the unconscionable severity of 
the first three sentences caused the Secretary of the Army, Stanley 
Resor, to cut them down to two years apiece even before the other men 
went to trial. A  number of Congressmen—including Senator Alan 
Cranston of California and Charles Goodell of New York— demanded an 
investigation of conditions at the Presidio stockade, and almost at once 
the place was cleaned up and refurbished, and the number of prisoners 
set at a permanent ceiling of 103. Resor also established a Special 
Civilian Committee for the Study of the U.S. Army Confinement System.50
The long series of trials—even though convictions became fewer 
and sentences progressively lighter—did lasting harm to the image of the 
military, and that alone upset Congressmen like John E. Moss of 
Sacramento, Jeffrey Cohelan of Berkeley, Don Edwards of San Jose, 
Allard Lowenstein and William Fitts Ryan of New York, and William S. 
Moorehead of Pittsburgh, who all put their protests into the Congressional 
Record. The trials added to the reputation of Terrence Hallinan as a 
headstrong crusader for justice, and they made the reputation of a young 
captain and JAG (Judge Advocate General’s Corps) lawyer named 
Brendan Sullivan, who would come into the public spotlight again 
twenty years later as Colonel Oliver North’s defense counsel at the 
Contra-gate hearings. The guard who did the shooting was adjudged to 
have committed “justifiable homicide,” fined a dollar (the price of the 
shell he “wasted”) and transferred to a base nearer his home. But in the 
end, the meaning of the Presidio 27 cannot be evaluated merely in terms 
of its effects on individual men’s lives or even on the role of the military.51
After having their lives blown off course by a rocket blast as 
traumatic as any launched by the Viet Cong, the men involved have 
mostly managed to survive and put new lives together. In late 1988 there 
was a reunion of some of them, at which “conspirator” John Colip 
remarked, “I don’t think too much about all the things they did to us, I 
think about all we did to them. You know what I remember best about 
those times? We were incorrigible!” Randy Rowland stressed the positive 
effect of the ordeal even more forcefully: “We were mainly working class 
youth, politicized by what was going on in the world, with our view of 
America-the-Unbeautiful clarified by the war, the military, and the 
brutality and outright torture we experienced behind bars. They tried to 
break us, but the only break was with them
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The military, of course, has survived too— as it has for the past 
five thousand years—minus the draft and many of the Mickey Mouse 
disciplinary demands that landed the majority of the prisoners in the 
Presidio stockade.
The thing that was being bom  partly at that impromptu sit-in at 
America’s oldest existing military installation was a rare and precious 
glimpse of the postwar future. In the words of Keith Mather, what the 
Presidio 27 had earned for the movement was “dignity” and “credibility.”52 
And those two intangible yet real qualities, which the war in Vietnam was 
rapidly draining from American life, opened wide the door between what 
had been rigid and unfeeling in this so-called land of the free, and a 
future of limitlessly renewable humanity, where virtually anything 
seemed possible, including the abolition of war and recognition of one 
man’s right to say that for now and for always he did not wish or intend 
to harm another.
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A  M atter  of C o n sc ien ce: R esistance  WlThiN 
ThE C.S. MiliTARy D u r Inq ThE V Ietnam  W ar
Bill ShoRT 
WillA SEldENbERQ
In 1982 when the Vietnam veterans Memorial was dedicated in 
Washington, D.C., it was the beginning of the nation’s retrospection 
about the war and its aftermath. But eight years and hundreds of books, 
articles, films and TV programs later, the GI resistance movement during 
the war has been consistently ignored. Frustrated by this glaring 
omission, we embarked on a project to tell the story of resistance. A 
Matter o f Conscience: Resistance Within the U.S. Military During the 
Vietnam War, a series of portraits and oral histories of vets who resisted 
against the war while still on active duty, has been exhibited at various 
locations throughout the country for the past two years.
Our interviews with resistance veterans reveal common social, 
moral and historical threads and provide a context for understanding 
why some GIs felt compelled to dissent. Additionally, the oral histories 
illustrate why the war was so divisive and troubling to many Americans.
Resistance took many forms. It included individual acts and 
group efforts. It was carried out by persons who enlisted, as well as by 
persons who were drafted. Resistance to the war and to military 
authority developed at installations in the United States, and in units 
stationed in Vietnam and Europe. Resistance included desertion, 
AWOLS (absent without official leave), the refusal of direct orders, 
fraggings (the use of fragmentation grenades by low ranking soldiers to 
intimidate or murder officers), sabotage, the publication of underground 
newspapers, demonstrations and passive noncompliance with the war 
effort. In this article we present the stories of individual resisters: those 
who ated in isolation without the advantage of an immediate support 
group. This was particularly true for serv ice  personnel stationed “in­
country,” in Vietnam, where Amerians were cut off from the antiwar 
movement back home..
Individual resistance developed from a deep moral conscience, 
usually in absence of political sophistication but with a well-defined 
sense of right and wrong. Most of the vets we interviewed indicated they 
learned a strong moral code from their parents: a sense of fair play and 
duty, respect for others and for private property, honesty—values 
reinforced by school, church, and scouting. John Tuma was an Army 
interrogator who almost lost his life for refusing to torture Viet Cong 
prisoners:
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I remember I used to think what would my parents have done.
The way I was brought up, what would be the right thing to do, 
not the right thing to do from the Army point of view, but from 
my own family, and my own community’s morality. I consciously 
thought about that and came to the conclusion there were things 
1 had been raised not to do, things I wouldn’t, couldn’t do.
These ideals were taken at face value, despite the contradictions 
of the 1950s: a time of segregation and racism, intolerance for religions 
other than Christianity, fervent anti-communist witch hunts, and 
overwrought nationalism manifesting itself as nuclear imperialism. In 
addition, as a result of “winning” World War II, the United States 
populace developed a chauvinist attitude toward the rest of the world. 
Young people were instilled with the idea that the role of the United 
States was that of policeman and protector without thought for other 
cultures. As former Marine Steven Fournier said:
1 had volunteered to go, I wanted to be there. I thought it was the 
right thing that we should go and protect democracy there. I 
believed in the Domino Theory, I believed that Cardinal Spellman 
was right when he said “Kill a Commie for Christ.” 1 really truly 
believed, I mean it was the cause. I was a young man, I’d been 
brought up in a Navy family. I was very proud of having become 
a Marine and fighting for my country.
By the time young men came of draft age, their sense of duty 
toward the United States was well-formed. Their personal values 
reflected the cultural norm of the early Sixties, with their roots in the 
Fifties. What was thought to be a new sense of duty and service to 
country was described by a young dynamic President John F. Kennedy 
when he said, “ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you 
can do for your country.” The weight of family service to “God and 
country” lived in the stories fathers and uncles told about World War II 
and Korea. The young man of the Sixties saw Vietnam as “his” war, a 
chance to gloriously serve his country just as male members of his family 
had done.
Of course, the fact that the Vietnamese were an Asian people, as 
were the Japanese and Koreans, was not lost on these young GIs. As 
Marine veteran Paul Atwood told us,
the Vietnamese were essentially in my mind the equivalent of 
Japs, and there was no question but that we could handle them.
My father had handled them, of course I would go over and 
handle them in the same way and come back in one piece.
Intrigued by the imagined war exploits of their fathers and uncles 
(since many veterans said their male relatives were often silent about the 
realities and horrors of World War II), and with romanticized, even
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mysterious images fostered by John Wayne movies, it is not surprising 
then that many of these young men enlisted in the military, and because 
they went in believing so wholeheartedly in the “cause,” their 
disillusionment was even more profound. Steve Spund, the son of a 
Jewish Polish immigrant, was a Marine who refused to go to Vietnam:
I’d grown up seeing the U.S. defend itself against the Nazis and 
Japanese, watching John Wayne movies and felt very patriotic.
Maybe I’d seen one too many Marine movies, but I felt, and it was 
supported by my father’s patriotism, that what we were doing 
had to be right. Here there were Marines coming back from 
Vietnam saying what we were doing was wrong. It really 
shattered, totally contradicted eveiything I believed in about the 
U.S.
Upon entering the service, pressure to conform to the norm and 
not question authority was strongly reinforced by the military system of 
training. Drill sergeants and the system replaced parents and other 
authority figures young men and women had known as civilians. The 
military system isolated the new trainees from the civilian world, forcing 
them to focus their attention upon the immediate functions and needs 
of the military, and turning them into obedient soldiers willing to 
unquestionably die for their country. Placed in the strange and often 
hostile environment of boot camp, trainees banded together for their own 
emotional survival against an immediate common enemy: the drill 
sergeant. A sense of camaraderie and single identity began to form 
among the young trainees and they began working together as a unit. 
Paul Atwood recalls:
The first process at Parris Island was to strip away your identity 
and reduce you to identical cogs in a machine, insofar as that 
was possible. So, literally we were stripped naked, we had our 
hair zapped right off. We were just shells of human beings. And 
the senior drill instructor walked up and down and said in a 
terrifying voice, “There are no niggers in this platoon, there are 
no spies, there are no wops, there are no kikes, there are no poor 
white whatever, there are none of those. You are all fucking 
maggots and maggots you will remain until you’ve earned the 
right to call yourself United States Marines." That had an effect 
on me.
An irony of U.S. military training is the animosity felt by the 
trainee for the system versus the loyalty toward the country which the 
system serves. The GIs saw in the drill sergeant an immediate enemy 
who made daily life miserable. The drill sergeant saw this bonding as the 
prime reason for military training. In the end, both the trainee and the 
drill sergeant submerged their mutual hostility in the realization that the 
training was all for a common good: fighting a greater enemy (in this case 
the Vietnamese communists).
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For those not already skeptical and mistrustful when they 
entered the service, disaffection and disillusionment with the military 
and the war often began during training. For others it came after they 
were assigned to their duty stations, whether in Vietnam or elsewhere. 
Dave Cline, a combat veteran and winner of the Purple Heart, recalls:
In training they gave you basically two things: you were going 
over there to help the people of South Vietnam fight against 
communist aggression, or you were going over to kill commies.
My background made me definitely be against the idea that I’m 
going over to kill commies, so I sort of latched onto we were there 
to help people. But when I got to Vietnam it really didn’t take me 
but about one day in-countiy to realize that all the helping people 
wasn’t true. The first thing they tell you is you can’t trust any 
of them, they're gooks, they’re not human beings, they’re all your 
enemy.
Despite the intense indoctrination of boot camp, many young 
soldiers eventually questioned the necessity and morality of American 
policy in Vietnam. Faced with the dilemma of “servie to ountry” (which 
meant serving in the military), or following their consciences, they ame 
to oppose the war, and often took the chance of severing ties with family 
members and friends back home. Antiwar soldiers risked the hostility 
of their fellow soldiers and the harsh reaction of the military, an 
authoritarian social institution which often regarded dissent as “un- 
Americcan,” cowardly and potentially life-threatening to combat units. 
The military punishment of dissident soldiers included extra work, 
transfers (often to dangerous areas of the war zone), constant harassment, 
courts-martial (often for dubious infractions), dishonorable discharges 
and imprisonment. Some resisters claim they were beaten and tortured 
by military authorities and that attempts were made on their lives.
When they got out of the military, some resistance veterans threw 
themselves into the antiwar movement, others remained silent about 
their military background, fearing retribution, and only in recent years 
have they begun to speak out about their experience. The veterans 
whose stories are presented here were profoundly changed and radicalized 
by their experiences as dissenting soldiers, and to this day, many former 
GI resisters remain committed and active in political, social justice and 
community causes.
A Matter o f Conscience is an ongoing project. We are still looking 
for resisters to interview, information about acts of resistance, and 
archival materials, such as GI newspapers and photographs. Persons 
interested in the exhibit are invited to contact us.
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Former Navy Nurse Susan Schnall holds her court martial documents, 
including one of the posters she dropped from an airplane onto the 
deck of the U.S.S. Enterprise.
S usan S c HnaU, 1 1  D e c e iv e r  1988
My father was killed during the second World War, in 1945 on 
Guam in the Pacific. He died a hero: they landed on the beachhead, he 
went back a number of times, even though he was wounded, to save the 
men under his command. It practically destroyed my mother when he 
was killed. She terribly resented the military for taking him. That’s the 
image of war and the military I grew up with and because of that I had 
a very personal involvement against war and against suffering.
When I went for my Navy physical I wore a peace necklace and 
I remember the doctor asking me why I was wearing it. I said, because 
I’m against war. The recruiter told me if I were ever in Vietnam and there 
was a Vietnamese soldier who needed to be taken care of, I could take 
care of that person. So there was not supposed to be any problem against 
war. My rationalization for going into the Navy was to undo the damage 
the United States was doing abroad. These young kids were sent 
overseas and shot up; they needed good care, and that’s what I was going 
to do. But there was a point at which it was obvious that I had to do 
something about the war, that I was no longer patching up people to feel 
better, but that I was promoting the war machine.
In 19681 heard about the GI and Veterans March for Peace in San 
Francisco for October 12th. I went to the meetings, and got posters and 
leaflets and put them up on base at the Oaknoll Naval Hospital, where 
I was stationed. We put posters up in the middle of the night and within 
an hour they were all down. I remembered hearing about B-52 bombers 
dropping leaflets on the Vietnamese, urging them to defect. I thought if 
the United States can do that in Vietnam, then why can’t I do it here. We 
had a friend who was a pilot, and my husband and a Vietnam vet and 
I loaded up the airplane with those leaflets promoting the peace march.
We loaded up the plane and the press was called to expect us over 
various areas in the San Francisco Bay area. We made a couple of trial 
runs; one didn’t turn out so well. At a couple of thousand feet up, we 
opened the door to the airplane to let the leaflets out and the plane 
dropped about a thousand feet! So we reloaded the plane and went back. 
We hit the Presidio, Oaknoll Naval Hospital, Treasure Island, Yerba 
Buena Island, the deck of the U.S.S. Enterprise. Then we landed and held 
a press conference and I said, “I did it.” They asked me to go back in the 
airplane and get out again, so they’d have good footage. And they had 
an interview. They used all of the footage at my court martial—evidence 
I really was guilty.
That was Thursday and the March for Peace was on Saturday. I 
wore my uniform in the demonstration that I was told specifically not to 
do. A  general Navy regulation stated you can’t wear your uniform when 
you’re speaking religious, partisan, political views publicly. I though, if 
General Westmoreland can wear his uniform before Congress asking for 
money for Vietnam, I can wear mine as a member of the Armed Forces
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speaking out against the war. I had as much right to freedom of speech 
as he does. I gave a speech and I knew when I got up to the microphones, 
one of these belongs to the Navy. But it didn’t make a difference.
C lA REN CE F iTCh, 28 AuqusT 1988
My father was in the military in World War II, and even though 
he was in a segregated army, it was very much a part of his life 
experience. Being a veteran wasn’t something that was looked down on, 
it was one of the few things black men had that they could hold up as 
being honorable, as being accepted, as being proof that you had just as 
much right to anything that was going to be given out, even though you 
didn’t get it all the time. That’s why a lot of the hostility and resentment 
came, because they didn’t get their just due. But they did get some 
things out of it. My father went to mechanics’ school on the GI bill. The 
house my mother lives in right now was bought on the GI bill. We 
probably would not have been able to do it without the GI bill. My father 
talked about his personal experiences in the war all the time. I could tell 
you where he was stationed because he told us a thousand times. He 
made us sit down and listen to the stories, but he didn’t really elaborate 
on the negatives and the racism.
As a black GI in Vietnam in 1967 things were changing. Things 
going on in the States affected our behavior there. Some of the same 
black consciousness, the whole black power movement, was taking 
place there too. We were growing Afros, expressing ourselves through 
ritualistic handshakes, black power handshakes, African beads, hanging 
around in cliques, trying to eat up as much of the black music as we 
could get our hands on. We kind of segregated ourselves; we didn’t want 
to integrate into what we considered the white man’s war. For the first 
time I was looking at the enemy, not so much as the enemy, but as 
another minority, brown people. The North Vietnamese reminded us of 
it too.
People started really trying to educate themselves about how the 
war started, where the war was going. We read a lot of the books, 
CoTifessions o f Nat Turner, Soul on Ice, all of the black publications, 
Ebony, Jet, as much as we could see because we wanted to be a part of 
it. There was some nights we had twenty, thirty, fifty brothers hanging 
out. When we went into a mess hall we ate together in certain parts oi 
the mess hall. They were trying to make us get haircuts, cut those Afros 
off, and people were going to jail to keep their hair. We tried to spend 
almost all of our time together, the Bloods in Vietnam, we tried to have 
all black hooches. The brass would try to prevent this, they would try 
to assign us to integrated hooches and stuff like that.
When I was put in the brig, it was like another awareness. 
Because the brig was like..., there were white Marines in the brig, but the
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overwhelming majority, was black, much like the jails were back in the 
World. It just made you more bitter, more conscious, more hard, more 
militant, gave you more of a reason for being what you were and to resist 
and to fight, and make sure you educated yourself and educated others.
You laid down at night and there was just so much tension going 
through you, with all the racial stuff, the war itself and we were so young. 
But it felt like we were so much older. It felt like you had lived a long time. 
That year in Vietnam was like twenty years, you saw so much and 
witnessed so much.
JohN T u(V1A, 15 A uqust 1987
A( my first duty station in Vietnam, a military intelligence [Mil 
detachment, I refused to work with South Vietnamese interpreters who 
were using physical coercion in order to extract “the truth” from North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers. There were four or five ARVN [Army 
of the Republic of Vietnam—the South] interpreters who were working 
with the MI unit. And although I was language trained in Vietnamese, 
it was standard operational procedure to have a Vietnamese interpreter 
with Americans in order to make sure no nuances of the language 
escaped anyone and maybe to check up on us.
The first person I was to interrogate was an NVA soldier who had 
been brought in during Operation Iron Mountain. I started doing basic 
debriefing of the individual and realized that the Vietnamese interpreter 
was pulling and twisting on the man’s ear lobe and had it stretched down 
somewhere below his chin line. I told him to stop, and he did, only to start 
again after a few moments. I stopped the questioning and requested 
another Vietnamese interpreter and the same thing happened. I decided 
to end the debriefing session. My next interrogation was of a suspected 
Viet Cong from a small village on the Laotian border, who had been shot. 
We had nothing to show he had ever been a Viet Cong and I classified him 
as being civilian, possibly civilian defendant. The South Vietnamese I 
was working with trying to debrief the fellow, kept pinching off his IV 
tubes while we were talking. I told him several times to stop, but it was 
totally out of my control. I tried using three other Vietnamese interpreters 
after that and they also abused the prisoner; either cutting off his IV or 
pulling and twisting on his ear lobe or twisting a handful of flesh from 
his side in order to create pain. I refused to work with them. As a result, 
I was transferred out of the MI detachment.
I was later asked to interpret at the evacuation of a refugee camp 
and was sent in unarmed to an area with several South Vietnamese from 
the Province Recon Unit. I felt something was wrong, very, veiy wrong. 
I was told we were looking for a woman and some children who were 
supposed to be on the farthest edge of the village. We got to the village 
edge and they told me it was just a little further. We went through the 
tree line, and still further. I realized they were acting very nervous and
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suspicious. They ran forward to a small ravine and I started running 
back. When 1 got to the edge of the village I heard gunfire behind me. The 
lire was directed at me; they were not supposed to bring me back alive. 
Earlier I had reported the use of a “birdcage” (a cage constructed of 
barbed wire wrapped around a captive and then hung in a tree) in a 
Vietnamese compound and they were forced to take it down. Shortly 
after this incident my hooch was fragged with a percussion grenade.
I was threatened with court-martial several times, but I always 
thought about what would my parents have done. What would be the 
right thing to do, not from the Army’s point of view, but from my family’s 
and my community’s. I consciously thought about that and came to the 
conclusion there were things I had been raised not to do and couldn’t and 
wouldn’t do.
P auI ATWOod, 10 D e c e iv e r  1986
I was bom immediately after the Second World War. I always 
think I was bom in the shadow of the bomb, and there was never a time 
in my childhood when I thought that men didn’t go to war. My father was 
a perfect example of a modem day warrior, and I thought he never looked 
better than he did when he was in his uniform. Once I knew my father 
had been in the Marine Corps, I always knew that I was going to go in the 
Marine Corps some day.
When I was a kid my father kept these medals and ribbons and 
other Marine Corps paraphernalia in a little cigar box that he had tucked 
away in the back comer of his dresser. My brothers and I used to visit 
that little cigar box as though it were a shrine, in which these magic 
talismans were. I never tired of going there and opening the cover, 
tingling with anticipation, looking once again. I guess I saw them as 
badges of courage and of honor, and there was never a time in my 
childhood that I doubted whether I would myself wear these emblems 
and earn these badges.
After I refused to go to Vietnam, I wanted only to get rid of them, 
to forget about them, forget what they had once meant to me. I was angry 
at the time because, at least in that period of my life, I felt that every 
symbol I once valued as a symbol of something good and decent, was not 
in my mind a symbol of its opposite. And I think I want ed to be rid of the 
ties that still bound me to my father; I have to say that I wanted to be rid 
of his disapproval.
It’s only been in the last five years or so that I’ve been able to pick 
these things up. You know, it’s funny that I even have some of them. I 
threw virtually everything I had away, but there were some things I kept. 
But I never looked at them until five years ago. It’s funny, I began going 
to that little corner of my own life, one by one pulling out some things; 
I guess a kind of talisman again. To pick, for instance, this globe and 
anchor; to pick that up was like picking up something radioactive. I
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didn’t know what it meant to me. I know that it still meant something 
deep, but I was afraid of it because, even now looking at it, I get that old 
sense of patriotism. There’s nothing wrong with love of country, but I get 
afraid of where that feeling leads; into a mindless, unquestioning, 
uncritical acceptance of policy by governmental leaders that got us 
involved in Vietnam in the first place.
Without exception, the people I knew who had gone to Vietnam 
felt they were doing something honorable. But many people would say 
to me it was the most fucked up thing they have ever done in their lives 
and wish they could get it out of their sleep, their nightmares. And in that 
sense, I felt I had made the right decision. I knew from listening to them 
that I would have been—if I survived at all—a complete basket case. I 
also felt convinced that my analysis of the war was correct; that it was 
not a self-serving one to justify my own behavior, but it was real. A  more 
fucked up war couldn’t be imagined. And it was clear to me that the 
Vietnam veteran was being scapegoated for the war, that collectively the 
United States had called upon vets to go and do something and then had 
turned its back on them afterwards.
S teve SpUNtJ, 1 4  January 1 9 8 9
I told my family I was on thirty day leave. But after thirty days 
were up, my father became suspicious and knew something was wrong. 
A  short time after the thirty day period, I was awakened by the police. My 
father had called the police and reported me.
They took me to this compound at the Brooklyn Navy Yard with 
barbed wire fence, j agged glass on top of the high walls and one main door 
in the front with Marine guards at the door. They asked me if I would 
consent to going back. I said sure. I probably would have said anything 
to get out of the Marine barracks at that point. So, remarkably enough, 
they gave me a bus ticket and told me to go back to North Carolina. I 
didn’t go back, I went home to my parent’s house, hoping for more time 
to think of something. It wasn’t too long later before my father turned 
me in again. This time the MPs came.
They took me to the Naval Brig and I started to get worked over 
by the Marine guards. You’d be stripped of all your clothing, they take 
your unmentionables and put them through the bars and hit them or 
stretch them or choke you until you’re white or out of air. They usually 
tried to do things that would not leave bruises or blood. They called you 
the lowest thing on earth, but not just terms that they might use in boot 
camp to break you down, this was of a personal nature to them, ‘cause 
usually these Marine guards had done at least one tour ol duty and 
they’d seen a lot of their buddies die. And you were the worst thing on 
earth.
Two of these guards told me this was my last weekend, that they 
were going to kill me. I checked around with other prisoners and quite
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a few of them told me that they hung a few Marines and made it look like 
suicide. I couldn’t believe at first that anyone would do that to another 
American, or another Marine, but they assured me it was so, and at that 
point, I wasn’t going to take any chances. I started to believe that they’d 
sooner see me dead at their hands than free at mine.
I was faced with another tough choice. One was going back to 
North Carolina and then to Vietnam, or take my own life. I decided that 
was the right thing to do. They took us to the PX to get a shave kit and 
all that other kind of stuff. They were supposed to take out the blades 
from the shave kits, but the guards were busy and I took the moment to 
put a package of blades in my pockets. There was one Marine guard that 
wasn’t crazy like these other two and I told him if he could to get in touch 
with the chaplain or the rabbi, that I wanted last rites. He came back and 
said they were both unavailable and for a while I felt that this was it, I 
was going to do it, ‘cause the next day the other guards were coming back 
on duty. Unexpectedly a visiting psychiatrist heard what I was up to. He 
came in and saw my condition and knew I was going to do it. He sent 
me to St. Albans Hospital in Queens, for observation in the psychiatric 
ward.
I received a general discharge with honorable conditions at the 
Brooklyn Navy Yard. I thought it was strange, not only to be back there 
again, but the sergeant asked me—and he was serious—if I would like 
to enlist again. I don’t remember the vulgarity I used, but I’m sure I let 
him know that I wasn’t interested.
G r e q  P a y t o n , n  A uqust 1 9 8 8
I was in a supply unit in Vietnam located in Long Binh. We went 
out on the field depot and I worked a location deck. What they told us 
was, is if we come in and do the right thing in the beginning, that we’re 
doing the menial jobs now and as other groups come in they will get the 
jobs and we will get a better situation. So I accepted that for words. So 
in the beginning we had a lot of dirty jobs: burning feces, cleaning out 
urine pits and all kind of different things. But what I began to notice is 
that a lot of white recruits were coming in and they weren’t getting the 
same assignments I was getting. It seemed like we was always pulling 
up the short end of the stick.
One time the first sergeant was talking about these gooks or 
something, and I replied, “Yea, the gook is the same thing as a nigger.” 
It was like a light went off, it was a real revelation. I was naive about a 
lot of things. I had to develop a racist attitude. I never was raised with 
that. The first sergeant told me I was a smart nigger, that’s just what he 
said.
One incident that really opened my eyes was with a white GI 
named Muncey, from Kentucky. He was really a typical super artificial 
macho guy. A  group of Vietnamese kids came up to our truck as we were
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coming back from guard duty. We had food and stuff and we’d feed the 
people out in the field. We had leftover food, bushels of apples and 
oranges and stuff. These kids came up to the truck begging and you 
could see it in their faces, these kids had that I’m hungry, feed me, kind 
of look. So Muncey says look at these gook kids and he took a bite out 
of an apple and threw it in the dirt and about four or five kids dove on 
it. It was just like when you drop a piece of bread in the fish tank. It just 
really set me off. I damn near threw him out of the truck and it was still 
moving. I was brought up on charges for that.
I had three courts-martial and I went to the stockade and it was 
all these black people, all these brothers. That blew my mind. After I’d 
been in the stockade about two months, I made it to minimum-security 
and I had a work detail. I used to bring in kerosene to burn the feces with. 
Some guys got together and said they were going to have a riot in the 
stockade. They asked me to bring in an extra can of kerosene every other 
day so they couldn’t see build-up. So I did. It started in minimum- 
security but they went to maximum-security and broke the locks and let 
everybody out. They picked 12:00 because that’s when the guards 
change and most of them were eating in the mess hall. They broke the 
gate, broke the lock, let everybody out of maximum-security, and started 
burning the hooches and what not. There was a lot of chaos. A lot of 
people got hurt and I imagine some people got killed. I remember seeing 
white guys, in particular, and guards getting beat up with bunk 
adapters. If you were white you were in trouble, whether you was a good 
guy or a bad guy.
I’ve never been as violent as I was in Vietnam. There was a lot of 
rage; it just began to build and build. I did so many things that were 
unnecessary and hurt some people and it really wasn’t their fault. But 
I had to take it out somewhere, I had to vent this anger in some way. 
Today I work on not becoming violent, I’m scared of violence.
Bill ShO R T , 50 A uqust 1987
I served with the Blue Spaders 1 BN 26 INF First Infantly 
Division, otherwise known as the “Bloody Red One” from February, 
1969, to July, 1969. I was an infantry platoon sergeant with Mike 
platoon in Alpha Company. My “tour of duty” was cut short by my own 
volition.
My unit patrolled the Michelin rubber plantation, operating in 
company strength by day and splitting up into platoon size ambushes 
for the night. We usually spent three to five days doing this before we 
rested in a fire support base for a couple of days. Whenever we made 
contact or blew an ambush the body count came next. I would never view 
the bodies, I was afraid to. I didn’t want to know what I was doing. So 
when the guys would say, “Hey Sarge, we got to check out the dead 
gooks," I always made up some excuse. I knew it was my responsibility
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as platoon sergeant to be on top of all situations, but somehow the body 
count was something I had no desire to be part of. After a firefight I felt 
drained and empty, it seemed pointless, our battles were never decisive 
and tomorrow always came with the welcome of surviving one day only 
to have to face another. The last thing I wanted to do was count bloody 
body parts so we could compete with the Second of the Twenty-Eight, the 
Black Lions, our sister battalion, for first place in the division. I carried 
my weapon and fired many rounds through it, but I always felt protected 
against taking another life because twenty or eighty other guys fired too. 
For years after the war, when people would ask the inevitable question, 
did you kill anyone, I always answered I don’t know: but in reality I did.
On one company size operation we broke for a rest at midday. My 
RTO [radio telephone operator], because he had a feeling, put his 
claymore mine out, something we only did for ambush. Halfway through 
our lunch all hell broke loose. Barney blew his claymore, and after a 
three hour firefight things were calm again. The attack came from three 
Viet Cong, two of which we got. When the body count came I went for 
the first time to see the remains. Both VC had been killed by the blast 
from one of our grenades, and as I approached the first thing I noticed 
was a piece of bone protruding from the hand of one of the bodies. It 
seemed to glow white hot, I thought it was the brightest thing I had ever 
seen. The next thing 1 noticed was how heavy the body seemed to my 
eyes. It looked as if it were glued to the ground. One of the new NCOs 
[non-commissioned officers], a staff sergeant and second timer, decided 
we should booby trap the bodies and he asked for my help. We rolled 
them over and pulled the secondary pins on two grenades, leaving the 
primary detonation lever in place. Each grenade was placed, lever side 
up and under the rib cage beneath the dead men. Later that night, while 
positioned in a company size ambush, I heard the grenades go off. I knew 
the comrades of the men we had killed had come to claim the bodies and 
quite possibly had gotten something extra to go with their grief. I knew 
I was responsible for taking human life. Two months later I refused to 
go out on any more combat missions.
H o W A R d  L e v y , 15 January 1989
I was part of a plan whereby doctors could defer being called into 
the Am iy to allow them to finish whatever specialty training they were 
doing. I really didn’t want to go into the military, it just seemed that since 
they were drafting young doctors, I was going to go whether I liked it or 
not, so I might as well go on my terms. At the time I made the 
commitment, the war in Vietnam was just a little blip. As the war began 
to escalate, and my time to go, which was ‘65, began to draw near, my 
opinion about the war changed drastically. By now there was no 
cjuestion where I was coming from with regard to Vietnam. The only 
question was, what the hell do I do about it? I went into the Army figuring
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number one, I’ll buy time. Number two, I worked it out so I would be sent 
down South, where I figured I could at least do some civil rights stuff that 
I’d been wanting to do anyhow. And number three, I figured I’ll draw the 
line somewhere. I knew where that was going to be—when they ordered 
me to go to Vietnam.
I was stationed at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, where I ran a 
clinic, and every night and on weekends, I would go to the town of 
Prosperity to work with an organization that was registering blacks to 
vote. At some point the Army assigned some Green Beret guys to me and 
I was supposed to train them in some aspect of dermatology. I did that 
for a number of months, which really allowed me to get to know them. 
The more I got to know them, the more upsetting some of their stories 
became. I reached a point when I just said, “Look, I’ve figured this out 
and I can’t train you guys anymore.” I said, “I don’t really want you in 
the clinic, so let’s not make a big fuss about it, but I want you to leave.” 
And they did. Each month a new guy would come and I’d give him the 
same schpiel. That went on for a number of months.
By the time charges were brought against me, I only had another 
two or three months in the Army. It turns out from the trial testimony, 
military intelligence knew of my activities within days, maybe hours of 
me arriving in Prosperity. But actually they had been tracing me from 
my days when I was involved in some Socialist Worker Party stuff, before 
I went in the Army. My CO [Commanding Officer] was only going to give 
me a slap on the wrist until they threw the intelligence report on his desk, 
which detailed the fact that I was a fucking Communist. That’s basically 
what it said. He then decided it was going to be court martial.
We tried to put the war on trial, but the military court said the 
truth is no defense. Another defense we used was medical ethics, saying 
the real objection to training the Green Berets is they were using 
medicine as just another propaganda tool. If you had a bunch of kids 
in a poor village in Vietnam, and you gave them a shot of penicillin and 
cured them of their impetigo and suddenly they looked much healthier 
and didn’t have ugly skin things all over their goddamn body, you would 
probably make some friends in town. That strikes me as illegitimate 
because it can be taken away as easily as it can be given. That’s not a 
basis for doing medicine.
I was sentenced to three years in prison. The only shock was it 
wasn’t nine.
S t e v e  F o u r n ie r , 17 A uqust 1987
I volunteered to go to Vietnam. I wanted to be there, I thought it 
was the right thing, that we should go and protect democracy. I believed 
in the Domino Theory and that Cardinal Spellman was right when he 
said, “Kill a Commie for Christ.” My mother and father were both in the 
Navy during World War II and there was a lot of pride in military service 
in my family. I was proud of being a marine and fighting for my country.
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My first night at Dong Ha I can remember being really excited 
looking out over the DMZ and seeing artillery fire start to walk in toward 
our positions, and saying, “This is wonderful, I’m really here, this is real 
war.” The guy next to me, who had three more days left in-country, was 
lying on the bottom of the trench begging, “God not now, just three more 
days, God not now!” I looked at him and thought, “That’s a marine?” The 
next thing I knew a round blew up one of the outposts and some guys 
were wounded. I saw, for the first time, the effects of war.
After three months I was hit by friendly artillery fire, medevacked 
to Guam for recovery and shipped back to Vietnam two months later. I 
went on a mine sweep through Con Thien that was a real living hell; it 
had been defoliated, napalmed, burned and constantly shelled by both 
sides. The death and destruction were nothing I ever could have 
imagined. That was the beginning of my new look at the war. I witnessed 
Vietnamese torturing other Vietnamese, marines cutting ears and 
penises of enemy bodies and displaying them proudly. I even saw an 
eight-year-old boy shot in the leg for saying, “Fuck you marine,” and an 
eighty-year-old woman beaten by a marine with his rifle butt.
One night during a firefight I dragged in the body of a North 
Vietnamese lieutenant. I thought I heard him moaning, but when I 
reached him I found he was dead. I searched his body; he had a scapular 
medal around his neck and a holy card pinned inside his shirt. The holy 
card looked very much like the one I had from Catholic school when I was 
growing up. There was a picture of himself and a young woman with a 
priest in front of a Cathedral, evidently in Hanoi where he was married. 
He was obviously a Catholic like myself, and I thought, my God, Catholics 
are involved.
Alter being wounded a second time, I was sent to recuperate at 
Chelsea Naval Hospital where I was bom. With only two weeks to go 
before being retired from the Marines, I went to a demonstration at 
Boston Common. For about an hour I listened, and then I finally got up 
the nerve, walked to the microphone area and with my Marine haircut 
said, “Look, I’m just back from Vietnam and I’d like to say something.” 
There was a bit of hesitation, then I was introduced as a marine just 
returned from the war. The place got very, very quiet. I said, “I just 
wanted to tell you that myself and some other marines have been calling 
you people back here in the World a lot of lousy names and claiming that 
we’d like to do some terrible things to you and well.... I want to apologize. 
I think you’re doing something wonderful for America and I’m proud to 
be here with you today.” I got a wonderful ovation. I felt like, God, I’m 
home, I’m finally home.
S tea I inq  HubcAps: K eynote  SpEEch
DEliVEREd AT tL|E COHERENCE ON YoUTh, 
MiliTARiSM ANd ALTERNATIVES,
ChicAqo, > June 1988 
W .D. EHrLia r t
Only a few weeks ago, a student where I teach approached me to 
ask if I would talk to him about the Marine Corps. Seventeen years old, 
he is just finishing his junior year of high school. He’s already made up 
his mind that he doesn’t want to be an enlisted man; he’s going to college 
first, and then he’ll become an officer. His dilemma is whether to join the 
Reserve Officers Training Corps during college, or wait and go through 
Officer Candidate School after graduation. He wanted to know what I 
thought.
I asked him why he wants to go into the military at all. He had 
several answers; to make his resume seem more attractive when he 
finally goes looking for a job in the fields of law enforcement or 
communications; to challenge himself and to gain experience and 
discipline; to learn hand-to-hand self-defense and to become an expert 
in the use of firearms. I asked him why he wants to join the Marines. 
“Because they’re the best,” he replied, ‘That’s what I want; the best.”
I tried to give him a brief history lesson on the uses of U.S. armed 
forces in the post-World War Two era, touching upon such things as the 
stalemate of Korea, the quagmire of Vietnam, the invasion of the 
Dominican Republic, the invasion of Grenada, the fiasco in Lebanon, 
and the attack on the U.S.S. Stark. “Can you give me a good reason why 
those 265 Marines died in Beirut?” I asked, “Can you give me a good 
reason for the deaths of those 37 sailors in the Persian Gulf?”
He couldn’t. I doubt that he’d ever though about such questions 
before. I doubt that he’ll ever think about them again. Instead he replied 
that if he joined ROTC, his college education would be paid for; he could 
invest the money he would have spent on college and be able to buy his 
own home a decade sooner than most of his peers.
“What if you don’t live that long?” I asked. But the question was 
meaningless. I’ve seldom met a teenager who could imagine himself or 
herself dead, who could conceive of a world without him or her in it. And 
it is next to impossible to expect a teenager to understand the connect ions
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between obscure and distant foreign policy decisions and his or her 
immediate wants and needs. And taking aim on another human being 
in combat, let alone killing unarmed middle-aged women or burning 
some peasant’s entire worldly goods, are unfathomable abstractions to 
those lor whom death and misery are confined to newspaper headlines 
and television adventure shows.
Even as we spoke, our conversation reminded me of a similar 
conversation I had had with an ex-Marine English teacher of mine fully 
22 years ago. I didn’t pay any attention to that man, and it was clear early 
on that this boy wasn’t going to pay any attention to me. It was all very 
frustrating and depressing, but I can’t say that I was surprised. 
Frustration and depression have become chronic conditions of my life.
I could tell you all sorts of horror stories. There was the entire 
class of first- and second-year college students I had in 1977, none of 
whom had ever heard of Dean Rusk, much less who he was or what he 
had been a part of. There was the girl I taught in 1979 who, when 
confronted with five Vietnam poems in a high school English class, 
blurted out, “Do we have to read these, Bill? It’s so depressing.” There 
was t he boy who, in the midst of my 1982 history course on the Vietnam 
war, asked me when I was going to tell them “the other side,” oblivious 
to the fact that “the other side” is all he’s been hearing since the day he 
was born. But I’m sure all of you have enough horror stories of your own.
I don’t know howyou deal with your horror stories, but I deal with 
mine rather poorly. I can’t tell you the number of times in the past twenty 
years that I’ve wanted to drink myself to death or get a good-paying job 
in a public relations firm or just crawl under a rock and let the world pass 
me by. I’m so tired of paddling against the torrent that most days I wake 
up not knowing how I can possibly pick up the paddle even one more 
time.
If I could feel like I were getting somewhere, it wouldn’t be so bad. 
But I look around the world we live in today, and I can’t make myself 
believe that it’s any better than the world around me when I was a 17- 
year-old kid passionately intent upon enlisting in the Marines and 
utterly oblivious to the irreversible consequences of my decision.
It took a brutal war and a brutal homecoming and a brutal self- 
examination coupled with a brutal study of history to force me to see the 
world as I do now. I don’t know why I kept at it. I don’t know why I didn’t 
end up dead of drugs or suicide, or locked away somewhere deep in the 
wilderness of the Pacific Northwest, or wrapped in the American Hag, 
parading down Wall Street, crying in my beer and imagining my days in 
Vietnam as the noblest and most fulfilling experience of my life. A  lot of 
Vietnam veterans did. I don’t know why, but I didn’t.
Instead, I came to the messianic and naive conviction that the 
Vietnam war might end up being worth something good after all, that out 
of the debacle could grow the seeds of a new understanding, not just for 
me, but for my country. I believed it because I wanted to believe it, 
because I didn’t know what else to believe.
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But the war dragged on and on and on. Most of the once-vast 
antiwar movement dried up and blew away like dead leaves in November 
long before the war finally ground to an end nearly a decade after I had 
fought there. Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon, but he wouldn’t 
pardon those who’d resisted what had long since become Richard 
Nixon’s war. Jimmy Carter offered resisters a deal that wasn’t much 
better, and no deal at all for military deserters and veterans with “bad 
paper discharges.” Ronald Reagan declared the Vietnam war a noble 
cause, and the vast momentum of our collective national mythology has 
worked hard and with great success to fix that assessment as the final 
verdict of history.
It’s really much worse than that. Nuclear stockpiles are 
geometrically larger than they were even 15 years ago. Our government 
has replaced the blood-price of American lives in Vietnam with the far 
less politically costly dollar-price of low-intensity conflict all over Central 
America. We are daily confronted with such absurdities as U.S.-backed 
guerrillas attacking U.S.-owned oil refineries in Angola, U.S.-sponsored 
rebels who think the Ayatollah Khomeini is the best invention since ice 
cream, and U.S. recognition of the genocidal Pol Pot regime as the 
legitimate government of Cambodia. We’ve got the same bunch of cloak- 
and-dagger men who once equipped an army of Lao mercenaries by 
selling heroin to American GIs in Saigon equipping an army of Nicaraguan 
mercenaries by selling cocaine in the streets of our own cities.
Most disturbing of all is that the American people, most of them 
at least, just sit there day after day and year after year and let it all 
happen. How in the world are we going to get teenagers to understand 
the world they live in when we can’t even get grown people to learn 
enough or care enough or think enough to do it? And what really scares 
me is that I find myself more and more forgiving of my fellow citizens. 
Fifteen years ago, I couldn’t even talk to such people without shouting. 
Ten years ago I couldn’t understand why everyone wasn’t busily reading 
WIN Magazine and The Nation and Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee.
But if the world hasn’t changed much in 20 years, I surely have. 
The past eight years, in particular, have brought a personal “revolution” 
about which I have deeply ambivalent feelings. In 1981, I got married. 
In 1985, after two decades of living in barracks and dormitories, out of 
the backs of cars and on other people’s living room sofas, or in rented 
apartments, I bought a house. In 1986, my wife and I had a child. More 
and more, my life has taken on the shapes and rhythms of so many 
Americans for whom I one harbored nothing but contempt.
I’ve got responsibilities now. My wife and child deserve something 
better than sleeping bags and canned sardines. I’ve got bills to pay, a 
rotting back stair that needs to be fixed, a hamper perpetually full of dirty 
clothes, and a widowed mother who’ll break her neck if she tries to 
change her own storm windows. I’ve got a classroom full of 15-year-olds 
who’ll eat me alive the first day I come into school unprepared. I can’t
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even find the time to keep up with my own writing, let alone to go out and 
change the world.
And I care. I’ve given most of my adult life to the struggle that 
brings us here tonight. I know what it means to be cannon fodder. But 
you tell me where I’m supposed to get the time or the energy to read the 
latest issue of NACLA Report, or attend the next meeting of Pledge of 
Resistance, or leaflet the reservists at Willow Grove Naval Air Station.
It isn’t anger that I feel so much anymore, though I am certainly 
angry, but rather a marrow-deep sadness heavy as cast iron. Henry 
Kissinger gets $15,000 every time he opens his mouth. G. Gordon Liddy 
stars on Miami Vice. Sylvester Stallone earns multi-millions refighting 
a war in Hollywood that he desperately avoided in real life. An I end up 
feeling guilty about the $200 I’ve been paid to come here and talk to 
people who already think pretty much like me. Each year I move more 
slowly, read less avidly, turn down more unpaid work, and believe less 
passionately that anything I have ever done or ever will do will make one 
damned bit of difference.
Even as I write this, my daughter has been crying inconsolably 
for nearly an hour. Do I stop writing and try to comfort her, or do I let 
my wife bear all the burden of coping with a teething 18-month-old. At 
least my wife understands what I’m doing. How do I explain to my 
daughter that I don’t have time for her because I have to inspire a group 
of people intent upon tilting at windmills? All she will know of this day 
is that her father wasn’t there when she needed him. And each time I 
choose to spend what little spare time I have in trying to make a better 
world for my daughter, I am putting that much more distance between 
myself and my child, losing that much more of the precious little time I 
have to give to her and to receive the blessing of her tears. And I want 
more than ever just to put the world aside and live my life in peace.
But of course, there’s the catch: whatever peace I might find by 
ignoring the world around me is and always will be no more than an 
illusion, a luxury of place and time and circumstance, a buy-now-pay- 
later sort of proposition that may one day come back at me with a 
vengeance too terrible to contemplate. How long before all those 
thousands of nuclear weapons are finally triggered? What happens 
when the rain forests are finally gone? What will I say to my students 
when they come back and ask me, “Why didn’t anyone tell us?” What 
will I say to my daughter when she explains to me that she can get a 
college education and learn valuable life skills if she enlists in the army?
That’s the trouble with knowledge: once you’ve learned something, 
it's hard to unlearn it. Once you’ve seen the misery of others, it’s hard 
to believe that such misery will never be yours, or your children’s or your 
grandchildren’s. Once you’ve seen the world for what it is, it’s hard to 
ignore it. And once you’ve seen the world for what it could be, it’s hard 
to accept it for what it is.
This is what is known as being stuck between a rock and a hard 
place. Nothing I do will make any difference, but to do nothing requires
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a kind of amnesia I have yet to discover a means of inducing. The 
dilemma leaves me much of the time feeling like a failure at everything 
I do. Certainly it requires only the most rudimentary powers of 
observation to notice that I haven’t had much success at changing the 
world. Meanwhile, I don’t spend enough time on my teaching, I don't 
spend enough time on my writing, I don’t spend enough time with my 
wife, and I don’t spend enough time with my daughter. Jack of all trades; 
master of none.
But what else can I do? A  rock and a hard place. So I bumble 
along like a punchdrunk boxer too broken to win and too proud to go 
down for the count. Some days are better than others. On my bad days, 
I am somewhat less sociable than a Kodiak bear with a toothache. On 
my bad days, those horror stories of mine hide in the shadows quietly 
laughing at me, and there are shadows everywhere I look.
But I do have good days, too. And on those good days, I draw 
strength and inspiration from people like Lou Ann Merkle, who conceived 
and brought into being what has got to be the most remarkable comic 
book in history, Real War Stories. People like Brian Willson, who lost his 
legs but not his heart. People like Jan Barry, who single-handedly 
created the first county-level peace commission in the United States. 
People like Rick and Laura Quiggle, who are raising five children on a 
blue-collar salary while refusing to accept the collective complacency of 
the entire city of Erie. People like Martin Sheen, who donated the entire 
proceeds from his part in the movie Ghandi to Sister Mother Teresa. 
People like my own students, who recently collected an entire truckload 
of clothing and school supplies for the children of Nicaragua. People like, 
well, all of you. Ordinary people, just as tired and harried and over­
extended as I am, who somehow find the courage and the will to do the 
extraordinary. And to keep doing it in the face of certain failure.
That young student of mine will probably end up joining the 
Marines, and I’m sorry I couldn’t figure out a way to be a bit more 
persuasive with him. Maybe next time I’ll get it right. Or the time after 
t hat. Every once in a while, I actually do get it right. There was the former 
student of mine in 1983 who was all set to join ROTC in college, but 
didn’t. “I kept thinking about things you’d said in class,” he told me, “I 
just couldn’t make myself sign the papers.” There was the phone call I 
got in 1985 from a 22-year-old unemployed bricklayer from Brooklyn 
who was just about to enlist in the Air Force when he read my book 
Vietnam-Perkasie. He’d just called to say that he’d changed his mind 
about enlisting. There was the woman from Texas who told me after 
reading my book Marking Time in 1986, “I feel as if I’ve made a friend, 
someone on this earth who has touched my soul and said what I’ve been 
feeling for a long time.” And there was the letter I received in 1987 from 
a 16-year-old high school boy in Seattle who said, “I guess you could say 
I’m really trying to understand what went on during Vietnam and why. 
I’ve been watching the Iran-Contra hearings, and it seems like one big
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mess. Anyway, Bill, you have sure changed my perspective on a lot of 
things and I’m really glad I’ve read your books.”
Things like that don’t happen as often as I would like them to 
happen, but they do happen. And I’m sharing them with you not because 
you need to hear them, but because I need to hear them. Too often, I am 
too caught up in my own weariness and frustration and self-pity to take 
the time to consider the people for whom I have made a difference.
I no longer believe that I can change the world. I no longer believe 
that even all of us together are going to change the world. But I do believe 
that we have to keep trying because if our voices fall silent, the only voices 
left will be those of people like Elliot Abrams and Oliver North. I have 
to keep trying because it is the only way I can live with myself, knowing 
what I know. It is the only way I can live with my wife, who believes in 
me more than I believe in myself. It is the only way I can live with my 
daughter, who will inherit the world I give her.
I’ll tell you my darkest fantasy: when they drop the big bomb on 
the oil refineries of South Philadelphia, I want to have time to take my 
daughter in my arms and hold her tight and whisper into her ear, “Kid, 
I’m sorry about this. I did the best I could.” That’s it. That’s all I ask for. 
Looking around at the world through rational eyes, that’s all I reasonably 
can ask for: the time to say it, and the knowledge that what I am saying 
is true, that I did the best I could.
And who knows? Maybe I’m wrong. It wouldn’t be the first time. 
Maybe it isn’t as bad as I think. Maybe we really can change the world. 
I know one thing for sure: I certainly can’t do it without you. If you’re 
willing to keep trying, so am I. What else are we going to do with 
ourselves, anyway? Steal hubcaps?
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Larry  R ottmann
Lieutenant Hatfield figured that he was a survivor—
One night a mortar round shredded his mosquito 
netting, but he escaped completely unscathed.
A couple months later, a single 50 cal. round 
went right through the top of his steel pot 
without touching a hair on his head.
Another time he stepped on a “Bouncing Betty” 
but only the guys in front and back of him 
got hit.
Lieutenant Hatfield figured that he was a survivor—
But one evening he sent a reluctant patrol into 
“Indian Country,” and they got badly ambushed.
A  few weeks later, he wrote up an “Article 15” 
on a trooper he found sleeping during guard duty. 
And once, he ordered a private from Alabama 
to stop flying the Confederate flag over his bunker.
Lieutenant Hatfield figured that he was a survivor—
But he didn’t survive the high explosive 
fragmentation grenade 
rolled under his cot late one night by his 
own men.
“He was a survivor, a Brave Soldier,” wrote the 
colonel to Lieutenant Hatfield’s parents, “and he died 
in a manner you can be extremely proud of.”
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